



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





ALSACE-LORRAINE SINCE 1870

BY
BARRY CERF
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1919

All rights reserved

DC
610
A55
C41

COPYRIGHT, 1919
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Set up and electrotyped. Published, February, 1919

**TO THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER
ERNEST CERF**

353157



PREFACE

The question of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the chief causes of the present war, is today one of the most important obstacles to peace. It is by no means the only one, however, as many German publicists, desirous of throwing upon France the burden of forcing a continuation of hostilities, would have us believe. Germany will cling to Alsace-Lorraine to the last. The present Kaiser said in 1888: "It is my opinion . . . that we would rather leave our eighteen army corps and our forty-two million inhabitants dead upon the field of battle than give up a single stone of the land conquered by my father and Prince Frederick Charles." From this pronouncement of 1888 to the famous "Never!" of Von K hlman, uttered a few months ago, German sentiment has never wavered: Alsace and Lorraine form the Reichsland, the Land of the Empire, and such they must remain. Yet, if the tide of battle turns, and if it seems to Germany unlikely that she will be allowed to hold the conquered provinces, she may be willing to renounce her claim to what she considers indisputably hers, provided she be given compensatory advantages elsewhere. Her right to hold Alsace-Lorraine or to bargain with the Allies on the basis of her present possession must be carefully weighed. It is hoped that this book may present some facts, as yet not readily accessible to Americans, which will confirm the belief, generally felt in the United States, that lasting peace

PREFACE

can be restored to Europe and the world only after the return of the lost provinces to France.

Wherever German sources have been obtainable, they have been utilized, but the Germans have always insisted that there is no Alsace-Lorraine question and have, in writing of the Reichsland, rarely devoted their attention to those phases of the country's condition which bear upon the political and social problem before us.

At first sight it may seem that the author has presented the French point of view, pure and simple, since the bibliography appended contains a great many French titles; but it will be noted that the final sources are largely German, and that the effort has been made here to condemn the conquerors "out of their own mouths." Many French books and articles have been used, chiefly for the quotations they furnish from newspaper and magazine articles unobtainable in America, in which Germans of consequence have expressed themselves with more freedom than in the formal propaganda literature sent abroad to prove by mere declaration, without demonstration, the attachment of the two provinces to their self-appointed fatherland.

The author has made every effort to verify scrupulously all the evidence he has accepted as valid. He has rejected much material which seemed unsupported by sufficient corroborative testimony. He does not pretend to have escaped error, for, where feeling runs high, it is practically impossible to avoid being misled occasionally by enthusiasts, who, unconsciously for the most part, cloud the truth. He is aware that he is more or less at the mercy of his sources; but he has endeavoured to discriminate between them, and he has in all doubtful cases chosen to follow the more conservative. In particular, works of the venerable Alsatian, Professor

PREFACE

Reuss, unimpeachably sound and written with admirable sobriety, have been of constant value as a guide in matter and manner.

It is with the greatest pleasure that the author expresses his gratitude to his friends Professor W. F. Giese and Professor Frederick A. Manchester, who have assumed the arduous task of seeing this book through the press.

July, 1918.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The absence of Captain Cerf in active service abroad not only accounts for our reading the proofs, but possibly also for the survival of oversights such as would not have escaped a reader more familiar with the subject. *Sit venia . . .!*

W. F. G.
F. A. M.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

GERMANY'S CLAIMS TO ALSACE-LORRAINE	1
-----------------------------------------------	---

The Claims: I. Former Possession; II. Natural Boundary; III. Race; IV. Language—Germany's Claim to Belgium and Switzerland—The Real Justifications: I. Military Necessity; II. Economic Necessity; III. The Pledge of Unity of the Empire.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED	24
---------------------------------------	----

The Assimilation of Foreign Populations—Alsace Happy and Prosperous under French Rule—The Revolution Consolidates the French Nation—The Protests of 1871 and 1874: Declaration in the National Assembly, Bordeaux, February 17, 1871; Protest of Bordeaux, March 1, 1871; Protest in the Reichstag, February 18, 1874: Speech of Edouard Teutsch.

CHAPTER III

PERSECUTION: 1871-1914	44
----------------------------------	----

Constitutional Rights—Repression—The Teaching of French—Conciliation: Manteuffel, 1879-1885—Blood and Iron: 1887-1901—Pin-pricks and Scorpions: 1901-1914—The Zabern Affair: 1913.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY	61
------------------------------------	----

Discouragement: 1887-1900; Request for Autonomy—Renaissance: 1900; Demand for Autonomy—Germany Did Not Dare Grant Autonomy—A Final Effort for Peace.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER V

PAGE

THE FAILURE OF GERMANIZATION 77

The Love for France — Antipathy of Alsatians and Immigrants — Gallicization of Immigrants — The Alsatian Women — Germanization a Failure — Sterner Means of Germanization — The Alsatians are French.

CHAPTER VI

DURING THE WAR 93

Autonomy Not Sufficient Now — Alsatians in the French Army before 1914 — Alsace, Enemy Country; Treatment of Alsatian Soldiers; Treatment of Civilians; Condemnations; Protests in the Reichstag; Atrocities and Deportations.

CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC QUESTION 119

The Lorraine Iron — The Briey Basin — Annexation and the Next War — German Industrial Prosperity at Stake — German Economic Propaganda in Alsace before the War — Alsatian Prosperity: The Reverse of the Medal — Taxation — Population — Strasbourg and the Rhine Traffic — Metz and the Iron District — Alsatian Industries — Textiles — If Alsace and Lorraine Had Remained French — Economic Persecution — Germanization of Property before the War — Germanization of Property since 1914 — The Consent of the Governed.

CHAPTER VIII

THE QUESTION OF A PLEBISCITE 162

Difficulties in the Way of a Plebiscite — Germany's Preparation for a Plebiscite — Division or Neutralization — The Restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France the Test of Victory.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION 180

BIBLIOGRAPHY 181

ALSACE-LORRAINE SINCE 1870

CHAPTER I

GERMANY'S CLAIMS TO ALSACE-LORRAINE

THE CLAIMS

When Germany wrested Alsace-Lorraine from France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, she defended herself on four grounds: first, that the provinces belonged to her by right of former possession; second, that the natural boundary between her and France was the Vosges; third, that the Alsatians were Germans by race; fourth, that the Alsatians were Germans by language.

A brief examination of these contentions will show to what extent they may properly be invoked by Germany in justification of her action.

I

Former Possession

It is true that Alsace-Lorraine did not always form a part of France, but the incorporation of portions of this territory in the French nation began as far back as 1552, when Metz was ceded to Henry II by the German Protestant princes.

German historians know, but they conveniently ignore the fact, that there was no Reichsland, no Elsass-Lothringen, before Prussia seized the country in 1871; there

was no province Alsace, no province Lorraine until the mosaic of principalities, bishoprics, free cities, republics, seigniories, etc., which comprised the Imperial possessions on the west bank of the Rhine, was organized under French administration. Some parts of the country were gained by what we should today call conquest, which was the universally accepted method of aggrandizement at the time; one very important region came voluntarily into the French nation¹; in no part of the country was there any serious resistance, and in no part of the country was there at any time from the moment of annexation any serious opposition to French government. There was a certain amount of friction, it is true, due almost exclusively to the natural indignation of the Protestant population of Alsace at the aggressive tactics of French Catholics bent on conversion. But whatever animosity existed resulted not at all from a feeling that Germans were kin and French aliens, not at all from resentment at being torn from the Holy Roman Empire; it resulted, rather, from France's encroachment on their rights as independent entities under the vague sovereignty of an Emperor who remained far away and was utterly indifferent to their affairs, provided the tribute was regularly paid into the Imperial coffers.

During the time that Alsace was under the sway of the Empire she was the battleground of Europe. The Empire's hold was tenuous indeed, never extending to the point of protecting the land against the successive incursions of Armagnacs, English, Burgundians, Austrians, Hungarians, Spaniards, Swedes. France promised protection, prosperity, happiness, and kept her word until the tragic spoliation of 1871.

¹ As late as 1798, the little republic of Mulhouse, a member of the Swiss confederation since 1466, asked and obtained admittance into the French Republic.

Germany never possessed Alsace-Lorraine. The land was within the confines of the Holy Roman Empire, but so were Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. The dominion of the Emperor over all this territory was merely nominal at best, illusory in fact, since he did not guarantee protection, the first duty of a suzerain. The people looked upon themselves as citizens of their local unit, free city, bishopric, seigniory, and they never considered themselves Germans, subjects of an Austrian Emperor.

It was without justification that William, King of Prussia in 1870, claimed the heritage of the Holy Roman Empire. If anything as unsubstantial as the Holy Roman Empire, "a piece of antiquarianism hardly more venerable than ridiculous," as Lord Bryce said of it, can be inherited, certainly it should have fallen to Austria, as Austrian historians have maintained, since it was, if it was the heritage of anybody, the heritage of the Hapsburgs. During the last four hundred years of its existence, the Empire had been ruled by Hapsburgs, with only two exceptions: Charles VII of Bavaria (1742-1745) and Francis I of Lorraine (1745-1765).² It had long outlived reality when it breathed its last gasp in 1806. Bismarck resuscitated

² Despite the present alliance, relations between Germany and Austria have never been such that the latter has been able to forgive entirely the humiliation of 1866. There may be some recollection of the added humiliation of 1870, when the Austrian Holy Roman Empire was unceremoniously supplanted by a Prussian Holy Roman Empire, in the following sentence of the letter addressed by the present Emperor Charles of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, early in 1917: "I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine." (Letter communicated to President Poincaré by Prince Sixtus on March 31, 1917; made public by the French Foreign Office on April 10, 1918; reprinted in *Current History*, May, 1918, p. 193.)

it in 1871, thereby proving himself to be a maker, not only of present and future history, but also of past history. The Holy Roman Empire was German when "German" meant "Austrian." Suddenly in 1866 Austria was driven out of Germany and "German" came to mean "Prussian," or something very similar. Then Bismarck, with an effrontery which seems to have hoodwinked the world, placed the crown of the long-since defunct Austrian Holy Roman Empire upon the Prussian head of William I.

Germans, with their customary confidence in the authority of a German *ipse dixit*, still really believe in the substantiality of the necromancy by which a dead Austrian Empire became a living German (or Prussian) Empire. But occasionally an independent dares to kick over the traces of sacred German-made tradition and give the lie to Treitschke and Sybel. Such for instance is Maximilian Harden, the *enfant terrible* of Pan-Germanism, who declared only the other day: "What the Chancellor said about the history of Alsace-Lorraine is not true. The Germanic Empire [*i.e.*, *Germanic-Austrian*], composed as it was of countries inhabited by Celts, Germans and Frenchmen, had nothing in common with ours."³ (Quoted by the *Literary Digest*, March 9, 1918, p. 20.)

³ Gothein, Deputy in the Reichstag, wrote in 1910 that the history of Alsace up to 1648 "is not such as to preserve brilliant memories in the minds of the population nor the sentiment of solidarity with Germany." (Quoted by Eccard in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 66, 1910, p. 318.)

German socialists, such as Bebel and Liebknecht, protested till their death against the cynical iniquity of 1870. German democrats of today have laughed to scorn their country's claim to Alsace-Lorraine. The following résumé ends an article which appeared in their organ, the *Freie Zeitung*, published in Switzerland:

"It is, therefore, established:

"1. That Alsace and Lorraine were not filched by France. They passed like so many other lands, from one dynasty to another, at

Germany has, then, on historical grounds, by right of former possession, not the slightest claim to Alsace-Lorraine. The country was never German, and the people were never German citizens.

a time when such a proceeding appeared perfectly natural, just as, for example, the Ticino was given to Switzerland. In those good old times men changed their nationality more easily than their shirts.

"2. So far as the question of races is concerned, Alsace belongs to no nation, for there are no longer pure races in the civilized world. Besides, the question of race has nothing to do with the political destinies of a country, as Switzerland proves.

"3. So far as the language is concerned, Alsace is in a peculiar situation. Just as the Alsatian is obliged to learn High German to be able to speak it, so he can learn French to be in a position, as he was formerly, to rise to the highest administrative and military ranks. Again, the question of languages plays no rôle in the political destinies of a people, and once more we cite Switzerland in this connection.

"4. Alsace lived, with France and in France, the days of the proclamation of the Rights of Man, and profited therefrom. In consequence she became part and parcel of that country. The hearts of her inhabitants have become entirely French, for the very reason that to be French means to enjoy liberty, democracy and human dignity.

"5. The annexation of Alsace by Germany, in 1871, was a flagrant violation of the Rights of Man by a dynasty which has always shown the greatest reluctance to grant such rights to its own people.

"6. Alsace desires to recover her freedom, and she will find that freedom only where she was born, not where she has always been held in bondage. She wishes to return to her mother, to beautiful, to kindly France. Gladly will she turn her back to the sovereign and to the subjects who have always acted like lords and masters in Alsace." (Quoted by Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit* . . ., p. 42.)

These Liberal Germans differ from their compatriots in that they realize times have changed. The nineteenth century is not the seventeenth, and proceedings which "appeared perfectly natural" then have in the nineteenth century "appeared perfectly natural" only in Pan-Germany. In the seventeenth century possession was understood in quite a different manner from that prevailing in civilized countries today, when the rights of the population are paramount, as is tacitly confessed by Meyer's *Konversations-Lexikon*, sixth edition, v. V, p. 733, article "Elsass-Lothringen":

II

Natural Boundary

Germany claimed in 1870 that the natural boundary between her and France was the Vosges. It is, of course, indisputable that the natural boundary between central and western Europe is the Rhine. Cæsar tells us that Gaul is bounded on the east by the Rhine, and for the first five centuries of the Christian era the Alsatians (Celts) found the Rhine the only safe barrier against the inevitable invasions of the German barbarians. During the centuries of French administration, the Rhine still served as a "natural boundary." Furthermore, the Germans at Frankfort in 1871 did not apply their doctrine of a natural barrier with great rigour: in certain localities they successfully claimed some slopes west of the crest of the Vosges.

No one can take this German plea seriously. The Vosges are the natural boundary between Alsace and France, the Rhine is the natural boundary between Alsace and Germany. The sole question to decide is whether Alsace is German or French.

III

Race

Wilser, in an article in the *Centralblatt für Anthropologie*, expresses the generally accepted view that the

"How little the Imperial House of Hapsburg was willing to preserve the frontier-land for Germany was shown by the Treaty of March 20, 1617, by which it ceded its rights in Alsace to Spain. During the thirty years' war, Duke Bernhard of Weimar tried to found a principality for himself in Alsace. He tried to do this with the help of French support and of French money. When he died prematurely, in 1639, Alsace fell into the hands of the French, and by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the Emperor ceded all his rights in Alsace to France, which thus took the place of Spain."

safest ethnic sign is the shape of the skull. Ranke, in *Der Mensch*, declares that one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric craniology and archeology is that of the Germans Ecker and Lindenschmidt, who showed that the early Teutons all had dolichocephalic skulls. On the other hand, the Celtic skull was brachycephalic. Blind has demonstrated that in Celtic times "Alsace was inhabited by a people of absolute ethnic purity, characterized by an exceedingly clear brachycephalism." His study of the ossuaries of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries shows that up to this time there is no change, and he concludes that the race is still ethnically pure. Investigations of Blind, Schwalbe and others have proved that the Alsatian skull of today is "pronouncedly brachycephalic," even more so, perhaps, than that of the earliest known Celtic inhabitants of Alsace. The colour of hair and eyes shows, too, a decided predominance of the non-German types. (Batiffol, in *Revue hebdomadaire*, February 9, 1918.)

Thus German professors have shown by one of their nation's favourite sciences that there is no foundation for Germany's ethnic claim to Alsace. The admixture of Teutonic blood, due to invasion and immigration, has not in the slightest degree modified the pure Celtic strain in France's lost province.

IV

Language

The reluctance of Americans to demand the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France is based very largely on the feeling that a common language is a natural bond of union.

Theobald Ziegler, professor at the University of Strasbourg, a Pan-German of the most pronounced type,

says in *Die Grenzboten*, March, 1915, p. 393: "What makes a nation . . . ? Not the feeling of race, nor the consciousness of belonging to the same stock, which is often lost in the uncertainty and obscurity of history; not the native soil, which may remain, even when a piece is transferred from one people to another as in the case of Alsace; not the language — one has only to think of Switzerland where three languages are spoken; not even a community of purpose, for this even a corporation possesses; — not any of these, but two centuries of history lived in common with the great nation of France have made Alsatians and Lorrainers Frenchmen."

If the Germans really believed in their criterion of language as a determining factor in nationality, they would restore North Schleswig, which they seized in 1866, to Denmark, they would restore to Poland the millions of Poles whom they hold in subjection, and they would invite Austria to cede Trent and Trieste to Italy.

Just as Germany interpreted the historic claim and the claim of a natural boundary to suit herself, so she applied the linguistic criterion: in parts of Alsace and in most of Lorraine the language of the people was French. Metz, the great city of Lorraine, had throughout all its history been entirely French, and when it was seized in 1871 it was as French as Paris. Germany took what she wanted; her only justification was the might of the sword.

In the greater part of Alsace the masses speak a German dialect; we shall see in a moment that they are not for that reason German.

A German professor of political economy said in 1900: "[In Alsace] the rural population speaks German, except in the upper valley of the Bruche and in some localities in the higher Vosges. German is the

language of the lower middle-class in the cities (the *petite bourgeoisie*). The upper middle-class in the cities and the notables in the whole country prefer French, without giving up the dialect entirely, for they are obliged to use it in their relations with their servants and workmen." (Wittich, p. 782.)

So in Alsace all men of consequence prefer French. Furthermore, many stories are told of the pathetic efforts of humble Alsatian labourers to learn French, but it is practically impossible for them to do so, since for almost fifty years now it has been strictly forbidden to teach French in the elementary schools.

Even despite this proscription, the number of people speaking French in Alsace — of course there is no question of Lorraine, where the vast majority of the people, high and low, speak French — has steadily increased. A German writer, Karl Franzos, in a volume published in 1904, says:

"According to a census taken in 1866, during the reign of Napoleon III, a third of the population of Strasbourg could speak and write French; a second third could not write it but understood it and spoke it, at least a little; the remaining third used the dialect exclusively.

"People who are thoroughly acquainted with the present population, among others public officials and professors who ought to know, have affirmed to me that, so far as the indigenous inhabitants are concerned, these figures have been radically modified.

"Among the old Alsatians [that is, people born in Alsace, as distinguished from German Immigrants], who form seven-twelfths of the population, no longer a third but a half speaks and writes French. In the half which does not know how to write it, one person out of two understands it at least, imperfectly per-

haps, but sufficiently to be able to express himself. Only a fourth of the indigenous population is completely ignorant of French.

"Some people have thought that this phenomenon is not a reason for grief. But if you reflect that French is not taught in the schools and that this development has taken place during a generation of German domination, you will find in this fact ample matter for reflection." (Quoted by Florent-Matter, p. 193.)⁴

Official German figures corroborate this evidence of Alsace's determination to remain French in the face of persecution. In 1895, 159,532 declared their maternal language to be French; in 1900 the number had leaped to 199,433, a gain of almost 40,000 in five years. And let it not be forgotten that these figures are certainly far below the truth, for a declaration of a preference for French immediately stamped a man as rebellious to German rule.⁵

"A fact insufficiently known," writes a correspondent of the *Gazette de Lausanne*, sent into Alsace in January, 1914, "is that, despite all insidious opposition, French is gaining in all the important cities, especially Strasbourg. Its domain is little by little spreading downward from the middle classes, which cultivate it still more out of a spirit of opposition than out of respect for tradition, to the people, as rapidly as ease and comfort come to them." (Quoted by Dauzat in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 88, 1916, p. 352.)

⁵ On the necessity of using caution in connection with German linguistic statistics concerning Alsace-Lorraine, see Meuriot in *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, 1914, p. 453.

Official figures for the number of inhabitants whose maternal language is French are as follows:

1895.....	159,532		
1900.....	199,433	Gain 1895-1900.....	38,901
1905.....	200,220	Gain 1900-1905.....	787
1910.....	204,262	Gain 1905-1910.....	4,042

The years 1895-1900 were years of discouragement in Alsace-Lorraine, when it seemed as if the resistance of the provinces had been broken. There seemed to be no harm at this time in telling

The *Journal de Genève* comments as follows on the phenomenon which so saddened the good German, Franzos:

"Either the French populations are more prolific than the others or the children of German origin are absorbed in the French melting-pot to the extent of forgetting the language of their fathers. The first hypothesis is scarcely admissible; we are, therefore, in presence of the phenomenon described by the famous saying: *Graecia capta ferocem victorem cepit*. The Alsatians are not becoming Germans, the Germans are becoming Alsatians." (Quoted by Florent-Matter, p. 194.)⁶

In Alsace, then, French is still the language of the leading classes; and even the German Immigrants, or rather their children, are swelling the number of those speaking French.

The lower class speak a German dialect. But they are not German, they never were Germans before they were won by conquest in 1870, they are French, they endeavour by every means to learn the French language, they have no love for Germany, and they demand now

the truth, or something like the truth. But the comments in Germany and abroad on the increase of 38,901 in five years showed the authorities they had made a mistake, and the gain fell, accordingly, to 787 for the years 1900-1905. It happens that an intense revival of pro-French feeling, which increased to the day war was declared, began about 1900, as we shall see later. There cannot be the slightest doubt, despite the official figures, that if the increase was 40,000 from 1895 to 1900, it was much more than 787 for the period 1900-1905.

It seems certain that the census-takers put down in the German column all those who could speak German at all, even though they knew French much better.

⁶ "It was our experience in Mülhausen to walk into the Bourse and find three hundred men — well-to-do Germans to all appearance and with German names — transacting their vociferous business all in French. The use of French in common life is advancing downward in spite of and largely because of official pressure in the other direction." (Jordan, p. 65.)

that they be allowed to return to the French fatherland.

"The propagators of the French genius in Alsace are first of all the notables . . . but also the lesser bourgeois of the cities, at least those who have had some education. (By far the most important social category in Alsace is formed by the lesser bourgeois of the cities, to whom correspond in the country the middle-class and lesser farmers.) The peasants and the workers in the factories remained, it is true, German in language and customs, but saw in French civilization *the* civilization of the world, and remained completely separated from the development of the German national genius."

(Wittich, pp. 785-789.)

Thus a professor of political economy at the German University of Strasbourg, who knows Alsace thoroughly and has made one of the most profound studies yet published on the conflict of nationalities within that province, declares explicitly that not only the higher classes who have always been admittedly French, but *all* classes, high and low, whether they speak German or French, are at heart French, feel themselves at home in an atmosphere of French civilization, under French institutions, and look upon German Kultur as something alien.

Wittich continues: "Today the Alsatians must retrace their steps on the road with great difficulty traversed, must 'de-Gallicize' themselves and develop to the maturity of the modern German intellectual culture a feeble and antique Germanism which has remained in them in embryonic form. It is extremely difficult to accomplish this, and a considerable extent of time is necessary, as well as an inclination to do it, which up to the present has been lacking." (Wittich, p. 806.)

The fact is that speaking German has not made the Alsatians German. Hostility to Germany since 1870

has been most violent, not in French-speaking Lorraine, but in German-speaking Alsace.⁷

The great Alsatian artists, Hansi and Zislin, both of whom were constantly persecuted by the German authorities for their pro-French tendencies, both of whom are serving under the French flag today, wrote in the Alsatian German dialect, and their supporters were the common people of Alsace, the German-speaking population. Zislin was before the war the editor of *Dur's Elsass*, published in the Alsatian dialect and consequently expressing the political and social views of

⁷ "The most persistent opposition to the Prussian régime now appears in the districts most thoroughly Germanic by blood. It centres especially in Ober-Elsass and in its chief cities of Colmar and Mülhausen." (Jordan, p. 39.)

A German editor said: "German-speaking Lorraine is at heart the most French and anti-German part of the province. . . . Upper Alsace [the part that is most exclusively German-speaking] is the most troublesome part." (Quoted by Jordan, p. 41.)

The chief reason why Lorraine is less hostile to Germany than Alsace is to be ascribed to the relatively heavier immigration of Germans into Metz and the industrial centres in the neighbourhood, and to the wholesale emigration of influential citizens.

The composition of the population of the three departments in 1914 was as follows:

	Natives	Germans	Other foreigners
Lorraine	72%	19.8%	8%
Lower Alsace	88.5%	10.1%	1.3%
Upper Alsace	90.3%	6%	3.6%

The non-native population is, of course, concentrated in the cities. Percentage of natives in the four large cities is as follows: Colmar, 85%; Mulhouse, 80%; Strasbourg, 70%; Metz, 53%. (Meuriot, in *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, 1914, p. 450.)

Lorraine, "decapitated" by the departure of its most capable citizens,—the exodus continued up to the eve of the war,—did not recover till 1908, when the vigour of Alsace's resistance inspired a similar movement in those very localities, Metz and Thionville, in which immigrants had been most effectively planted, and which the government had looked upon as definitively Germanized. (See Braun, in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 30, 1910, pp. 667 ff.)

those who could not read the French newspapers and magazines. *Dur's Elsass* was just as pro-French and anti-German as the law permitted. It was under constant surveillance and was frequently prosecuted by the authorities. In February, 1908, it demanded autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine and took its stand with these words: "We say without hesitation, and we repeat it to whoever cares to hear, every time we have an opportunity, that we are entirely destitute of those German sentiments which the Prussians would like to impose upon us." (Florent-Matter, p. 157.)

The Alsatian populace speaks the language of Zislin's *Dur's Elsass* and of Hansi's *Professor Knatschke*, and it proved by its support of these productions that it cherishes the attitude toward France and Germany therein expressed.⁸

The popular theatre, too, gives an accurate indication of the temper of the masses. The reception given to the plays produced in Alsatian-German at the "Alsatian Theatre" of Strasbourg and at the similar houses in Colmar and Mulhouse shows that Alsations speak a German dialect indeed, but that they have no love for their conquerors.⁹

⁸ "One of Zislin's cartoons in *Dur's Elsass* drawn at the beginning of the Balkan War represents Austria as the ogre ('Kindlifresser') watching with amacking lips the play of three children—Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania. Dame Germany advises her not to bite: 'I ate two such once and I found them very bad for the digestion.'" (Jordan, p. 112.) See Hinzelin, pp. 110 ff. Striking cartoons from *Dur's Elsass* are reproduced in the various fascicles of *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*. See, for instance, the cartoon by Zislin in volume 33, 1912, p. 444: a fat-faced little girl with Germania's crown on her head has been meddling with a bee-hive labelled "France"; she is in flight before a swarm of aeroplanes issuing from the hive, and has dropped her parasol, on which is printed the word "Agadir." The legend is: "And that's how a bad little girl was punished!"

⁹ In one of the plays of Stosskopf, a favourite writer, which had a tremendous success in Alsace, *D'r Herr Maire*, the Mayor who

Colmar is in the heart of German-speaking Alsace; furthermore, it numbers in its population a very large portion of Immigrants. According to the census of 1910 there were in Colmar 34,480 Alsatians and 8,219 Germans. But Colmar, despite all this, has been the centre of pro-French feeling in Alsace.

is hoping to earn a decoration by his obsequious regard for authorities soliloquizes as follows:

"I have been mayor for twenty-five years. . . . I always attend the lectures on agriculture, I have always warmly recommended artificial fertilizer, I always politely salute the police, I never miss the official banquet on the birthday of the Emperor, I have bought two shares in the Erstein sugar refinery, I have always worked for the government's candidate. (*Aside*) It is true I have never voted for him, but nobody can know that. . . . (*Suddenly troubled*) Has somebody in the opposition on the Municipal Council defamed me to the Prefect? Can it have been learned that a second cousin of mine is a French officer . . . or that I caught my rheumatism in the casemates of Strasbourg in 1870 . . . ?"

In 1907, at the popular theatre in Strasbourg, Stosakopf presented with great success his *Hoflieferant*, "Purveyor to the Court." The plot is as follows:

A rich immigrant manufacturer of preserves, Fritz Grinsinger, is tormented by two ambitions: to be made purveyor to the King of Saxony, and to receive from the French government the "academic palms." To obtain this last distinction he tries to pass as an Alsatian. But he is so clumsy, so chauvinistic in his protestations of loyalty to Alsace, so noisy and generally unendurable that he rouses the suspicions of a scientist, who measures his skull. His is a skull from over the Rhine! Herr Grinsinger will never get the "academic palms"!

In February, 1908, the censor suppressed a passage of a vaudeville, *The Refractory Cousin*, written for the popular stage in the Alsatian dialect, by an Immigrant, Gunther. The passage ran as follows:

"There's no greater misfortune than when a German dies in Alsace."

"But yet that means one less!"

"Sure! but all the relatives of the deceased hasten to the funeral, and when they are in Alsace, they never want to leave!"

Translations of the work of Erckmann and Chatrian, who were the commonly accepted interpreters of Alsatian life, and, born in the lost provinces, passionately French, have been made for the dialect theatres. (Florent-Matter, pp. 208-209.)

In 1914 and during the nine years preceding, Daniel Blumenthal was Mayor of Colmar. When war was declared, the elected mayor of Colmar, knowing that his name was at the head of the famous black-list of suspicious persons who were to be arrested in the event of mobilization, fled, and after escaping many dangers succeeded in reaching Switzerland, whence he passed over to France. While in Switzerland he learned from German newspapers that he had been shot; a fortnight later, just as he was leaving for Paris, he read in a German journal at Berne that he was interned in the fortress of Rastadt in Baden. (See Blumenthal in *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1918.) This is the man who was chosen mayor of one of the three great cities of Alsace by electors practically all of whom called German or the Alsatian German dialect their mother tongue!

Does speaking German prevent a people from being French? That the linguistic argument is, in fact, negligible is proved by the existence of German-speaking Alsace happy for centuries under French rule and rebellious for fifty years under German rule.

During their administration of two hundred years the French made no effort to replace German by French as the language of the Alsatian lower classes. They never felt the need of doing so; they realized that Alsace was as French as Gascony and that the foreign dialect spoken by the untutored was not in any way an impediment to complete absorption of the province into the French state. With the advantage of language on her side, and with the most tyrannical proscription of French, Germany has not in fifty years made any appreciable advance toward gaining the goodwill of the Alsatian peasants: it is not language, but culture, that makes a people a part of a nation, as Ziegler confessed;

and Wittich expressly states that the culture of Alsace from top to bottom of the social scale is French, not German.

GERMANY'S CLAIM TO BELGIUM AND SWITZERLAND

The Germans claimed Alsace-Lorraine on the ground that it had formerly belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and that the population was German in race and language. Not even the maddest of them pretended that the Alsatians desired annexation. "In scorning the will of the Alsatians," said Treitschke in 1871, "we are following the dictates of Prussian honour."

Switzerland was more closely than Alsace under the domination of the Holy Roman Empire and was formally detached at the same time with Alsace by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648). A large part of Switzerland is German in race and language. Why did Germany not seize Zürich and Basel and Berne along with Alsace and Lorraine? "We deign to suffer that Switzerland remain independent," said Treitschke in 1871.

Germany deigned to suffer that Belgium remain independent also, though her claim to Flemish Belgium was quite as good as her claim to Alsace and much better than her claim to Lorraine. But apparently her condescension has limits; under our very eyes she is trying to drive a wedge between Flemish and French Belgium with the intention of annexing the former when the moment is ripe, on the ground of former possession and racial and linguistic homogeneity.

We have a full comprehension of how history was made in 1870-1871, for we see the phenomenon of that year reproduced today by the same prestidigitator. The Germans told the Alsatians of 1870 that they were coming to rescue their long-lost brothers from slavery

to a foreign and decadent race. They are repeating their refrain today, snatching their long-lost Flemish brothers from the yoke of Walloon domination. It must be admitted that the Flemings of today are more nearly German in spirit than were the Alsatians of 1870.

We understand what happened in 1871, for the comedy is being repeated with Belgium playing France's rôle and her Flemish districts that of Alsace-Lorraine. And we realize that we cannot with consistency deny at the coming council of peace Germany's claim to the Flemish lands which she has conquered, as she conquered Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, if we do not at the same time support President Wilson's declaration that "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all."

THE REAL JUSTIFICATIONS

I

Military Necessity

The greatest king of Prussia said: "I begin by taking; later I shall find pedants to show that I was quite within my rights." Bismarck may well have had this dictum of Frederick the Great in mind in 1870. He began by taking, and the pedants have since been trying to show by arguments drawn from former possession, natural boundary, race and language that he was quite within his rights.

The real justifications for the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine were those invoked by the army which invaded

Belgium in August, 1914, and by the Pan-Germanists of today: military and economic necessity. No one of the responsible leaders in Germany took the trouble to justify their action by recourse to such immaterial matters as former possession, race or language. They left these moral considerations to the pedants, and bluntly stated the facts.

Bismarck said in the Reichstag on May 16, 1873: "We Prussians and North Germans are not famous for knowing how to win friends and for treating disagreeable questions courteously" (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 397); on March 3, 1874: "We have not annexed Alsace-Lorraine to make the inhabitants happy, we have erected a rampart against the incursions which a passionate and warlike people have been making into our country for two hundred years" (P. Matter, *Bismarck*, III, p. 343); on November 30, 1874, he declared that Alsace had not been annexed for her fine eyes, that he was equally indifferent to her lamentations and to her wrath, and that she had been taken solely to serve as a zone of defence for the Empire (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 400). Moltke said Metz was worth two army corps: it was an open door to France. So Germany took Metz, which had been French for over three hundred years and which was as French as Paris. (P. Matter, *l. c.*, p. 230.)¹⁰ Bismarck intended Alsace-Lorraine to serve, not as a

¹⁰ "There was nothing German in Metz," said Heinrich Abeken. (Quoted by P. Matter, *l. c.*, p. 230.) Bismarck knew perfectly that there was no feeling of friendship for Germany in Lorraine — nor in Alsace. Moritz Bush, under his master's inspiration, wrote an article on September 9, 1870, on "the unbelievable attachment of the Alsatians to France." (*Ib.*, p. 231.) The word *Metz* sounds German to American ears. As a matter of fact, it is pronounced *Mess*, and is thoroughly Romanic in origin and development. Many place-names in Alsace and Lorraine, which had a French ring before 1870, have been, since that date, officially transformed into something more German: thus *Saverne* became *Zabern* and *Thionville* became *Diedenhofen*.

bulwark for defence, but as a base for aggression against France. It is notorious that he was determined that France should be crushed. In 1875, when he discovered that the terrible losses of the war and the monstrous indemnity imposed had not reduced France to the condition of a second-rate power, he prepared to attack again and was restrained only by the warning of England and Russia.¹¹

¹¹ Practically the whole world was duped by German propagandists in 1870: Napoleon III was ambitious and foolish, Eugénie was worse, the new-born German nation roused enthusiasm by its energy and courage, and the diabolical falsification of the Ems despatch was as yet a secret between Bismarck, Moltke and Roon. But, even before 1875, eyes began to open, and the new-fledged eaglet was seen to be a mere vulgar bird of prey.

Already in February, 1871, when it was evident that Germany had decided on the dismemberment of France, Lord Granville sent a protest to Bismarck. His emissary was greeted with an outburst of fury on the part of the Chancellor: "What are you doing here?" Bismarck cried. "Mind your own business. This is a question for us to settle between us, France and ourselves, and you neutrals have nothing to do with it." (P. Matter, *l. c.*, p. 251.)

Gladstone's opinion is expressed in this extract of a letter to Bright, dated October 1, 1870:

"My opinion certainly is that the transfer of territory and inhabitants by mere force calls for the reprobation of Europe, and that Europe is entitled to utter it, and can utter it with good effect."

The following memorandum shows the attitude he took in the cabinet:

"A matter of this kind cannot be regarded as in principle a question between the two belligerents only, but involves considerations of legitimate interest to all the Powers of Europe. It appears to bear on the Belgian question in particular. It is also a principle likely to be of great consequence in the eventual settlement of the Eastern question. Quite apart from the subject of mediation, it cannot be right that the neutral Powers should remain silent, while this principle of consulting the wishes of the population is trampled down, should the actual sentiment of Alsace and Lorraine be such as to render that language applicable. The mode of expressing any view of this matter is doubtless a question requiring much consideration. The decision of the cabinet was that the time for it had not yet come. Any declaration in the sense described would, Mr. Gladstone thought, entail, in

As late as 1889, when Crispi, the Italian premier, who wished to avoid complications into which Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance might be drawn, spoke of the neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck said: "The French government might agree to it. But not even this would suffice to ward off war. We should no longer be able to threaten France by land, while France would be free to attack us by sea." (*Memoirs of F. Crispi*, translated by Mary Prichard-Agnetti, v. III, p. 254.)

The Rhine is the natural zone of *defence* of the German Empire; the Vosges are the natural zone of *offence*, as the present war has clearly demonstrated. The tragedy of 1914 has shown, if it has shown anything, that the Rhine boundary must be re-established for the defence of France and the rest of the world against the periodic incursions of Teutons, which did not begin with Ariovistus and will not end with Hindenburg.

II

Economic Necessity

The advantage of having henceforth a knife at the throat of France appealed to Bismarck and Moltke; the fairness, an obligation to repudiate the present claim of France to obtain peace without surrendering 'either an inch of her territory or a stone of her fortresses.'

He said further:

"If the contingency happen, not very probable, of a sudden accommodation which shall include the throttling of Alsace and part of Lorraine, without any voice previously raised against it, it will in my opinion be a standing reproach to England. There is indeed the Russian plan of not recognizing that in which we have had no part; but it is difficult to say what this comes to."

On December 20 he said to Granville: "While I more and more feel the deep culpability of France [he, of course, knew nothing of the editing of the Ems despatch], I have an apprehension that this violent laceration and transfer is to lead us from bad to worse, and to be the *beginning* of a new series of European complications." (Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, I, pp. 346-348.)

people were impressed by the riches the sword had won for them. Maximilian Harden said that "the most profitable achievement of the Germans in the nineteenth century was the war of 1870." (Quoted by Y. Guyot, *The Causes and Consequences of the War*, p. 187.) According to Sir Robert Giffen ("The Cost of the Franco-Prussian War," in *Essays in Finance*, First Series), the war cost Germany \$300,000,000. The indemnity exacted from prostrate France was \$1,000,000,000. A profitable investment, indeed!

But the most profitable acquisition was not the indemnity; it was the iron land seized in *French-speaking* Lorraine. In 1913, 36,000,000 tons of iron ore were produced within the *Zollverein*. Of this, 7,300,000 tons came from Luxembourg, 7,600,000 tons from Germany, and 21,100,000 tons from the mines of annexed Lorraine. (*Metallarbeiter-Zeitung*, quoted by *Current History*, July, 1916, p. 666.)

III

The Pledge of Unity of the Empire

When Alsace and Lorraine were conquered, the German Empire did not exist. Before the Treaty of Frankfort was signed, William I had been crowned at Versailles. The Empire was by no means secure; it was free from danger from without, but the domination of Prussia was not yet complete and German statesmen feared the disintegration of the new state through the mutual hostility of the north and the south. Alsace-Lorraine was to serve as a bond of union, to be the collective property of the various sovereign states, and thus to act as the cement which united the separate states into an Empire.

The German law of June 9, 1871, which determined

the status of the country ceded by France, declared:
"Alsace-Lorraine is the price of combats in which all
the German states have shed their blood, the pledge of
the unity of the German Empire conquered by its
united forces. . . . Alsace-Lorraine must belong to all."
(Quoted by Antony in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v.
27, 1912, p. 43.)

CHAPTER II

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

THE ASSIMILATION OF FOREIGN POPULATIONS

The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 has but one justification, a thoroughly German one, which Americans abhor: the right of might. The cardinal principle of American political thought is that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Germany has no such powers over Alsace-Lorraine: she won the two provinces by conquest and she has held them ever since by the might of her sword. Alsatians great and small, French-speaking and German-speaking, fought desperately against the Germans in 1870. They had found happiness and prosperity as a part of France; France had derived her just powers from the consent of the governed.

Germany has never been able to assimilate foreign populations: Poles, Danes and Alsatians remain Poles, Danes and Alsatians. Bohemians, Slavs and Italians do not become Austrian. France, on the other hand, has, beyond all other nations in the world, succeeded in merging alien peoples in the stream of her national existence.

An Englishman, writing in 1892, says:

"This power of attracting loyalty from neighbouring conquered States is one of which France may fairly boast, for she is almost alone in Europe in its possession. . . . Our own failure in Ireland is at this moment the governing factor in English politics; and

though Scotland is more than friendly, the fusion of the two kingdoms, such as France has always insisted on in all absorbed States, would be next to an impossible revolution. France only has secured a loyalty at once complete and obedient. . . . France can, in a very special degree, assimilate absorbed peoples. . . ." (*The Spectator*, September 10, 1892, p. 342.)¹

In no case did France prove her ability to "assimilate absorbed peoples" more conclusively than in the case of Alsace. There was no question of absorption in Lorraine, which, except in some districts, had never been anything but French. Alsace, too, it is true, was by no means an alien country when she became French in the seventeenth century. The German Professor Wittich says:

"A social structure identical with that of France, which existed before Alsace became a part of France and was at most reinforced by the annexation, constituted a predisposition essentially favourable to the rapid and decisive conquest of the people by the French national genius, from the day that Alsace became a part of the French state." (Wittich, p. 788.)

But even granting this predisposition for French things in Alsace, the speed of the absorption was marvellous, especially in view of the inevitable clash in religious opinions, and all that this entailed in pious days, between Catholic France and Alsace with her large Protestant population.

ALSACE HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS UNDER FRENCH RULE

Alsations had no reason to regret their transference from Austrian to French sovereignty. Protected

¹ Michelet appropriately said: "None are more French than peoples who do not speak French, like our Basques, our Bretons, our Alsations."

against aggression as they had never been protected before, with long peace assured, they turned in all tranquillity to the arts of peace, and the land prospered.

In marked and significant contrast to the German policy since 1871, no effort was made to Gallicize the new provinces; not a single regulation aimed to substitute French for German as the language of the people; the laws, manners, customs, traditions of the country were respected. The watchword was: "Don't touch the things of Alsace!"

A German, von Icktersheim, in a work published in 1710, pays a great tribute to the French administration: "The Sovereign Council of Alsace," he says, "rules with strict justice. What is particularly praiseworthy is that law suits are not lengthy. . . . Expenses are not great, and, above all, no attention is paid to the standing of the litigants, and quite as often the subject wins his suit against his sovereign, the poor against the rich, the servant against his master, the layman against the cleric, the Jew against the Christian, as *vice versa*. Yes, the king himself accepts the jurisdiction of this Sovereign Council. . . ." (Reuss, v. I, p. 336.)

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was, at least nominally, not effective in Alsace, and thus Protestants were persecuted in France and guaranteed protection by the state in Alsace. That there was, nevertheless, much official discrimination against Protestants in Alsace, is, of course, true; it is a signal evidence of the French idea of justice, however, that the bigoted monarch Louis XIV did not ride rough-shod over all agreements and treat Alsatian Protestants with the same rigour as French Protestants. Except for the inevitable friction between Catholics and Protestants, there was

no reason for discontent in the newly acquired territory.

Strasbourg became French in 1681. Less than 30 years later, in 1709, the Prussian ambassador to the court of France, Baron Schmettau, wrote to Prince Eugene, Heinsius, and the Duke of Marlborough: "It is notorious that the inhabitants of Alsace are more French than the Parisians themselves, and the King of France is so sure of their affection in his service and for his glory that he orders them to provide themselves with guns, pistols, halberds, swords, powder and lead every time there is a rumour that the Germans intend to cross the Rhine; and they rush in masses toward the banks of the river to prevent or at least to dispute the passage of the German nation, at the evident peril of their own lives, as if they were going to a triumph. . . . If the Alsatians were separated from the King of France, whom they adore, the only way their hearts could be torn from him would be by a chain of 200 years." (Reuss, v. I, 727.)²

A German professor, Dr. Martin Fassbender, writes as follows in the Pan-Germanist *Deutsche Politik* of January 18, 1918:

"The French may be a frivolous and hard people (Voltaire, who surely knew his countrymen, calls them a nation as frivolous as barbarous, and we have known them as such during this war), but one has to own that they understand marvellously how to assimilate an annexed people. A remarkable instance of the attitude of France in this respect is to be found in an exchange of letters in 1659 between the Minister Colbert and his

² Reuss (v. I, p. 727) questions the authenticity of the Schmettau document and emphasizes on the contrary the consummate skill of the French authorities who slowly and gradually from 1648 to 1789 won Alsace from German to French culture.

brother Colbert de Croissy, the first Governor (*Intendant*) of Alsace. The Minister urges his brother to see that the inhabitants of Alsace should be better treated than the inhabitants of the other German provinces, and at the same time to take care that the clergy should be so treated as to use their influence to render the inhabitants of Alsace good Frenchmen. The result was that, as early as 1675, when German troops invaded these provinces [which had become French in 1648], they not only met with complete indifference but with hostility on the part of the inhabitants. . . . The reproach which is unfortunately being made against us by other nations, namely, that we do not know how to assimilate conquered regions, and that, furthermore, these conquered regions remain a foreign body inside the German Empire, this reproach is only too well founded." (Quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, pp. 324, 338.)

THE REVOLUTION CONSOLIDATES THE FRENCH NATION

But it was the French Revolution that consolidated France and definitively won Alsace, along with all the other provinces, to the French fatherland. Whatever remained in Alsace alien to France, partaking of separate and distinct national feeling, utterly disappeared in the Revolution. Out of this hell came a new France. Alsace had earned and demanded the right to be considered an inalienable portion of the new nation.

The citizens of Strasbourg, gathered in the Place d'Armes on March 18, 1790, voted by acclamation the following address to the National Assembly: "Assembled in this Square where our fathers gave themselves regretfully to France, we have come to cement by our oaths our union with her. . . . We have sworn and we swear to shed even the last drop of our blood to main-

tain the Constitution. If the city of Strasbourg has not had the glory of giving the first example to the cities of the realm, she will at least have that of being, by the energy of the patriotism of her inhabitants, one of the mightiest bulwarks of French liberty." (Reuss, v. II, p. 600.)

In June, 1790, the Alsatian National Guard set up in the middle of a bridge over the Rhine a tri-coloured flag which bore the inscription: "Here begins the Land of Liberty."

In April, 1792, Dietrich, Mayor of Strasbourg, asked a young officer to compose a song for the army of the Rhine which was advancing to repel the German invader. In response to this request, the officer wrote "The War Song of the Army of the Rhine." For a century and a quarter that Alsatian song has been the rallying-cry for all who would make and keep the world safe for democracy. The young officer was Rouget de Lisle and the song was later re-named "La Marseillaise." Only a quirk of fate deprived France's and freedom's national hymn of its rightful title, "La Strasbourgeoise."

The great French historian, Fustel de Coulanges, said in 1870 in a passionate, but wonderfully restrained, reply to certain violent letters of Mommsen:

"Do you know what made Alsace French? It was not Louis XIV, it was our Revolution of 1789. Since that moment Alsace has followed all our destinies, she has lived our life. All that we have thought, she has thought, all that we have felt, she has felt. She has shared our victories and our reverses, our glory and our mistakes, all our joy, and all our sorrows. She has nothing in common with you. The fatherland, for her, is France. The alien land, for her, is Germany." (*Questions historiques*, ed. Jullian, 1893, p. 509.)

Naumann of Heilbronn said in the Reichstag in 1910: "That first and powerful political sentiment, which makes of a man a citizen, that first and powerful civic sentiment, which is transmitted faithfully from generation to generation, because the individuals remember with gratitude the day when they ceased to be subjects and became free men, these first popular sentiments came to Alsatians and Lorrainers from France." (Quoted by Eccard in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 66, 1910, p. 318.)

In the armies of the Republic, Kellermann, the victor of Valmy, and Kléber, both Alsatians, distinguished themselves. Alsace contributed more men and generals to the forces of the Empire than any other French province. The names of twenty-eight Alsatian generals are inscribed on the Arch of Triumph in Paris. In addition, thirty-four other Alsatian generals served under Napoleon. Phalsbourg, in Lorraine, a town of two thousand inhabitants, gave to France at this time twenty-three generals.

In 1814, a German paper, the *Merkur*, reviled the Alsatians as unnatural hybrids, more antagonistic to Germany than the French themselves, and added that Napoleon's Alsatian generals had behaved in Germany with more cruelty than any others. (Dimnet, in *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1917, p. 516.)

Between 1815 and 1870, the Germans, under the spell of that peculiar hallucination which the world at last recognizes, gradually persuaded themselves that Alsatians were Germans in captivity, longing to return to the German fatherland. In 1867, at the time of the Luxembourg difficulty, when a war between Germany and France was menacing, the students of the University of Strasbourg sent an address to the students of Germany in which they said:

"War we do not wish, national hatred we do not know. Without doubt, if war were inevitable, we would ungrudgingly make whatever sacrifices France might ask; but, today, while there is still time, we come to offer you our hand and to ask your co-operation in defending in both our countries the cause of peace and liberty. . . ."

This dignified appeal was met by the following reply from the Burschenschaft of Berlin, the democratic party among the youth of the German universities: "Renegades and deserters are detested by all men, and you will be no exception. What! You would be willing to abjure your nationality! . . . to march against Germany, our mother and yours! What! You would be willing to pierce the bosom of your Alma Mater! Quit being bastards, students of Alsace and Lorraine, become again in your hearts real children of the German fatherland. Then we too, if we are victorious in the next war, and there is no question that we shall be, will press you in fraternal embrace to our mighty breasts. But before then, Never! *Diximus et salvavimus animam.*" (Quoted by Delahache, p. 58.)³

Alsations did not receive the Germans as liberators. German domination did not come to them with their consent. In 1681 Strasbourg surrendered to the French army without striking a blow. In 1870 the siege of Strasbourg by the German army was one of the most

³ From 1806 on, Prussia gradually worked herself into a frenzy under the dominion of which she finally, when the time was ripe, in 1870, set forth in a holy crusade to redeem from immoral France "all the heritage of the Hapsburgs, and Burgundy." The remarkable evidence of this paranoia, pronouncements of pastors, professors, publicists, generals, princes, is presented by Delahache and Hazen. Skillfully fostered, it expanded in volume and virulence till in 1914 Kultur sallied forth in the second holy crusade to bring light not only to "all the heritage of the Hapsburgs, and Burgundy," but to all Middle-Europe and beyond—from Antwerp and Calais to Bagdad.

bitter, the most horrible, in modern history.⁴ The magnificent libraries of the city were wantonly destroyed with a purpose, the same purpose that prompted the insult to the world perpetrated at Louvain in 1914: to destroy foreign civilization and make way for German Kultur.

Before 1870 Germans cherished the delusion that Alsatians longed to be freed from their French prison. During the war they were undeceived. They realized that Alsatians were foreigners and in their exasperation made no pretence of asking for the consent of the governed. Treitschke in his pamphlet "What do we demand of France?" said in 1871:

"We Germans who know Germany and France, know better what is good for Alsace than the unhappy people themselves, who through their French associations have lived in ignorance of the new Germany. We will give them back their own identity against their will. We have in the enormous changes of these times too often seen in glad astonishment the immortal working of the moral forces of history ('das unsterbliche Fort-

⁴ The General commanding the besieging army was Werder, called by the inhabitants "Moerder." He said to a young Protestant preacher: "I hate the Alsatians because they love France." (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 375.)

The following is of interest in the light of certain incidents of the present war: "Warning—The severest surveillance of railroads and depots—The railroad bridge near Fontenoy, in the neighbourhood of Toul, last night blown up—as punishment the village of Fontenoy was burned from top to bottom—The same fate will befall places in which similar things happen.—Toul, January 22, 1871—Von Schmadel." (Delahache, p. 99.) The French is by no means good, in contrast with that of the placards posted in 1914 in Belgium. But then, in 1870 commanders did not have the advantage of the official "Complete Proclamation Writer," "L'Interprète Militaire—Zum Gebrauch im Feindesland," prepared in anticipation of the events of 1914. (See "German War Practices," Committee on Public Information, Washington, p. 10.)

wirkung der sittlichen Mächte der Geschichte') to be able to believe in the unconditional value of a plebiscite on this matter." (Quoted by Morgan, *The War Book of the German General Staff*, p. 62.)

Germany and Austria are conspicuous for their disdain of the rights of people to determine their own destinies. Piedmont constituted the kingdom of Italy by annexations of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, the Romagna, Naples, the Marches, Umbria, only after successive consultations of the people. France annexed Nice and Savoy after a plebiscite. There was no dream of a plebiscite when Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel and Frankfurt.⁵ There was no suggestion of a plebiscite in 1871 when Germany seized Alsace-Lorraine, nor when Austria seized Bosnia and Herzegovina a few years ago.

Germany and Austria enlarge their territories in accordance with the law of feudal ages, long since discarded by the nations facing them in arms today, the law of force, the right of conquest.⁶

⁵ This is not quite accurate. Prussia did, in fact, promise Austria in 1866 to hold a plebiscite in North Schleswig, but in 1878 she persuaded Austria to release her from this obligation.

⁶ The theory of the "self-determination" of nations was a hobby of Napoleon III. It is well-known with what insistence he recurred to this doctrine in his diplomatic conversations with Prussia and Austria. After Solferino, Napoleon and Francis Joseph met at Villafranca. The French peace plan contained these words: "The Emperor of Austria cedes his rights to Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, who, *according to the wish of the people*, delivers the country into the hands of the king of Sardinia." Francis Joseph protested against the last phrase: "What you call the wish of the people," he said, "I call revolutionary right, which I cannot recognize. I know only right written in treaties. According to treaties, I possess Lombardy. I am willing, constrained by the fortune of arms, to cede my rights to the Emperor Napoleon, but I cannot recognize the wish of peoples nor anything of the sort." (*Journal de ma Mission auprès de l'Empereur d'Autriche, par le prince Napoléon, Revue des Deux Mondes*, August 1, 1909, p. 489.)

THE PROTESTS OF 1871 AND 1874

In February, 1871, the French National Assembly met at Bordeaux. On February 17, 1871, the Alsatian deputies presented the following statement:

*Declaration in the National Assembly,
Bordeaux, February 17, 1871*

"We, the undersigned French citizens, chosen and delegated by the departments of 'Bas-Rhin,' 'Haut-Rhin,' 'Moselle' and 'Meurthe' to bring to the National Assembly of France the expression of the unanimous will of the populations of Alsace and of Lorraine, after having met together and deliberated, have resolved to set forth, in a solemn declaration, their sacred and inalienable rights in order that the National Assembly, France and Europe, having before their eyes the wishes and resolves of our constituents, may not accomplish nor allow to be accomplished any act which might do injury to those rights whose guardianship and defence have been entrusted to us in a formal mandate.

"Declaration

"I. Alsace and Lorraine do not consent to alienation.

"Associated with France for more than two centuries in good fortune as in evil, these two provinces, ever exposed to the attacks of the enemy, have constantly sacrificed themselves in the cause of national greatness.

"They have sealed with their blood the indissoluble compact that binds them to French unity.

"Under the present menace of foreign pretensions, in the face of all obstacles and all dangers, under the

very yoke of the invader, they affirm their unshakable loyalty.

"With one accord, citizens who have remained in their home, and soldiers who have hastened to join the colours, the former by their votes, the others in combat, signify to Germany and to the world the immutable will of Alsace and of Lorraine to remain French territory.

"II. France cannot agree to nor sign the cession of Lorraine and Alsace.

"She cannot without imperilling the continuity of her national existence deal a mortal blow to her own unity by abandoning those who have won by two hundred years of patriotic devotion the right to be defended by the whole country against the enterprises of victorious force.

"An assembly, even if it is the product of universal suffrage, cannot invoke its sovereignty to shield or ratify demands which are destructive of national integrity: it would take upon itself a right that does not belong even to the whole people gathered in general assemblage. Such an abuse of power, which would result in the mutilation of our common mother, would subject those guilty of it to the just reprobation of history.

"France may suffer the assaults of force, she cannot sanction its decrees.

"III. Europe cannot permit nor ratify the abandonment of Alsace and Lorraine.

"Guardians of the rules of justice and of the rights of men, the civilized nations could no longer remain insensible to the fate of their neighbour, under penalty of being in their turn victims of the violations that they would have tolerated. Modern Europe cannot allow a people to be seized like a common herd, she cannot remain deaf to the repeated protests of menaced popula-

tions; she owes it to her own preservation to prohibit such abuses of might. She knows, moreover, that the unity of France is today, as in the past, a guarantee of the general order of the world, a barrier against the spirit of conquest and invasion. Peace made at the cost of a cession of territory would be only a ruinous truce and not a definite peace. It would be for all a cause for internal troubles, a legitimate and permanent provocation to war.

"In résumé, Alsace and Lorraine protest vigorously against all cession of territory, France cannot consent to it, Europe cannot sanction it.

"IV. Wherefore we call to witness our fellow-citizens of France, the governments and peoples of the whole world, that we hold in advance null and void all acts, treaties, vote or plebiscite, which may agree to abandonment in favour of the foreigner of all or a part of our provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

"By these presents we proclaim for ever inviolable the right of Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain members of the French nation, and we swear both for ourselves and for our constituents, for our children and their descendants, to claim that right eternally and by all means against any and all usurpers." (Facsimile in Reuss, *La France et l'Alsace à travers l'Histoire*.)⁷

⁷ The assertion of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, so eloquently voiced at Bordeaux and later at Berlin, did not strike a note never before touched in the history of man. A little over half a century before, a proud nation made a similar declaration: "Over all treaties soar the rights of nations. Contrary to the rights recognized by humanity and null, therefore, are treaties which dispose of a nation against its will." This is the noble manifesto issued by Prussia during her War for Liberation against Napoleon, in 1806.

The Constitution drafted by Condorcet in 1791 declares: "The French republic will wage war only to maintain liberty, preserve its territory, and defend its allies. It solemnly renounces the uniting to its own territory of any foreign country,

Before leaving the National Assembly, the deputies from Alsace and Lorraine, about to become Germans by right of conquest, made their last statement as Frenchmen :

Protest of Bordeaux, March 1, 1871

" Given over in defiance of all justice and by an odious abuse of might to foreign domination, we have a last duty to perform.

" We again declare null and void a compact which disposes of us without our consent. It will ever remain open to each and all of us to claim our rights in such manner and in such measure as our conscience shall dictate.

" At the moment of leaving this chamber where our dignity does not permit us to sit longer, and despite the bitterness of our sorrow, the supreme thought that we find at the bottom of our hearts is a thought of gratitude to those who for six months have not ceased to defend us, and of unalterable attachment to the fatherland from which we are violently torn.

" We shall follow you with our prayers, and, with entire confidence in the future, wait till regenerated France resumes the course of her great destiny.

" Your brothers of Alsace and of Lorraine, cut off at this moment from the common family, will preserve for France, absent from their homes, a filial affection until the day when she returns to take her place there again." (Reuss, *La France et l'Alsace à travers l'Histoire*, p. 9.)

Until February 18, 1874, Alsace-Lorraine had had no unless a wish to this effect is freely expressed by the majority of the inhabitants of such a country, and only in a case when the countries which are asking for such a union have not been incorporated in and united to another nation by a social covenant embodied in a previous, and freely adopted Constitution."

representation in the Imperial Reichstag. On that date the fifteen deputies from the conquered provinces, elected by a population of what Germany had called "long-lost brothers," took their seats. The deputy of Zabern, speaking in the name of the fifteen, prefaced his speech with an apology for the fact that it was translated from French, German not being his mother tongue.⁸

The Protest in the Reichstag, February 18, 1874
Speech of Edouard Teutsch

"Gentlemen:

"The people of Alsace-Lorraine, whose representatives we are in the Reichstag, have entrusted to us a special and most important mission which we are eager to fulfil without delay. They have commissioned us to express their thoughts upon the change of nationality violently imposed upon them as a consequence of your last war with France. . . .

"Your last war, which ended to the advantage of your nation, gave her without doubt the right to reparation. But Germany exceeded her right as a civilized nation in obliging vanquished France to make the sac-

⁸ His name was *Teutsch*. It is a most disconcerting fact that we insist upon branding nationality upon a man in accordance with the sound of his name. Long before the *Mayflower* and Hudson's vessels and Captain John Smith's brought European names to the United States, German names were introduced into Alsace. Before the ancestors of all but the very oldest American families had left their European homes, Alsatians—good Celts who had taken German names, at the time when people took names—had become French, and their descendants have been French ever since. And yet, when a man's name is *Teutsch* or *Reuss* or *Preiss* or *Blumenthal*, we say he is German, and German he must be, though his ancestors were French, generations, if not centuries, before the *Mayflower* left Plymouth, or at any rate a century or more before England signed the treaty of peace which created the United States of America.

rifice of a million and a half of her children. In the name of the Alsatians and Lorrainers sold by the Treaty of Frankfort, we protest against the abuse of force of which our country is the victim.

"If in times remote and relatively barbarous, the right of conquest has sometimes been able to transform itself into an effective right, if even today it may be excused when it is exercised on ignorant and savage peoples, nothing of the sort is applicable in the case of Alsace-Lorraine.

"It is at the end of the nineteenth century, a century of enlightenment and progress, that Germany conquers us, and the people thus reduced to slavery—for annexation, without our consent, is for us tantamount to moral slavery—this people is one of the best in Europe, the one, perhaps, which most exalts the sentiment of right and justice. . . .

"Citizens possessed of souls and intelligence are not merchandise to be bartered; and it is not permissible to make them the object of a contract.* . . . Now it was with your sword upon her throat that France, bleeding and exhausted, signed the treaty agreeing to abandon us. France was not free, she yielded to violence, and our codes teach us that violence nullifies all contracts. . . .

"A celebrated jurist, Professor Bluntschli of Heidelberg, in his *International Law Codified*, page 285, teaches this:

"'In order that a transfer of territory may be valid, it is necessary to have the acknowledgment of those who live in the ceded territory and there enjoy their political rights. Such acknowledgment can never be

* President Wilson said to Congress on January 22, 1917: "No right exists anywhere to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."

passed over in silence nor suppressed; for peoples are not things without rights and without wills, the ownership of which may be transferred.'

"Even the French despot, for whose mad policies Alsace and Lorraine are now so cruelly punished, and whom you pretend to surpass in liberalism, Napoleon III, always linked with his schemes of annexation the idea of consulting the annexed populations.¹⁰ You have granted us nothing of the kind. . . .

"Our hearts are, in fact, irresistibly attracted to our French Fatherland.

"Two centuries of common life and thought create between the members of the same family a sacred bond that no arguments, and still less violence, may tear asunder. . . .

"To accomplish this annexation, which in our opinion is an unheard-of action that nothing can excuse, to thus break the hearts of a million and a half of free men, what arguments did Germany invoke? May we take the liberty of briefly recalling them.

"1. With bitter mockery she has claimed us as a part of her own family, as her brothers. Well, you know today, without any possible doubt, that any family tie between us and yourselves is severed. . . .

"2. To annex us, Germany has invoked the customs of war. But, as we have said once before, these are customs borrowed from barbaric times and wholly out of place in the civilized epoch in which we live.

"3. Finally, Germany has put forward the needs of her own defence against French aggression. But, without dismembering France, she could have attained that aim by imposing upon her vanquished enemy the dismantling of the fortresses of Alsace-Lorraine.

"We must, therefore, look to the intoxication of vic-

¹⁰ See p. 33; note.

tory, and to that intoxication alone, for the true reason of the exorbitant claim by virtue of which we are now the vassals of your empire. By giving way to that intoxication Germany has committed, perhaps, the greatest mistake to be written in her history. . . .

"Because in 1871 she did not follow the counsels of moderation, what is she reaping today? All the nations in Europe suspect her encroaching power, and multiply their armaments. In order to maintain that empty thing called military prestige, Germany is exhausting herself in men and money. And, gentlemen, what are your prospects for the future? Instead of that era of peace and brotherhood among peoples that it was in your power to inaugurate, we are sure that you foresee with the same dread as we, new wars, ruin and death again descending upon your homes." (See Welschinger, in *Revue hebdomadaire*, June 16, 1917; Gailly de Taurines, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May, 1918, pp. 77 ff., 302 ff.)¹¹

This speech provoked hoots of derision such that the speaker was heard with difficulty. Only twelve Poles, a Dane, seven Socialists and two other Germans voted in favour of the Alsatians. Among the Socialists were, notably, Bebel and Liebknecht.¹² It is a son of this

¹¹ After Teutsch had spoken, the Bishop of Strasbourg, Mgr. Raess, deputy from Schlestadt, an octogenarian, rose and declared that he accepted the treaty in the name of his co-religionists. The fifteen deputies had previously agreed upon the Protest delivered by Teutsch. Raess's Catholic colleagues immediately disavowed his action, and the next day all Catholic Alsace rose in indignation. (Gailly de Taurines, *l. c.*, pp. 306 ff.)

¹² German Socialists, having loyally voted war credits until the war became one of conquest, denounced the annexation from the moment it was evident in what direction things were tending. On September 5, 1870, the day after the proclamation of the Republic at Paris, the Central Committee of the German Socialist party sent forth a manifesto to the workingmen of Germany in which it is said: "In the name of the German Workman's Party, we protest against the annexation of Alsace-

Liebknrecht that the German government has held in prison since early in the present war.

The protests of Alsace and Lorraine in the French National Assembly and in the German Reichstag live

Lorraine, and we know that we are in agreement with the workers of Germany. In the interest of Germany as in that of France, in the interest of peace and liberty, in the interests of western civilization, the workers of Germany will not tolerate the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine."

When the war ceased to be a war of defence and became one of conquest, Karl Marx could no longer support it. Three days after Sedan, the German Social Democratic Party issued a manifesto, which was prepared by Marx, setting forth that, although "so long as the mercenaries of Napoleon threatened Germany" it was their duty "as Germans to defend the independence of the Fatherland," it was now their duty to recognize that, with the empire overthrown and a republic established in France, Germany must make an honourable and generous peace; that it was the duty of the German Socialists to oppose all annexations of French territory. The manifesto solemnly warned the people of Germany that the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine would lead inevitably to an alliance between France and Russia and to a general European war beginning as a war of Russia and France against Germany. Such a war was, Marx believed, inevitable, "except in the doubtful event of a Russian revolution."

Four days after this remarkable document was issued in Germany, the General Council of the International issued from London another manifesto, written by Marx, in which the following significant paragraphs appeared:

"Do the Teutonic patriots seriously believe that the independence, liberty and peace of Germany may be secured by driving France into the arms of Russia?

"If the luck of arms, the arrogance of success, and the intrigues of the dynasties lead to the robbing of French territory, then there are only two ways open for Germany.

"It either must pursue the dangerous course of being a tool for Russian aggrandizement, a policy which coincides with the traditions of the Hohenzollerns, or it must, after a short pause, prepare itself for a new 'defensive' war — not one of those new-fangled 'localized' wars, but a race war, a war with the united Slav and Latin races. This is the peace prospect held out by the brainless patriots of the German middle class.

"History will not measure her retribution by the circumference of the square miles conquered from France, but by the intensity of the crime of having re-established in the second half of the nineteenth century the policy of conquest."

today. They have never been abrogated by any similar public and popular action.

From September 21, 1870, to the conclusion of peace all issues of the official organ of the German Socialist party carried these words in large letters on the top of the first page: "Honourable peace with the French Republic, no annexation!"

On November 26, 1870, Liebknecht and Bebel demanded in the Reichstag that the war be stopped, now that Germany was victorious, and that peace be concluded with France as soon as possible, without any annexation of French territory. On May 2, 1871, Bebel said in the Reichstag: "I protest against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, because I consider it a crime against the right of peoples and a shameful disgrace in the history of the German people." This protest Bebel and Liebknecht raised again and again till the day of their deaths. Both men were condemned to two years of imprisonment. (Rosenthal, *L'Alsace-Lorraine*, 1916, *passim*; Spargo, in *New York Times Magazine*, May 5, 1918.)

CHAPTER III

PERSECUTION: 1871-1914

"Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein,
So schlag' ich dir den Schädel ein!"

Prussian proverb.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Francis Joseph wrote to William I in 1871: "I congratulate you on the annexation of an open sore to your empire."¹ His words were prophetic. The open sore has never healed.

Germany took Alsace and Lorraine into her nation on the ground that they were German and then proceeded to treat them as French. She hailed Alsatians and Lorrainers as "long lost brothers" and proceeded to treat them as an inferior race.

Since 1871 Alsace and Lorraine have been governed like conquered provinces, like colonies. In 1879 and 1901 some concessions were granted. In 1911 a Constitution was finally accorded, but it was a mere travesty, and Alsatians and Lorrainers were not duped; all, whatever their political party, expressed their disappointment in no uncertain manner.

Article II, § 1, of the Constitution reproduces word for word the following clause from Article III of the Law of June 9, 1871: "Die Staatsgewalt in Elsass-

¹ Mgr. Freppel said to William in February, 1871: "Believe a bishop who says to you before God, his hand on his conscience: Alsace will never belong to you." (Duhem, p. 92.)

Lothringen übt der Kaiser aus " ("The Kaiser exercises the sovereignty in Alsace-Lorraine").

The Reichsland was given, under the new Constitution, three votes in the Bundesrat, the real governing body of the Empire. This seemed a great concession, but, as usual, what Germany gave with one hand, she took back with the other. Alsace-Lorraine has no control over the three votes; her delegates receive their instructions from the Governor, who is appointed, and may at any time be replaced, by the Kaiser. Thus, as a matter of fact, the three new votes in the Bundesrat are not Alsace-Lorraine's, but Prussia's. The other German States fully realized this, and Prussia was forced to concede to them the provision that the three votes of Alsace-Lorraine were not to be counted if they assured a majority for Prussia. These votes cannot be cast against Prussia, because they are controlled by Prussia. If cast in favour of Prussia, they are not counted unless Prussia loses. It is difficult to see how they count at all. Alsace-Lorraine surely gained nothing by securing representation in the all-powerful Bundesrat.

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg said in the Prussian parliament on January 10, 1914: "I know I have been criticized for having given a constitution to Alsace-Lorraine. . . . The Conservative speaker complained a moment ago that votes in the Bundesrat had been granted the Reichsland. It cannot be claimed that the influence of Prussia has suffered as a result of the votes granted Alsace-Lorraine, since the Kaiser controls the votes of Alsace-Lorraine just as he, as King of Prussia, controls the votes of Prussia." (Speech quoted in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 37, 1914, p. 117.)

The Constitution states: "The present law can be

abrogated or modified only by an Imperial law." Thus this Constitution may be withdrawn at any time and may be modified at any time without the slightest consultation of the people whom it is supposed to protect!

Even in matters of internal finance the Constitution limits the freedom of the local Parliament. Article V, § 3, reads as follows: "The consent of the Government is necessary for the addition to the budget by the Lower House of expenses not provided for in the budget." The purpose of this clause was to prevent what had taken place in previous years, to the embarrassment of the Secretary of State for Finance: the appropriation of money for the benefit of petty local functionaries who were Alsatians and consequently not cared for by the Government. (Antony, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 27, 1912, p. 255.)

Not only is the Kaiser master of the Reichsland's votes in the Bundesrat of the Empire; he is also master of the provincial legislature. The Lower House is elected by a modified universal suffrage. The Kaiser has complete control of the Upper House, half of the members being in large part appointed subject to his will, and half being directly appointed by him. Furthermore, no bill passed by both houses becomes a law until it has been approved by the Kaiser, and the autocrat who graciously accorded the Constitution could tear it to pieces if he wished, as he declared in that remarkable speech at Strasbourg in May, 1913. In all German states the *sovereign* of the particular state names a certain number of the members of the Upper House, but he names them for life. Under the Constitution of 1911, the *Kaiser* names half the members of the Upper House of Alsace-Lorraine, and for a single session. (On the Constitution see Braun, in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 31, 1911, pp. 345 ff.; and,

especially, Heitz, in *Revue du Droit public*, v. 28, 1911, pp. 429 ff., where the Constitution is given in full and carefully studied.)

Repression

The conquered provinces might have forgotten their political servitude, if that had been the lowest depth of their degradation. But they were allowed none of the privileges of free-born men. Their martyrdom began in 1871 and has not yet ceased.

At the time of the inauguration of the Strasbourg tribunal in 1871, the Attorney-General declared: "Clemency would be a mistake, moderation a danger." Germany did not make that mistake, nor incur that danger.

Newspapers were suppressed, officials removed, schools closed, individuals summarily banished, all in a manner to gail and infuriate the population. Most of those who had the means fled into exile. Alsace-Lorraine was administered by a Governor responsible exclusively to the Emperor and by a host of petty immigrant officials,—Carpet-Baggers, the student of American history would call them,—the riff-raff of the German states, incapable of earning their living in their native country, a good riddance for Germany and destined to be pestilential rubbish in impotent Alsace.

The Teaching of French

Within a year of the conquest, the teaching of French in the public schools had been suppressed to such an extent as to enable a witty speaker to announce in the Reichstag in 1872 that in the technical school of Mulhouse "the teaching of history was in German, of geography in German, of penmanship in French, of drawing in French." (Delahache, p. 139.)

The teaching of French in the primary schools was entirely forbidden; in secondary schools it was permitted two or three hours a week, the professor being almost invariably an Immigrant, that is to say, a newcomer from Germany. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 379; Duhem, p. 21.)² In 1908-9 decided efforts on the part of the Alsatian parliament were made to secure the teaching of French in the primary schools. The argument advanced was a practical one: the proximity of the French made it desirable for commercial reasons that their language be known in Alsace. This argument served as a boomerang, for the government pretended to be making a considerable concession when finally it permitted the teaching of French in the primary schools of localities along the frontier.³ Alsations were, of course, not satisfied, and the struggle went on, but the sole result was a fine of 500 marks for Hansi and two months in prison for the Abbé Wetterlé. (Delahache, pp. 174 ff.; Braun, in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 29, 1910, pp. 461 ff.)

"In Metz," says David Starr Jordan, after a journey through Alsace-Lorraine in 1913, "instruction [in

² In 1909 Hansi published in the *Nouvelliste d'Alsace-Lorraine* a caricature of Professor Gneisse of the lycée of Colmar with this legend: "French must not be taught, because the professors do not know it themselves." (Wetterlé, *Ce qu'était . . .*, p. XIII.)

³ The restriction of the use of the French language is written even into the Constitution of 1911! There it is stated that an exception may be made in favour of French in localities where a majority of the population speaks French, and that the Governor may authorize French as a language of instruction. (Article II, § 27.) Of course it is the administration that decides what localities those are "in which a majority speaks French." In 1871, 420 communes were recognized as entirely French; in 1892 this number was officially reduced by 109, but in 1908 Labroise, mayor of Winsse, deputy to the Reichstag, said that in his commune, one of the 109, only two persons spoke German, himself and the school teacher. (Dauzat, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 88, 1916, p. 354.)

French] is given *in German* to students who use French in daily speech and in their games. The lessons occupy one hour a week." (*Alsace-Lorraine*, p. 51.)

Helmer's teacher of French was a native of Cologne; Hansi's came from Königsberg. (Helmer, in *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1918, p. 235.)

Instruction in all subjects, in all schools, public and private, sectarian and lay, was in accordance with regulations laid down by government officials. Only one privilege was left to the school authorities, that of paying the professors, who were very often imposed upon them by the government and were almost always Immigrants. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 391.)⁴

Conciliation: Manteuffel, 1879-1885

Only one Governor of Alsace-Lorraine made a serious effort to reconcile the people by gentleness: Manteuffel, who ruled from 1879 to 1885. His measures were nullified from above and from below. When Hertzog, the chief minister, visited Mulhouse, he was asked to be considerate of the people. He answered: "The wishes of the people are absolutely indifferent to me." (Valbert, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 1, 1888, p. 205.) Practically all the subordinate officials were of the Hertzog type, and all, great and small, waged a merciless war against the Governor in German newspapers from the date of his accession to the date of his death. (Reuss, *Histoire*, pp. 407 ff.)

In 1887, on the issue of the famous Law of the Septennate, Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag. The elections for a new Reichstag resulted overwhelmingly in favour

⁴The text books used in the schools were sometimes preposterously unsound, presenting past history and contemporary fact, not as they were, but as Germany would have preferred them to be. (See Brunetière, "Un Manuel allemand de Géographie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1876.)

of the Chancellor everywhere in Germany except in Alsace-Lorraine. The conquered provinces again returned a solid block of Irreconcilables, immutably opposed to Germany, to Bismarck and to his Law of the Septennate, which was directed against France. Of 314,000 registered voters, 247,000 voted for the Irreconcilables, 82,000 more than in 1884. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 417.)

Blood and Iron: 1887-1901

Manteuffel died on June 17, 1885. Bismarck had never approved of the régime he had inaugurated in Alsace-Lorraine,⁵ and was determined it should not be continued. The new Governor, the Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, was a man after Bismarck's own heart, a Prussian of one of the oldest noble families, with supreme confidence in the policy of blood and iron.

Bismarck's intentions in regard to Alsace are disclosed by a passage in the *Journal* of Hohenlohe under date of May 8, 1888:

"Since last spring, in consequence of the excitement produced by the result of the elections, we have introduced a number of more or less vexatious measures, which have aroused much ill-feeling. Prince Bismarck thereupon desired me to introduce the system of compulsory passports against France, which existing legislation allows me to do upon my own initiative. He informed me that our ambassador at Paris would not be allowed to *visa* any pass without previously asking

⁵ At first Bismarck had been enthusiastic about the possibility of speedily reconciling the Alsatians; he was soon disillusioned and said in 1878 that he had no longer "the enthusiastic hope conceived under the happy impression he had felt on seeing these countries of the Empire recovered by Germany." (P. Matter, *Bismarck*, III, p. 491.)

permission, so that infinite delays would arise in consequence. There is no doubt that this measure would not only excite general surprise and excitement, but would also greatly embitter the local population. It seems that Berlin desires to introduce these irritating measures with the object of reducing the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine to despair and driving them to revolt, when it will be possible to say that the civil government is useless and that martial law must be proclaimed." (*Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst*, v. II, p. 395; see also the letter to Wilmowski, *ibid.*, p. 396.)

After martial law had been proclaimed, the recalcitrant provinces were, doubtless, to be annexed to Prussia or divided between Prussia, Bavaria and Baden. (See P. Matter, *Bismarck*, III, p. 494.)

The repression and coercion to which Hohenlohe refers, and which he was forced from Berlin, not greatly against his will, to put into operation, reached unbelievable limits of severity. All sorts of Alsatian societies were dissolved, artistic, choral, scientific, gymnastic,—even the old and famous medical society of Strasbourg. All societies not suppressed were forced to submit their statutes to revision at the hands of the prefects, to exhibit their banners and insignia in order that the least French word might be effaced therefrom, and to declare their readiness to receive henceforth any Immigrants who might desire to enter. Deputies were expelled and political prosecutions took place on every side. The use of French was prohibited on street-signs, and even on tombstones. When the old patriot Kablé, deputy in the Reichstag, returned from Nice to die in his native land, his colleagues were strictly forbidden to use one word of French in the last adieux pronounced over his grave. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 418.)

The régime of passports was the most cowardly and infamous of the means adopted to break the heart and soul of the nation. The purpose was purely and simply, as has been frequently said, to put Alsace at the mercy of all Germanizing influences by raising a Chinese Wall between her and France.⁶ No person from France could enter Alsace without a passport, and it was tacitly understood between the German government and its embassy at Paris that passports should be issued only in exceptional cases and after intolerable delay. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 419.)

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* explained these measures of repression by saying that "the chief obstacle to the assimilation of Alsace was the continuation of social and economic relations with France." (Y. Guyot, *The Causes and Consequences of the War*, p. 58.)

The accession of William II and the retirement of Bismarck brought no relief to Alsace. Hohenlohe was continued as Governor, and Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, announced on June 10, 1890, that he was resolved to maintain the passport system in order "to deepen the gulf which separated France from Germany." He added: "It is true that after seventeen years of annexation the German spirit has made no progress in Alsace." (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 420.) On September 4, 1892, at a luncheon in Metz, the Kaiser said to the Lorrainers: "Germans you are, and Germans you shall remain, with the aid of God and the German sword!" (Maringer, p. 223.)

It was all in vain, however. In 1895, a few months

⁶ The passport régime is in direct contravention of Article 11 of the Treaty of Frankfort. (See the text of the treaty in Delahache, pp. 201 ff. See *Journal du Droit international privé*, v. 15, 1888, pp. 488-500.)

after the commemorations of the battles of the Franco-Prussian War, Germany celebrated the centenary of William I, the conqueror of 1870. Alsatian officialdom and the official newspapers arranged festivities and demanded general participation. In spite of official insistence the Abbé Sipp, writing in the *Colmarer Zeitung*, declared: "Wir machen nicht mit!" ("We'll have nothing to do with this!"); but he made an exception for the religious services which were to be a part of the program, saying: "We will pray for the dead who fell in the wars made by William I, and we will also pray for this Emperor; for we remember that before God, the supreme Judge, the emperor is judged as well as the beggar, and that we find in the Scriptures these awful words bearing on rulers and their fate: 'Mercy will soon pardon the meanest, but mighty men shall be mightily tormented.'" The newspaper was, of course, suppressed. (Helmer, p. 171.)

Solutions were found for the insensibility of Alsations and Lorrainers to the honour of being once more Germans. Before 1887, during the mild Manteuffel régime, they were terrorized, it was said, by France, afraid of the taunts their erstwhile compatriots across the border would fling at them as renegades. After 1887, when the provinces were governed in such a way that there could be no question of *French* terrorism, it was decided that Alsations and Lorrainers were—"not historically minded" ("nicht historisch denkend")!

These two reasons for Alsatian and Lorraine recalcitrance were commonplaces in German newspapers, the one before 1887, the other after.

The phrase "historically minded" must not be misunderstood. It did not mean that Alsations were unmindful of the fact that they had been German several centuries before; it meant that they were not suffi-

ciently clairvoyant to see that the centuries to come were to be German centuries, during which German culture would rule the world, whereas France, the motherland toward which the incorrigible provinces were yearning, was decrepit and decadent.

Pin-pricks and Scorpions: 1901-1914

A system of conciliation was initiated in 1901 under the personal order of the Kaiser. The meddling of the carpet-baggers was curbed, and the government no longer intervened despotically in internal politics.⁷

The German Immigrants, restrained from political domination, now assume cultural superiority and bend

⁷ Careful surveillance prevailed, however, and it was learned on frequent occasions that the relaxation was only apparent.

In 1906 a terrible scandal was provoked when Stéphan, ex-commissioner of police in Alsace-Lorraine, published a pamphlet ("Germanisation, Willkürregierung und Polizeiwirtschaft," Schmidt, Zürich) in which he disclosed such facts as the following:

"In every district administrative office and in every district police office are kept:

"1. A secret list of Alsatians and Lorrainers to be expelled in case of war.

"2. A secret list of Alsatians and Lorrainers who, in case of mobilization, are to be arrested and confined in a safe place.

"These proscription lists are revised and completed twice a year. They are sent to commissioners of police in envelopes guarded by five seals. . . . I can affirm most authoritatively that these lists have not been annulled as a result of the revocation of the dictatorship paragraph (1902), but that they have been brought up to date recently and that the revision continues at the present day." (Florent-Matter, p. 225; Delahache, p. 166.) These "black lists," it is known with certainty, existed and were utilized in July, 1914.

The Abbé Wetterlé was fortunate enough to have an opportunity to see himself as the authorities see him. "The stupidity of a clerk," he says, "enabled me to go in a leisurely manner through my record at the prefecture of Colmar. The impression I got from the reading was overwhelming. I could never have imagined any man capable of so many attacks on the public safety." (*Ce qu'était . . .*, p. 32.)

their efforts to convincing the provincials that they are raw, "unreif." Representatives of the highest civilization in Europe were, however, among them, and Alsatians had but to forget decadent France and recognize the tutorship of the pioneers of culture, "Kulturpioniere," as the Immigrants called themselves, in order to rise to the high plane of German spirituality.

The following anecdote is told of the German efforts after 1901 to introduce German culture into the "unreif" provinces. At a Pan-German Congress held at Wiesbaden, a German clergyman, Pastor Spiesser, gave an account of his campaign in favour of German *Kultur*. When visiting one of his colleagues, he had noticed that the latter talked French to his family. He tried by every means to persuade his friend to adopt the German language, but was met by the objection that his wife insisted on speaking French. He then pointed out the weakness of allowing oneself to be thus dominated by a woman. Having found his efforts unavailing, on returning to his home he sent his friend a book entitled *Ueber den biologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes* (*On the Biological Imbecility of Woman*). The Pan-German Congress at Wiesbaden heartily applauded. (Helmer, p. 149.)

"The more it changes, the more it remains the same" — the reign of the Pioneers of Culture was not more enduring than that of the Carpet-Baggers: a slight alleviation here, an aggravation there; Alsace and Lorraine remained to the day war was declared in 1914 the collective chattel of the states which form the German Empire, the "zone of defence of the Empire," existing for the benefit of the Empire, administered for the benefit of the Empire.

We have discovered since 1914 that Germans are constitutionally incapable of understanding any people

except Germans. Incapable of understanding the Alsations, the Germans would not realize that, however great the risk, their only chance of success lay in granting "home rule," unrestricted, genuine "home-rule." Instead of that, they continued to ply the unfortunate provinces with scorpions and pin-pricks.

French was still proscribed. The newspapers of the province invented a new rubric under which they registered the prowess of the police in running down the last remnants of the French language: "La Chasse aux Inscriptions françaises" ("Gunning for French Inscriptions").

A "Public Inscription" is defined with laborious Germanic thoroughness in a circular sent out to all the mayors, commissioners of police and magistrates in Alsace-Lorraine:

"An inscription or an announcement is public when it can be seen by one or several persons, whoever they may be; to be considered such, therefore, are announcements or inscriptions on private premises capable of being seen from the public street, such as signs posted in stores, show-windows, gardens, etc. . . . Inscriptions on clothes, such as caps worn in public by employés or servants of certain commercial or industrial establishments, are to be considered public inscriptions."

So the French word *gaz* on the caps of employés of the gas companies was changed to the German word *Gas*; the barber changed his sign from *coiffeur* (which was French) to *Friseur* (which was German); *bureau d'octroi* passed muster when altered to *Octroi-Bureau*; *modiste* was banned to make way for *Modistin*, *restaurant* became *Restauration*, *concierge* became *Portier*, *café* became *Kaffee*, *concert* became *Konzert*, etc.

In Lorraine, where the German signs would have been meaningless, French signs were permitted when

preceded by the same inscription in German. (Florent-Matter, pp. 188 ff.; Hinzelin, pp. 82 ff.)

The Constitution of 1911 brought no relief, and at every sign of generosity on the part of the authorities in Alsace — there were not many — the Pan-German newspapers raised an outcry. In fact, from 1911 on, the Pan-German party directed the policy to be pursued in Alsace, with the result that during the next three years even the slight progress that had been made toward Germanization was obliterated. In July, 1914, Alsace and Germany were farther removed from each other than at any period since the first days of the annexation.⁸

In May, 1911, William II unveiled the statue of his grandfather in the *Kaiserplatz* of Strasbourg, while the population marvelled at the tactlessness of thus enthroning the Prussian of 1870 in the city he had so fiendishly bombarded forty years before. In June, 1911, the "Society of Alsatian-Lorraine Students" was abolished. A few months later the Graffenstaden Affair, the culmination of the policy of economic persecution, began to agitate the populace. The Pan-German newspapers attacked the Governor for his moderation! In 1913 Laugel was forced to resign the presidency of the Society for the Preservation of the Historic Monuments of Alsace because he had delivered a lecture at Belfort. A little later the society called the "Souvenir Alsacien-Lorrain," which cared for the tombs of soldiers fallen in 1870, was dissolved. The Pan-Germans had been scandalized by the participation of Alsatians in the inauguration of the monument commemorating the heroes of Wissembourg (October 16-17, 1909) and in the cele-

⁸ In 1911 the Pan-Germanists took in hand the administration of Schleswig-Holstein also. (*Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 31, 1911, p. 560.)

bration organized at Metz by the "Souvenir," August 15, 1911; and by the cracking of their whips they forced the dissolution of the "Souvenir."⁹ When threats of a protest in the Lower House were heard, Zorn von Bulach, the hated minister, replied: "Vote your protest; we shall not yield a hair's breadth. . . . There is somebody at Berlin who alone decides whether or not we are to appear here at all." At the same time he was preparing with the collaboration of Berlin new laws which should destroy the French press and permit him, without formalities, to get rid of all societies that seemed dangerous. This amounted to nothing else than the re-enactment of the abominable dictatorship law. (Reuss, *Histoire*, pp. 441 ff.)

THE ZABERN AFFAIR: 1913

The climax was reached this same year (1913) in the Zabern Affair, the most outrageous insult civilization has ever received at the hands of militarism. The pusillanimous abdication of the civil authorities during this affair in the face of the jeering insolence of Pan-German jingoes proved that Germany had bartered away her soul and had reached the climax of barbaric triumph of the mailed fist over human law.¹⁰

Lieutenant von Forstner, an officer such as only Pan-German militarism could produce, promised ten marks and immunity to any one of his men who would run his steel through a "wacke" ("vagabond," the pretty term commonly employed in the German army to indicate

⁹ The administration had permitted the Wissembourg celebration and similar pious commemorations of Alsatians who had died in 1870, thinking that the country had been pacified. They were most emphatically undeceived, and the Pan-Germanists had the joy of crying triumphantly: "We told you so!"

¹⁰ On this affair, which, being generally well known, is treated quite inadequately here, see the chapter in Hazen, and the article by Barth, in *Revue des sciences politiques*, v. 31, 1914, pp. 161 ff.

"Alsatian"), and invited all to befoul the French flag in a certain manner which is dear to so many Germans. Feeling ran high. The civil authorities were uncere- moniously and illegally brushed aside, and military law was declared. A few days later blood was shed when Forstner, "in self-defence," struck a lame cobbler over the head with his saber. Forstner was finally court- martialled and sentenced on December 19 to the mini- mum period of detention, forty-three days. He ap- pealed, and was acquitted on January 10.

All liberal Germany was roused.¹¹ On December 4, 1913, by a vote of 293 to 54 with four abstentions, the Reichstag for the first time since the foundation of the Empire passed a formal vote of censure against the Chancellor. (*Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 36, 1913, p. 754.) Pan-Germanism laughed at the protest. The Reichstag on January 20, 1914, ap- pointed a commission to examine into the affair, but the commission never acted. The Chancellor and the Reich- stag ignominiously capitulated before von Falkenhayn, Minister of War, and Germany fully justified Mira- beau's diagnosis of a hundred years before: "Prussia does not possess an army; an army possesses Prussia."

The Alsatian Lower House, January 11-15, vio- lently attacked the administration of the Reichsland. On January 19 even the Upper House was forced by popular clamour to take up the affair. A vote of cen-

¹¹ The Zabern Affair must be recognized as one of the immedi- ate causes of the war. Liberal Germany gained great strength as a result of it, and the Pan-Germanists saw that they must strike soon before the great mass of their compatriots, whom they had thus far successfully bewitched or cowed, should wake and hurl them and their "shining army" into the Baltic Sea. (See the very significant press-comments collected by Altschul in *German Militarism and its German Critics*, published by the Com- mittee on Public Information, Washington; and Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, chapter IV.)

sure was passed in this stronghold of the Kaiser and his appointees, only two Prussian generals and one servile professor voting against it. Two members refrained from voting.

While all Alsatians, supported by practically all the Immigrants, were protesting thus against the weakness of their administration, the Pan-Germanists were active also in attacks upon this same administration for a contrary reason. They were, of course, successful. The Governor, von Wedel, and the chief of the ministry, Zorn von Bulach, both of whom were hated in Alsace for their harshness, were withdrawn on the ground that they had not opposed the Alsatian nationalists with sufficient vigour. To take their places Dallwitz and Roedern were sent, both fierce Pan-Germanists, both ready to obey the orders they had received and to reintroduce the favourite Prussian régime of blood and iron. After he had been a week in Alsace, Dallwitz expressed surprise that no attempt had yet been made to assassinate him. Already the reign of terror had begun. Hansi published his *My Village*, in which he continued his accustomed satires directed at the Immigrants. He was arrested, sent to Leipsic (!) for trial, and there sentenced to fifteen months in prison on a charge of high treason. Fortunately he escaped a few weeks before the outbreak of war and is now in France. (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 125.)

In reply to the Prussian challenge, Alsatians composed their party divisions and stood united to meet the attack. All was ready for the bitterest contest in the history of Alsace when suddenly news came of the assassination at Serajevo.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY

DISCOURAGEMENT: 1887-1900; REQUEST FOR AUTONOMY

The repressive measures adopted in 1887 had their effect; the persecution of the provinces became so intense that Germany did achieve her purpose: she exhausted — for the moment — the power of resistance of the people. They were worn out by their years of fruitless rebellion, frankly disheartened, particularly since it was becoming evident that France was less and less disposed to embark upon a war of revenge; the Boulanger affair and the Panama scandal tended to destroy confidence in the old Fatherland. Extensive emigration had sapped the strength of the land, for it was the leaders, the strongest, and only the strongest, who had had the courage to go forth into exile.¹ And

¹ The most pathetic sign of the inability of Alsatians to endure German rule is to be found in the emigration which began immediately after the conquest and has not yet ceased.

Eccard, an Alsatian, says:

“What the emigration has cost us in population amounts to hundreds of thousands; in money, to billions; in capacity and intelligence, no estimate can be made. The loss is irreparable.” (Quoted by Hazen, p. 103.)

To leave one's native land and most of one's possessions, to go out into exile without hope of return, is the last sacrifice, and Alsace has endured it to prove her hatred of Germany.

An English writer has calculated as follows Alsace's loss in population, from figures given in the official *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Elsass-Lothringen*, edition of 1913:

“In 1871 Alsace-Lorraine had 1,549,738 inhabitants. If there had been no emigration from that country it should have had in 1910 not 1,874,014 inhabitants, but 2,476,544 inhabitants, owing

the Alsatians, like all very democratic peoples, have always been in need of guidance.

to the yearly excess of births over deaths, and owing to immigration from Germany and other countries. This is borne out by the following figures:

Pop. of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 (Page 1).....	1,549,738
Excess of Births over Deaths 1872-1911 (Page 29)....	554,984
Germans and Foreigners at Census of 1910 (Page 17)..	371,822
Total	2,476,544

"As the population of the provinces was in 1910 only 1,874,014 it appears that no fewer than 602,530 people have been lost to Alsace-Lorraine by emigration between 1871-1910. That is exactly 40 per cent. of the original inhabitants. Very likely this gigantic figure of emigration seriously understates the actual fact, for many of the children of immigrant Germans and foreigners who were born in Alsace-Lorraine—they should number at least 100,000—are of course described in the census as native Alsatians and Lorrainers. It follows that probably at least 700,000 have left their homes." (Politicus, in *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1918, p. 387; cf. Vidal de la Blache, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 35, 1916, p. 310.)

While the neighbouring Grand Duchy of Baden increased in population from 1,460,000 to 1,725,000 between 1871 and 1895, Alsace showed a gain of only 10,000 inhabitants." (Wittich, p. 864.)

Out of 33,475 boys who ought to have presented themselves before the recruiting boards in 1872, 7,454 appeared; only 3,119 of these were fit for service, the rest having risked nothing in coming up, since they were declared physically unfit. The number of deserters in 1878 was 9,580; in 1879, 10,101. (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 393.)

It must not be forgotten that the emigrants were the most valuable, the most intelligent, portions of the population, "from the highest social classes." (Wittich, p. 862.)

The exodus continued uninterruptedly. It would have been much greater than it was, especially in the last decade or two, if many of the most intense lovers of France had not done all within their power to dissuade it with the quite valid argument that every Alsatian who departed left a place for one more German immigrant. It is in the same spirit that men like Wetterlé urged Alsatians to accept places in the administration, post-office, customs-office, etc. Before 1900 practically all functionaries were immigrants; after 1900, under the impulsion of leaders of the autonomist party, more and more Alsatians put on the civil livery

A Catholic and a Socialist party began to appear, thoroughly Alsatian, and not at all German in feeling, but sufficiently divergent from each other and from the single party of the past to break the unanimity of protest.²

It was evident that reconciliation, or rather acquiescence, was necessary if Alsace was to be allowed to live. The Chinese Wall on the French frontier forced Alsace to choose between Germany and starvation, moral and physical. She chose Germany.

When now Alsatians began to ask for autonomy within the Empire, such autonomy as the other German states enjoyed, they were honestly desirous of trying to accept the annexation as an accomplished fact. They proved their sincerity in the elections of 1893, when only one Irreconcilable was elected to the Reichstag. They asked merely the minimum rights of a civilized people. And Germany refused; she was simply too petty in spirit, too entirely the victim of her distrust of popular government, to be capable of an act which would have had in it something of magnanimity. Preiss, deputy from Colmar, speaking in the Reichstag during the debates concerning the Constitution of 1911, recalled his country's happiness under French rule and appealed for a broader attitude on the part of the Germans.

of the German government, not for that, however, becoming more German at heart, as many writers erroneously supposed.

² In 1889 and 1890 the Bishops of Metz and of Strasbourg, both natives, died and were replaced by German bishops. At about this time German workmen introduced Socialist ideas into industrial centres like Mulhouse. For the next twenty years the authorities supported by every means Catholics and Socialists with the purpose of breaking up the single Protest party into various groups. They were partially successful, but more and more after 1900, to the dismay of officialdom, the various groups reunited. It is piquant, to say the least, to see Hohenzollern Germany championing the interests of Socialism in Alsace and persecuting the leaders of the movement across the Rhine.

"Make for the Alsatians and Lorrainers a home in which they will be at ease and can thus forget a happy past . . .," he said. "The German Empire could only gain by following the example of France. You possess the language, you possess force, but there is something you do not possess: that is generosity. What we ask is not generosity, but simply justice." (*Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 31, 1911, p. 243.)

Germany's final reply to Alsace's appeal for the right to rule herself was given at Zabern and at Graffenstaden.

Alsace was prepared to endure even Zabern and Graffenstaden to avoid a war between Germany and France, from which she would be the chief sufferer. And France, too, was prepared to endure almost anything rather than resort to arms. Much has been said of the French determination to seek "revenge" for the defeat of '70. No intelligent man who knows the France of the generation before 1914 would hesitate to declare that the cause of "revenge" was hopelessly lost, that it was kept alive only by a few fanatic patriots, for the most part adherents of reactionary and discredited dreams, that at no time was it even remotely possible to rouse the French nation to actual war for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine.

France was ready even earlier than Alsace to accept the autonomy of the Reichsland as a solution of the question, as Bismarck confessed to Crispi in 1889, and as Alsatians complained. Her bitterness toward Germany failed to cool, not because of the rape of 1871, which she had resigned herself to accept as irretrievable, but because of Germany's intermittent truculent saberrattling, and particularly because the unending misery of her lost provinces did not permit her to forget. Alsace and Lorraine kept repeating: "You sacrificed us as a ransom to save the rest of France. See what we

have become! And you are willing to make a friend of our enemy, to renounce your duty of redeeming us?" This pathetic reproach was constantly voiced in Alsace after 1887.

The eminent lawyer of Strasbourg, Helmer, says in the *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1918, pp. 239, 243:

"France, having ratified the cession of Alsace-Lorraine by the vote of the national assembly, could not expect those provinces to take the initiative in a fresh conflict. Indeed, their former country never encouraged them to undertake any seditious enterprise. She had no wish for a struggle with Germany, and made use of the most insignificant pretexts to avoid one. She went too far, perhaps, in her desire to have no quarrel with Germany. Such, at least, was the opinion of the annexed population. The Alsatians observed this attitude, and very often regretted the ease with which France accepted inconsiderate treatment on the part of the Empire, and acts of injustice which were sometimes even violations of the Treaty of Frankfort. The Alsatians, being accustomed to a daily conflict with the Germans, knew how much can be gained from them by an attitude of decision and energy; while any concession, or desire to avoid a quarrel, is always interpreted by Germany as a sign of weakness. Alsatians in contact with French official circles knew that their former country would never give the least encouragement to any attempt at a rising, since, in her desire to avoid the smallest pretext for a struggle, she had refrained from opposing Germany on the question of options and passports, of the statute regarding French Insurance Companies,³ of the residence of French

³ In 1881 the French insurance companies (there were fifty-nine of them with policies issued to the amount of three and a half billion marks) were expelled from Alsace-Lorraine. This discrimination — other foreign companies were not disturbed — was

people in Alsace-Lorraine and of Germans in France, and of many other points on which she had preferred to yield.

"... when Bismarck was dismissed it seemed as though Europe breathed again, and there were those who believed that William the Second's fair words precluded the reparation of the injustices of 1871. Alsace did not fall into these mistakes; but the discussions in important Parisian journals on the question of Alsace-Lorraine and the possibility of solving it peacefully, and on the probability of a visit from the Emperor William to Paris for the Exhibition of 1900, rang very sadly in the ears of the Alsatians. This new spirit proved that the idea of revenge was abandoned, that France would not seek a fresh quarrel that might liberate the annexed provinces, that the only course was to depend on the justice inherent in events. In that justice, therefore, the Alsatians put their confidence. They foresaw that a day would come — when and how they could not tell — when the Germans would themselves provoke the conflict, when their arrogant spirit would at last wear out the patience of the world, or when, believing in their own strength and despising those who did not wage pacific war against them day by day, they would think they had only to pluck, like a ripe fruit, the leadership of Europe and the dominion of the world.

"In spite of all, the Alsatians believed in a future that should redress their wrongs. But since France seemed to have deserted them, they could not continue to sacrifice themselves every day."

It must not be supposed that the request for autonomy within the Empire constituted the slightest renunciation

in violation of the Treaty of Frankfort. See Kauffmann, in *Journal du Droit international privé*, v. 9, 1882, pp. 129-153. France did not retaliate.

of anti-German or pro-French feeling. It was merely a modification of the old Protest.

The day before the horror of 1914 the people were neither French nor German; they were Alsatians. They had given up the hope of becoming French without a war, but they refused to become German. The refrain:

"Vive la France!
A bas la Prusse!
D'Schwobe mien
Zuem Elsass 'nuess!"

("The Swabians, *i. e.*, Boches, must get out of Alsace!"),—this refrain had, on account of Alsatian—and French—unwillingness to precipitate world-wide carnage, given way to the less belligerent but equally determined refrain:

"Français ne peut
Prussien ne veut
Alsacien suis."

The country had from 1871 to 1914 been subjected to a persecution, at the same time stupid and malignant, such as only the German mind, filled with the pomposity of the upstart and corrupted by the innate Prussian cruelty of which Goethe speaks, could devise.

France won the heart of Alsace by gentleness, successfully acting on the naïve assumption that human beings would prefer to be French rather than anything else; the Germans have apparently acted in Alsace since 1871 on the shrewd assumption that human beings would prefer to be German rather than anything else only after they had been clubbed into submission.⁴

⁴Kapp, professor at the University of Strasbourg, recently published a book in which he says: "The Alsatians are not a race desirous of governing themselves, but they are rich in bril-

Germany had not yet in July, 1914, had time to club the Alsatians into submission. After almost fifty years of domination, she had failed. No real reconciliation had taken place. No fusion between Alsatians and Germans was possible.

RENAISSANCE: 1900. DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY

The discouragement which resulted from the systematic torture on the rack instituted after the elections of 1887, and from the discovery that France was forgetting her lost children, did not last long.

Among the older generation only the weak had been spared to Alsace by the emigration. But a new generation was coming forward.

Preiss, deputy from Colmar, said in the Reichstag on January 31, 1895: "We young fellows are not like the generation of 1870 which emigration has deprived of its most resistant elements. . . . If you do not introduce a more liberal régime, you will discover that this young generation will obstruct fusion much more energetically than has been done since 1870." (Quoted by Duhem in *Mercure de France*, July 16, 1917, p. 223.)⁵

These young Alsatians had never known France.

liant individuals who formerly found the opportunity to exercise their talents in a great state. France opened the door to them wide, while Germany has been bent merely on 'caging' them; she has never yet understood the lesson she could learn from France's manner of treating Alsatians and Lorrainers." (Quoted by *Le Temps*, January 24, 1918.)

⁵ In another speech in the Reichstag on June 30, 1896, he said: "The assimilation, the Germanization, has not taken a single step forward. It is terror that governs and poisons our political life. The government does not understand the people and the people do not understand the government. History will say, 'The German Empire was able to conquer Alsace-Lorraine materially, but was not able to conquer her morally; she has not known how to win the heart and soul of the people.'" (Quoted by Blumenthal, p. 56.)

They had been born and had grown up under German domination. Germany had had every opportunity to Germanize them in German schools and German barracks. It was about 1900 that they began to redeem the promise Preiss made in their name in 1895. It was at that time that the demand for autonomy became more insistent.*

This renaissance synchronizes with the period of conciliation inaugurated in 1901 by the Kaiser. The effort to gain the goodwill of the provinces was ushered in auspiciously by the repeal of the dictatorship para-

* An eminent Alsatian wrote in 1908: "It is an incontestable fact, however surprising it may seem to anybody who has not verified it, that for the last eight or ten years there has been in Alsace a renewal of ardour for the French tradition and of reaction against Germanism.

"The observer sees signs of this movement as soon as he touches the conquered land. All conversations, all that he sees himself, all that is brought to him by sure witnesses, confirm the first signs. There was a period of discouragement, of despair. Alsace felt herself overwhelmed, abandoned. She had lost faith, and then, since about 1900, gradually, in all classes of society, in all generations, especially in the youngest, I might almost say, there has taken place a profound and general recovery of the old spirit." (André Lichtenberger, in *L'Opinion*, April 4, 1908. Quoted by Florent-Matter, p. 228.)

The earliest definite sign of the recovery of energy is in 1898, when the *Revue Alsacienne illustrée* was founded by a group of ardent young men who had just finished their studies in German universities, and had become imbued there with a lasting antagonism to Kultur. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that hostility to Germany from 1898 to the present day has been most intense among the youth of the land. Wetterlé says: "Since 1905, the youths from the universities have united in uncompromising opposition to the government. They had passed through German schools, they had never known France; but in outward manifestations and in inner convictions they were distinctly Francophile. We older men had to moderate their headlong zeal." (*L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 167.)

A Bavarian, G. Peterson, says in his *Das Deutschthum in Elsass-Lothringen* (1902): "The majority of the students of Alsatian and Lorraine origin are not well disposed toward Germany." (Quoted by Nyström, p. 48.)

graph, the most obnoxious of the administrative regulations, in force since the first days of the conquest in order to provide for the immediate operation of martial law in case the occasion should arise. But Alsatians realized that the repeal of the dictatorship paragraph in fact meant little; they were amused and nettled by the ludicrous "Culture-pioneers" who came to replace it.

It was about this time that economic persecution of the provinces began to pinch; the development of Alsatian industries was arbitrarily checked whenever it threatened German business interests. And, too, a new and unexpected hope came to harassed Alsace: France, despite desperate internal disorders, showed signs of recovery from the prostration of the preceding quarter of a century. Not that Alsatians ever became more willing to risk a war, but it brought them courage to see a renewal of vigorous life in the country whose flag, though most of them had never lived under it, was, nevertheless, dearest to their hearts; and they were well aware that the threat of a strong France could, if anything could, force Germany to grant the minimum of privilege which would make life tolerable.

GERMANY DID NOT DARE GRANT AUTONOMY

The demand for autonomy has been cited by German writers as proof of Alsace's abandonment of her love for France. As a matter of fact, the demand for autonomy was to such an extent recognized as pro-French that the government did not dare to grant it.

Alsace was held in an exceptional status outside the political scheme of the Empire through fear of the democratic instinct of the Alsatians, which was felt to be a potential danger to the monarchical system of the neighbouring states. This fear had helped to dissuade Bismarck from annexing the conquered provinces to Prus-

sia. In 1911, during the discussions in the Reichstag relative to the proposed constitution, Delbrück declared that the government was remaining true to Bismarckian traditions. (See Heitz, *Revue du Droit public*, v. 28, 1911, p. 439; *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 31, 1911, pp. 240, 661.)

One of the strongest reasons for German unwillingness to grant autonomy to the Reichsland within the Empire resides in the fact that since 1871 Alsace-Lorraine had served as the "cement of the Empire," the pledge of union between all the states. It was feared that there might result a tendency to disintegration if these spoils of war which made them all kin ceased to be a common possession of the confederated states.

But the strongest reason for the refusal to grant autonomy was the conviction that, were Alsace allowed to rule herself, she would within a few years become more French than she had ever been.

The *Deutsche Tages-Zeitung* of December 29, 1907, declares that the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine would be dangerous, and warns that the particularism which is developing in the annexed provinces and which has taken as its rallying-call the slogan "Alsace-Lorraine for the Alsatians and Lorrainers" can in no way be compared with the particularism of the Bavarians; that many symptoms prove the vitality of the past in the hearts of the annexed populations; and that a great mistake was committed after the war when Alsace-Lorraine was not divided between Prussia, Bavaria and Baden. "This division would have prevented the existence to-day of a new unity with distinctly separatist tendencies." (Florent-Matter, p. 156.)

Speisser, pastor of a village in Lower Alsace, an impetuous Pan-Germanist, said: "There reigns in Alsace a singular superstition that to be a person of distinction

one must have French manners; and it is that superstition that retards the march of true progress." (Quoted by Helmer, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 57, 1908, p. 268.)

The same Speisser said before the Pan-German Congress of Wiesbaden on September 8, 1907: "Today it is an accepted convention in Alsace that the maternal language of a child of respectable parents must be French," and he concludes that autonomy must not be granted, for the French language would soon predominate and the land be Gallicized. (Novicow, p. 166.)

In February, 1910, the Alsatian Secretary of State said to the territorial legislature: "Have the courage to declare that, being Alsatian, you are Germans, and you shall have autonomy immediately." There was no response. (Novicow, p. 173.)

The *Hamburgische Nachrichten* wrote in April, 1910: "Alsace is more French today than she was in 1870. . . . If Alsace-Lorraine obtained today with its local representation the rights of an independent confederated state, there would be set in motion a movement of Gallicization a thousand times more powerful than the attempts at present made by the government to de-Gallicize the country." (Quoted by Dauzat, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 88, 1916, p. 353.)

On April 5, 1911, Wedelpissdorf said in the Prussian Upper House: "The debates on the question of a constitution for Alsace-Lorraine awaken grave misgivings in us, for we are of the opinion that the inhabitants have not yet become sufficiently German to admit of making Alsace-Lorraine a confederate [autonomous] state without danger." (*L'Indépendance belge*, April 7, 1911; quoted by Novicow, p. 173.)

These views everywhere expressed reflected the atti-

tude of official Germany,— of all Germany, in fact, except a small minority of liberals; for the Constitution of 1911 was a mere fraud, and Alsace after that date became more irreconcilable than ever, particularly in view of the desertion of certain elements in the Reichstag on which she had felt she could rely.⁷

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* in its issue of November 10, 1915, publishes a four-column article headed "Alsace-Lorraine," in which the definitive annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia is demanded. The writer admits that the Alsatians and Lorrainers would prefer either Bavaria or Baden to Prussia and explains thus the preference:

"Most of those who prefer annexation to Bavaria are probably inspired solely by political-religious considerations. Among the others, and these are, as it happens, the elements which are most skilful politically, certain disquieting undercurrents may be designated more exactly perhaps by the word 'Protest.' Beneath the veil of friendliness to South Germany and especially to Bavaria is concealed a sentiment of particularism. They hope, doubtless, under the protection of this veil, to continue to foster a sort of silent protest against all Germanization, and to be able to maintain, if only passively, their resistance to absorption in the German na-

⁷ The Berlin *Post* expressed the usual fear and declared that the first act of the Alsatian Chamber created by the Constitution of 1911 would be to demand the introduction of the French language into the primary schools. (Novicow, p. 166.) As a matter of fact, the Constitution of 1911, which contained Germany's utmost concessions toward "self-government," explicitly restricts the teaching of French in the Reichsland! Nothing could prove more conclusively than this that the Constitution was not a grant of anything like "home-rule," since the chief plank of the autonomist platform was unrestricted teaching of French; and there is no surer evidence that Germany realized that after fifty years of domination she did not dare risk giving the Alsatians the privilege of choosing between French and German culture.

tionality." (Quoted by *Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, 1915, p. 135.)

The expression "verkappte Protestler" ("disguised Protesters"), regularly applied to the autonomists in influential German circles, is sufficient evidence that Germany feared the influence of France, were Alsace given the privileges enjoyed by the other confederated states.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* says on January 16, 1918: "The Frenchified bourgeoisie managed to keep up the original opposition between natives and Immigrants [in Alsace-Lorraine]; it managed to discredit among the people all participation in German life, to cover the country with a varied network of associations, which bred hostility against the Empire; in a word, to develop that complicated and skilfully combined system which tended by every device to keep open the wounds of the country and which under the false pretence of keeping up the properly Alsatian traditions had no other ultimate object than to familiarize the people with the idea of betrayal. The real extent and the complete success of this movement, the way in which the soil had been mined under our feet, all this was first revealed by the present war. . . . The countless cases of hatred and treason of all sorts which have occurred here owing to the war and which have been officially registered, the conclusions which have been drawn from them as regards the past and the prospects they have opened, have irrevocably revealed the danger which the position of both provinces would entail to the Empire, were they to become a separate State. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is therefore, neither a question concerning both provinces, nor a question of public right, but a question concerning the whole of the empire and its safety. . . . This is not a question of liberty or servitude, but of adaptation of means to a certain end and of the general

interest of the Empire." (Quoted by *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, p. 338.)⁸

A FINAL EFFORT FOR PEACE

If in 1911, instead of the illusory concessions contained in the Constitution of that date, Germany had dared grant real autonomy,—autonomy within the Empire, nothing more,—the present war might have been averted by the removal of the chief cause of friction between Germany and France. But the Pan-Germanists had in 1911 decisively defeated Liberal Germany's efforts to conciliate Alsace, and, as we have seen, from this time on took the direction of the Reichsland into their own hands. The next few years were bitter ones for the conquered provinces. Notwithstanding the renewal of persecution, however, and in the very midst of the most flagrant denials of justice, while Germany was increasing her armaments and France was replying in kind, the great patriots of Alsace made one more supreme effort to preserve the peace of Europe. In 1913,

⁸ George Wolf, one of the few Alsatians who have gone over to the enemy, writing in the Pan-Germanist *Deutsche Politik* of September 14, 1917, says: "We must unfortunately confess that the policy followed hitherto has been a steadily increasing failure. In its manner of treating the Reichsland the Empire has never acted in a masterly way. The younger generation therefore lost patience, and the agitation in favour of France, under the pretence of regionalism, found a favourable ground." (Quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, p. 337.)

The *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote on December 6, 1917: "The institution and organization of autonomy would only separate Alsace-Lorraine more and more from the Empire and from Germanism, and thereby create a very serious danger for the unity and integrity of the Empire. From the interior of the country would soon spring up—and in a much graver way than before the war—Francophile aspirations, which in case of a new conflict between France and Germany (a conflict which must be expected with certainty, in view of the evolution of events) would surrender Alsace-Lorraine to the enemies of the Empire." (Quoted *ibid.*, April, 1918, p. 337.)

brilliant articles in the powerful *Journal d'Alsace-Lorraine*, and the speeches of Lalance, Preiss, Wetterlé and other leaders, delivered both in Alsace and in France, gathered the forces of the country in a magnificent effort to settle the question by drawing Germany and France together. All parties, Catholics, Nationalists, Socialists, and Liberals, united in great joint meetings, the most imposing gatherings in the history of Alsace, efforts at conciliation among the noblest in the history of the world. A motion was passed unanimously calling for a "frank and honest understanding between France and Germany." On May 6, 1913, the Parliament of Alsace-Lorraine invited the Governor "to give such instructions to the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bundesrat . . . as to bring about an examination of the means of reconciliation between France and Germany."

But it was all in vain. The Berne Conference of May, 1913, as a result of the action of the German delegates, refused to consider the question of Alsace-Lorraine. (Duhem, pp. 75 ff.; Leroy, pp. 233 ff. See *La Paix par le Droit*, 1913, especially pp. 197 ff.) The Pan-Germanists laughed to scorn the generous efforts of Alsace. Persecution continued. Finally came the humiliation of Zabern, and just before the present war all party division in Alsace was once more removed, but the fervent prayers for peace nobly uttered during the preceding year were heard no more. Those same men who had created the peace movement of 1912 escaped to France,—all who could,—and now demand, not autonomy, but the annulment of the Treaty of Frankfort.

CHAPTER V

THE FAILURE OF GERMANIZATION

THE LOVE FOR FRANCE

The German government and clear-sighted thinkers were not deceived as some Germans were, or pretended to be, by the apparent acceptance of Germanism inherent in the transformation of the old Protest into the demand for autonomy. In responsible circles it was fully realized that no fusion whatsoever had taken place between Germans in Alsace and the native population.

In 1901, at the International Congress of Socialists at Stuttgart, Bebel declared:

"Alsace-Lorraine rebels against her separation from France because for centuries she has taken her part in France's development, because, in the eyes of civilization, she was closely bound up with French thought, French tradition, with the soul of France." (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, January, 1918, p. 174.) And Wittich wrote at the same time: "This people clings to France with all its fibres."

"Alsace-Lorraine for Alsatians and Lorrainers," the shibboleth of the autonomists, meant "Alsace-Lorraine free to return unrestrictedly to the French tradition so dear to her" and "Alsace-Lorraine free to disembarass herself of Germans and Germanism." The wise heads in Germany were not deceived.

In the Alsace-Lorraine *Landesausschuss* on February 11, 1905, Blumenthal declared in the course of a debate: "It must not be ignored that the moral influence of

France on Alsace-Lorraine has never since the separation been so strong as it is today." (Leroy, p. 96.)

This evident fact was admitted even by Zorn von Bulach, one of the few Alsatian renegades: "The French current in Alsace is today stronger than ever." (Hinzelin, *Cœurs* . . ., p. 237.)

France was recovering her strength and was again a power in the world.

An old German priest who attended the Catholic Congress of Strasbourg in 1907 was greatly disturbed by the enthusiasm roused in the inhabitants when old French airs were played by trumpets: "Es ist ja noch alles französisch hier!" he cried. (Florent-Matter, p. 139.)

A French statesman said in 1908 to an Alsatian deputy in the Reichstag: "Come now, frankly, isn't Alsace Germanized?" The Alsatian replied: "Take her back and in forty-eight hours she will be as French as before." (Florent-Matter, p. 245.)

Germans suspected with good reason that Alsations hoped autonomy would be the first step toward a return to France by peaceful means, as Gambetta had dreamed in the '70's and Passy and Lalance later.

ANTIPATHY OF ALSATIANS AND IMMIGRANTS

A writer in the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* of April 8, 1907, warns Germany that she is in error if she thinks progress has been made toward an understanding: "In their daily life," he says, "the Alsations for business reasons accept the annexation as a fact; but if the option were offered as in 1870 between French and German citizenship, without the obligation of emigration, we should come off now worse than we did then. That is a conclusion hard to face, but true. . . . Let those who up to the present have been unwilling to see

and hear, read the accounts published in French newspapers, on our side and on the other side of the Vosges, of the unveiling of a monument on April 1 of this year — why was that date chosen? [Bismarck's birthday] — to two French officers and seventy-two French soldiers, who fell on September 1, 1870. . . . A French colonel, retired, and an administrative secretary delivered speeches on 'the army' and 'fidelity to the fatherland,' and the throng from Metz and its environs cried 'Long live the army!' and 'Long live the fatherland!' The 'army' and the 'fatherland' are on the other side of the Vosges." (Florent-Matter, pp. 229-231.)

Stiewe, an Immigrant magistrate at Zabern, wrote a few years ago: "The aversion of the two populations [Alsatian and Immigrant German] for each other grows more intense every year." (Florent-Matter, p. 227.) ¹

¹ The author of the article in the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* quoted above, adds: "He who writes these lines has for thirty-six years held an important post in the Reichsland . . . but he has never been able to gain admittance to Alsatian society. When by any chance an Alsatian makes advances, he has a special purpose in view. . . . Only in the elections do they [the Alsatians] enter into relations with Germans; there, apparently, all differences disappear, there they make compromises, and then afterwards you have the picture just described, not an attractive one, but faithful to the truth."

The elections of 1907 are particularly significant in this regard. For the first time Alsatians were divided into parties more or less associated with similar German parties. But during the electoral campaign the question at stake in the rest of Germany, one of colonial credits, was scarcely mentioned. The issue in Alsace was in part a religious one, but the one fact that each candidate strove to prove was that his party was more opposed to fusion with Germany than any other. A Socialist candidate said: "It is true that at school they tell us of German kindness and German honour and German generosity, but up to the present we have learned to know only Prussian pride, Prussian arbitrariness, Prussian arrogance." An Immigrant editor of the *Massevau's Landeszeitung* belonging to the Catholic Centre Party said that, having been born in the Rhenish provinces, he too had been annexed by Prussia and could consequently understand bet-

All this was before the infamous Zabern Affair, which, according to "An Alsatian" writing in the *Revue de Paris* in 1914 (January 15, p. 267), six months before the outbreak of war, "roused to paroxysm the antipathy between Alsatians and Germans, an innate antipathy which had been fostered since the annexation by the evil treatment inflicted upon the conquered by the conquerors."

Von Calker, an exceptionally friendly Immigrant, said in the Reichstag during the investigation of the Zabern Affair: "I cry out in anguish. For sixteen years I have laboured to . . . reconcile natives and Immigrants, and now we have arrived at the point where we may say: It's all come to nothing again!"²

ter than anybody else the feelings of the Alsatians. At Metz the Immigrant candidate is fighting the Centre because, as he says, "it would inflict upon our dear Lorraine moral annexation after territorial annexation." The Centre candidate replies: "To support this candidate would be to renounce the conquests of liberty achieved by the French Revolution." The Socialist candidate attacks the one as a Prussian officer and the other as being affiliated with the German Centre. And so the Prussian-baiting went merrily on! (Florent-Matter, pp. 179 ff.)

In the elections immediately following the grant of a Constitution in 1911, held on October 22, 1911 for the Landtag and on January 12, 1912, for the Reichstag, Alsace was still divided into political parties which during the campaign united on only one issue: hostility to Germanism. The Alsace-Lorraine Catholic Centre officially renounced the German Catholic Centre, which it accused of treachery; the Socialists invoked with the name of Jaurès the memories of the Revolution; the Liberals demanded political autonomy, amnesty for refractory conscripts and the teaching of French, condemned the Pan-Germanists, demanded that access to public offices be made more open to natives, that the Immigrant functionaries abandon their German manners and inquisitorial habits; a Prussian Immigrant urged the citizens of Metz, in a French which was far from correct, not to belie the proud lessons of their fathers by voting for his adversary, a native Lorrainer but a member of the Conservative Party. (Braun, in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 33, 1912, p. 136.)

² Various means had been tried to win the provinces: the rela-

GALLICIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS

Not only were the Alsatians no more Germanized in July, 1914, than in 1871, not only was the influence of French culture, despite all obstacles, spreading rapidly downward from the upper classes, but the Immigrants sent into Alsace to Germanize the country were becoming as Alsatian as the Alsatians, and even Gallicized! A great deal of sympathy has been wasted on the Immigrants for their plight when Alsace returns to France. There are not many of them, about three hundred thousand, a very large part of them functionaries and soldiers, out of a population of nearly two millions.³ Many will no doubt return to Germany, but a very large number will prefer to become French.

Pierre Baudin, writing in the *Journal* of January 19, 1905, cites this remark of a judge speaking with an officer, reported by one who heard it: "Instead of Germanizing, we are becoming French!" (Florent-Matier, p. 214.)

The writer of the article in the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* of April 8, 1907, already quoted, says:

tively mild Manteuffel régime (to 1887), repressive measures to 1901, missionary work by the "pioneers of culture" after 1901, repressive measures again after 1911; but, as Helmer (p. 175) says: "On the eve of the war (1914), the two groups seemed as irreconcilable as on the morrow of the annexation."

³ In 1910 there were in Alsace-Lorraine 371,822 Germans and foreigners. Of these 295,436 were Germans and 76,386 were foreigners.

"The 295,436 Germans can be classified as follows:

Male civilians	108,444	Citizens of Prussia..	174,468
Females	111,494	Citizens of Bavaria..	42,013
Soldiers of Germany ..	75,498	Citizens of Baden ...	39,495
		Citizens of the other states	39,460

Total	295,436	Total	295,436 "
-------------	---------	-------------	-----------

(Politicus, in *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1918, p. 388.)

"The Old German [*i. e.*, Immigrant] functionaries complain that their children are becoming Gallicized."

We have already seen (Chapter I) that hostility to Germany is greatest in the German-speaking centres like Colmar, and that the masses share with the upper classes this antipathy. We have heard Germans commenting on the persistence, and even the alarming spread, of French language and culture despite all administrative restrictions, the total collapse of the attempt to Germanize Alsace being summed up in these words of the *Journal de Genève*: "The Alsatians are not becoming Germans, the Germans are becoming Alsatians."

Two Belgian journalists, Dumont-Wilden and Souguenet, travelled through Alsace-Lorraine in 1912 on foot and on bicycles. The book in which they related their experiences, *The Victory of the Vanquished*, contains a mass of first-hand evidence as to the failure of Germanization in all classes, high and low.

The correspondent sent by the *Gazette de Lausanne* to study the situation created by the Zabern affair, writes in January, 1914: "The complete bankruptcy of the effort at Germanization is one of the discoveries that strikes the investigator most forcibly. In surroundings partly Germanized, the German remains a stranger here; and Alsatian vitality is powerful enough, not only to triumphantly resist all attempts at unification, but even to begin to assimilate the Immigrants themselves." (Quoted by Dauzat, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 88, 1916, p. 352.)

THE ALSATIAN WOMEN

The part that Alsatian women have played in this resistance to Germanism has been recognized with bitter resentment by German writers.

Bismarck is quoted as having warned the present Kaiser: "The Emperor's power ceases on the threshold of a woman's drawing-room."

It is notorious that when a German Immigrant marries a Pole, a Dane or an Alsatian, the children are almost invariably not Germans, but Poles, Danes or Alsations. There has been almost no intermarriage between Immigrants and Germans among the higher classes in Alsace; in the lower classes intermarriage is more frequent, but through the influence of the mother the children are Alsatian, usually as anti-German as the rest of the population.

It was hoped that the schools would Germanize the girls as well as the boys.⁴ Recently the Empress visited a girls' school near Metz. According to her habit she asked the children to make a wish and promised to gratify it. They hesitated. She insisted. One of them finally said: "We wish we might learn French." The Empress kept her word. (Hinzelin, p. 138.)

The *Tägliche Rundschau* says (August 5, 1915): "The Alsatian women, who, on account of the instruction they had received, lacked close attachment to the German nationality, language, literature and history, who were, on the contrary, all permeated by the French spirit, have had such influence over their husbands and children, that soon in these, too, German culture was dominated and smothered by a Franco-Alsatian pseudo-culture: the love of our literature and of our history, the intelligent knowledge of the civilization and effort

⁴ The net result of Germanization of boys through the schools is indicated by the official *Strassburger Post*, which admitted in July, 1916, that the young men who had received their training in German universities and upon whom, consequently, Germany had with reason expected to rely, showed more and more, in the very midst of war, their sympathy for France. (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 213.)

of our people, which they (the men) had acquired in the schools and strengthened in the universities did not resist the graces of the Alsatian women; these German virtues were blighted and dried up in the home, when they were not killed there." (Quoted by Fribourg, p. 59.)

Ruland, a Pan-Germanist lawyer of Colmar, an Immigrant, in a pamphlet called *Deutschtum und Franzosentum in Elsass-Lothringen*, fiercely denounced the women of Alsace, and declared that if the efforts at Germanization had produced but insignificant results, it was the women, first of all, who were responsible. (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 78.)

The *Strassburger Post*, the organ of the Germanizers, marshals its forces against the Alsatian women:

"The combat we have to wage here behind the front for 'Deutschtum,' it declares on May 13, 1916, "is less a combat of men against men, than a struggle to win the Alsatian women. The men, those upon whom the future depends, are at the front: it is to be hoped that the tumult of battles will make them good Germans more quickly and more certainly than all the fine discourses and all the reasonings that we might have been able to bring to bear here.

"Well, let us act so that this seed may not be spoiled by the women when the soldiers come home. For it is especially the women who are coated with the French varnish. We had already, before the war, frequently noted that the friendly attitude of the husband to Germany, an attitude acquired in the German school and in German barracks, was destined to bow before the 'Frenchifying' ideas of the wife. In any case, cost what it may, the daughters of the Alsatian bourgeoisie must cease to resemble their mothers, or for many a long

year we shall have no peace." (Quoted by Fribourg, p. 59.)

GERMANIZATION A FAILURE

A German official who had married an Alsatian woman and had passed his life among the Alsatian people said about 1911 to Stoddard Dewey: "We have been absolute masters here 40 years and we are further from reconciling the natives to our rule than ever. I do not believe it will ever be done until all the natives of Alsace and Lorraine are driven out and the country is settled anew with *bona fide* Germans." (*The Nation*, New York, February 1, 1917, p. 127.)

A Lorraine peasant said to Florent-Matter, who was passing through the country in 1908: "Germanize us! Why, sir, they'd need a century for that! Our youngsters are still French; at home they forget very quickly the German they learn at school." (Florent-Matter, p. 32.) ⁵

⁵The opinion of Professor Foerster, the famous savant of Munich, is of interest: "Alsace, a land thoroughly Germanic in origin, forty years after her restoration to Germany has still French sentiments to an astonishing degree, or at least no Germanophile sentiments. . . . After more than forty years we have not been able to re-Germanize this population." (Quoted in the *Revue de Paris*, January 15, 1914, p. 275.)

Preiss, who represented Alsace in the Reichstag, said in 1913 in a speech at Brussels:

"The resistance to Germanization is stronger now than it was twenty or even forty years ago; the conqueror has failed, completely failed, in his attempt; in 1913, as in 1887 or 1871, the two antagonists are divided by an absolute incompatibility — we have no hatred for the Germans, we only feel that fusion with them is impossible." (Quoted by Dimnet in *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1917, p. 527.)

Novicow, a Russian observer, writes in 1913: "Far from being Germanized in the slightest degree, Alsace is less German today than she was in 1870. . . . It may be boldly affirmed that the number of indigenous Alsations feeling today more sympathy

In April, 1916, the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* said: "It must be frankly admitted that there is an Alsace-Lorraine question and that Germanization has failed utterly." (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 213.)

In July, 1917, the *Kieler Zeitung* expressed itself as follows on the results of Germanization in Alsace-Lorraine: "The wise conservatives thought that, thanks to the reunion under the established rule of the Empire, they could reconcile two provinces different from each other, and having in common only an arrogant defiance of the ambitions of the Empire." (Quoted from the *Matin* of July 18, 1917, by Blumenthal, p. 58.)

In the *Deutsche Politik* of January 18, 1918, Professor Martin Fassbender added his denunciation of German methods in Alsace to the many already uttered by Harden, Delbrück and others. (A passage from this article is quoted above, pp. 27-28.) He says further: "The French base their claims to Alsace on the fact that the Alsatians are attached in their hearts to France. This, unfortunately, is only too true. The reproach, levelled at us, that we do not understand how to assimilate conquered territories, is well founded, and it is a phenomenon which merits our best attention.

"With us Germans an administration of such a nature [as that of the French in Alsace] is impossible.

for Germany than for any other nation (that is, feeling themselves to be German) has not increased by one since 1870." (Novicow, p. 162.)

A high Lutheran dignitary, Hermann Bezzel, wrote in 1913: "A week's journeying in Alsace-Lorraine, including the German-speaking part of the latter, has taught me to my deep sorrow that the inhabitants may indeed take advantage of German culture and of the German administration, especially as regards public assistance, but in their hearts they remain none the less French." (Quoted by M. L. Puech in *La Paix par le Droit*, v. 27, 1917, p. 301.)

Ours is a régime which admits of no change. Hence, when the functionaries of such a régime treat the inhabitants badly, it is difficult to conciliate them and even more difficult to assimilate them.

"That is why Alsace-Lorraine will always remain an open sore in the German body politic." (Associated Press correspondence from London, dated February 28, 1918, printed in American papers of March 25.)⁶

STERNER MEANS OF GERMANIZATION

German officialdom had even before the war given up the task of pacification. Hohenlohe had suspected that the harsh measures imposed after the elections of 1887 were prompted by a desire to drive the people to desperation, when they would revolt, be reconquered and annexed to Prussia. Annexation to Prussia, or partition between Prussia, Bavaria and Baden, seemed to many eminent Germans then the only solution of the problem. This is, apparently, the prevailing view today. The Constitution of 1911 infuriated the Alsatians and gave rise to serious anti-German outbreaks.

⁶ A few years ago Professor Otfried Nippold had confessed Germany's failure in the following words: "When one looks back into the history of Europe during the last forty years, it seems inconceivable that any one can be unwilling to admit that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a political mistake," and "that the Germans have shown themselves incompetent in their government of the people of Alsace-Lorraine." (Quoted by the War Cyclopedia, Committee on Public Information, Washington, p. 12.)

The *Tägliche Rundschau* writes on January 13, 1918: "One cannot wonder that the Alsatian, when he turns himself towards France, should be in such a high degree conscious of his own value, whereas he loses such consciousness when he turns himself towards Germany, which seeks to imprison the Alsatian mind in a narrow cage and is unable to give it a field for activity and expansion. Unfortunately the example of France has never been of any use to the Germans; yet if we do not imitate France we shall never win over the soul of the people of Alsace-Lorraine." (Quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, p. 337.)

The Kaiser came to Strasbourg in great wrath on May 13, 1912, and made the following address: "If this keeps up, I shall knock your Constitution to bits (*zerschmettern*). Up to the present you have known me from my good side, but you can perhaps learn to know me from the other side also. If things do not change, we shall make of Alsace-Lorraine a Prussian province." (Gauss, *The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances*, 1915, p. 68.)⁷

There was, perhaps, more in this extraordinary speech than mere imperial petulance, and it is by no means unlikely that the insane provocation of the wretched provinces during the Zabern Affair of the following year was a part of the plan mentioned above,—to drive the population to revolt and then reduce Alsace to what, as the Kaiser implied, would seem to its inhabitants the final degradation, annexation to Prussia.⁸

It was during the agitation arising out of the Zabern

⁷ The Immigrant organ, the *Strassburger Post*, summarized in 1898 the attitude of the German Empire towards the Alsations in the phrase *Oderint dum metuant* ("Let them hate, so long as they fear"). (Blumenthal, p. 39.)

⁸ This speech was one of the irrepressible Kaiser's indiscretions and roused much indignation in Liberal Germany. Poor Bethman-Hollweg, as Chancellor, had to defend his royal master. He did it lamely enough, as usual throwing the blame on the newspapers: the Kaiser must be free to say what he pleases, but the newspapers must be careful what they print. In his speech in the Reichstag on May 17, 1912, he said: "It is astonishing that politicians in Alsace-Lorraine think the time has come to take from the Empire and transport to their country constitutional legislation concerning the Reichsland. Such a thing is impossible. Alsace-Lorraine is the *Reichsland* (Land of the Empire). The Bundesrat and the Reichstag alone have the prerogative of considering whether, some day or other, the moment will come to modify the Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and in what manner it is to be modified." (Quoted by *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, v. 33, 1912, p. 692.)

The Socialist Scheidemann said in the Reichstag that the words of the Kaiser were "an avowal of great weight, issued from a

Affair that the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, said in the Reichstag on December 4, 1913: "We shall never make any progress in Alsace-Lorraine unless we abandon the fruitless attempt to turn the South Germans of the Reichsland into North German Prussians." (*London Times*, December 5, 1913.) Von Jagow, prefect of police at Berlin, confirmed the right of Alsace and Lorraine to an unconditional re-incorporation in the French state at the next council of peace, when he said in an article published on December 22, 1913, in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, forty-four years after 1870 and half a year before the crime of Serajevo: "Prussian officers stationed in Alsace feel as if they were encamped in the enemy's country." (Dimnet, in *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1917, p. 527.) The new Governor, Dallwitz, sent to Alsace to put an end to the disorders arising from the Zabern Affair, declared that "French influence and French sympathies are stronger than ever." (Duhem, p. 80.) Two months later, war was declared.⁹

The Constitution of 1911, a disgraceful mockery of the elementary rights of man, and the Zabern affair, were Germany's reply to Alsace's despairing appeal to be allowed to live. War came. Alsace and France had striven by every compromise to avoid it; both countries were ready to accept as a solution of the whole problem the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine within the German Empire. When Germany entered France at the beginning of the war, that annexation to Prussia is . . . a punishment equivalent to penal servitude with loss of civic rights." (Quoted by Barth, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 28, 1912, p. 219.)

⁹ In July, 1914, Liebknecht was returning from a Socialist Congress of protest against war. Passing through Belfort, he was profoundly impressed by his meeting with a crowd of Alsacians who had come there to join the French in the celebration of their national holiday. He wrote later: "This memory is graven on my mind as with a hot iron. It accompanies me wherever I go." (Duhem, p. 92.)

ning of August, 1914, technically she tore up the Treaty of Frankfort;¹⁰ morally the infamous treaty had been annulled already by the plebiscite involved in over forty years of anguished protest.

THE ALSATIANS ARE FRENCH

It is utterly impossible for Alsatians and Germans to live in peace side by side; their national spirits are as far asunder as the poles.

Ziegler rightly said: "Two centuries of history lived in common with the great nation of France have made Alsatians and Lorrainers Frenchmen." And his colleague Wittich's careful study of the problem points directly to the conclusion that Alsatians are thoroughly French, are constitutionally anti-German, and can be happy only within the boundaries of the nation from which they were torn in 1870. Wittich shows that they are French, and totally different from the Germans, in their democratic ideals and in their complete lack of monarchical sentiment and sense of class distinction (pp. 789-790). He is in entire agreement with the learned Alsatian historian, Rodolphe Reuss, who, writing in 1912, indicates the source of this similarity with the French and of this difference from the Germans:

"At the beginning our province was still foreign to the kingdom in many points; it is the Revolution that brought about the fusion in its immense furnace . . . especially by appealing . . . to our traditional love of liberty. On the whole, the Revolution exerted upon the

¹⁰ The Treaty of Frankfort itself recognizes the fact that war annuls existing treaties. Article 11 reads: "Treaties of commerce with the different states of Germany having been annulled by the war, the French Government and the German Government will take as the basis of their commercial relations the most-favoured-nation system." (The text of the treaty is given in full in Delahache, pp. 201 ff.)

generations of that day and of the days to come a profound and durable influence; the impress which Alsace received from that memorable epoch differentiates still today, after forty years of annexation, the inhabitants of its cities, big and little, the Alsatian workingmen and peasants, from the peasants and bourgeois across the Rhine. And the reason is that they were liberated by the Revolution from the yoke of monarchical superstition; that they have preserved the memory, more or less precise, the impression more or less clear, but ineffaceable, of that collection of lofty doctrines, of aspirations for brotherhood, of visions of the future which are summarized in the expression 'the principles of '89.' These principles may be declared elsewhere erroneous or absurd, but those who have lived under their inspiration will never free themselves from it." (Reuss, *Histoire*, p. 308.)

Only one phase of Germanism has proved acceptable to Alsatians, according to Wittich (p. 871): "Whatever one may think of the Social-Democratic theories," he says, "they are, nevertheless, incontestably the only product of the German national genius that has won the real sympathy of any considerable fraction of the South Alsatian population."¹¹ However much the Social-Democratic principles may owe to men like Marx, Bebel and Liebknecht, all of whom looked upon the Treaty of Frankfort as a monstrous iniquity, and even though these principles came to Alsace from Germany, it is certainly true that they are French in origin, are a natural product of the French national genius and alien to the German spirit. Those few brave German souls who

¹¹ Wittich adds, very significantly: "... and it is precisely this fact, that they come from Germany, that retards the extension of Social-Democratic ideas in Alsace."

On the anti-German attitude of the Socialists in Alsace, see Brocard, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 84, 1910, p. 62.

represent them today are either in prison with the younger Liebknecht or in Switzerland editing the *Freie Zeitung*.

Only dreamers imagine that Germany will change in a day. The cancer which infects the whole nation at the present moment will not be eradicated even if the Allies succeed in administering a crushing defeat to the militaristic party. It will be many long years before Social-Democratic or any shade of democratic theories will be other than foreign to the German spirit. Consequently, a people such as the Alsations, which, according to an official German professor, has received with sympathy from Germany nothing but democratic principles, can enjoy peace, prosperity and the free pursuit of happiness only after its life is reunited with that of its old mother.

CHAPTER VI

DURING THE WAR

AUTONOMY IS NOT SUFFICIENT NOW

All Alsatians were autonomists before August, 1914; there are few autonomists left now.

Alsace's representatives declared in 1871 and 1874 that the Treaty of Frankfort which disposed of them "like cattle" was invalid, and they issued this warning to the world:

"By these presents we proclaim for ever inviolable the right of Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain members of the French nation, and we swear, for ourselves and our constituents, for our children and their descendants, to claim that right eternally and by all means against any and all usurpers."

The sons of Grosjean, Keller, Teutsch, strove loyally to keep the peace of the world. The fatal hour struck through no fault of theirs, and they now claim their "right" to return to France and "remain members of the French nation."

There are few autonomists in Alsace now. The Abbé Wetterlé, one of the most distinguished leaders of the autonomists of the period before the war, declared the other day: "We could not, without exposing ourselves to prosecution on the charge of high treason, adopt a frankly separatist political program, and so had become, in a spirit of opportunism, militant autonomists." (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 15, 1917, p. 410.)¹

¹ He had written in *La Nouvelliste d'Alsace-Lorraine*, June 2,

Those leaders of the autonomists who were able to do so fled to France: Wetterlé, Blumenthal, Helmer, Weill, Laugel, Collin, Zislin and many others; Hansi had taken refuge in France a month or two before the war to escape a prison sentence. Preiss died in a German prison with many others of less renown. Samain was incarcerated at Coblenz until he was sent to the Russian front, where he was killed. In Alsace today the term for prison is "Hôtel de France," a title facetiously conferred by the very large number of prisoners who comfort themselves with the reflection: "At least we are in good society here."

The Germans, as we have already seen, realized that the demand for autonomy covered a desire to return to France. After the outbreak of war they came to understand that the protests of 1871 and 1874 were still a living force in the world. The *Basler Nachrichten* of June 29, 1917, gives an account of a desperate attempt to have the obnoxious declarations repealed. The Alsatian *Landtag* convened on June 5. The evening before, the Chancellor in person came to Strasbourg to bring pressure to bear in order to secure a vote favourable to Germany. He failed. Only the presidents of the two chambers were ready to obey his orders. The German newspapers have pretended that their statements were enthusiastically acclaimed. As a matter of fact the deputies who applauded could be counted on the fingers of the two hands. Most of the assembly had left the hall in protest.²

1910: "We should be entirely satisfied if we could obtain complete autonomy, equal in every point to that enjoyed by the Confederate States; that is the goal we aim at." (Quoted by Bourdon, *The German Enigma*, p. 318.)

² The Parliament of Alsace-Lorraine has practically ceased to exist. On April 12, 1918, out of sixty deputies who compose the second chamber, five appeared. The *Berliner Tageblatt*, on April

The Socialist Südekum had come at the same time with the Chancellor to work with the members of his party, fairly numerous in the Lower House, and to obtain their signatures, which he was to carry to Stockholm. He went away without a single name. Furthermore, the Bishops of Strasbourg and of Metz are members of the Upper House. Both are Germans, sent to the provinces to hold in check an indocile clergy. Both rose and declared that their consciences would not permit them to ask in the name of the people an expression of devotion to Germany. (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, August 1, 1917; Dimnet, in *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1917, p. 528.)

A German Swiss, von Arx, writing in the *Freie Zeitung* of October 3, 1917, passes the unescapable judgment on the Chancellor's signal failure: "The whole mentality of the Alsatian people, all their thoughts, all their feelings, are French. The world is witness that your manner of governing has had the result that you are today still as much foreigners in the eyes of the people of Alsace-Lorraine as you were on the day you annexed them." (Quoted in *Le Temps*, October 17, 1917.)

ALSATIANS IN THE FRENCH ARMY BEFORE 1914

The Alsatians have always been a military people. They have good reason to be proud of their record in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. But they have not been able to bring themselves to fight under the German flag. Just before the present war, Alsace could claim a higher percentage of superior officers in the French army than any French province. According to the official statistics of the French War Department,

24, commented on the significance of what it calls "the mute protest of the Alsatian and Lorraine deputies." (*Le Temps*, May 6, 1918.)

there were in 1914 in the French Army 20 generals, 145 superior officers, and 4000 ordinary officers, of Alsatian origin. In the German Army at this time there were four officers of Alsatian origin. The names of these four are well known to all Alsatis, and only two of them are pure Alsatis. (Dimnet, *l. c.*, p. 516; Hinzelin, p. 155; S. Lauzanne, in *World's Work*, February, 1918, p. 392.)

From 1871 on, large numbers of Alsatian boys, unable to endure the thought of serving in the German army, deserted home and family for ever and enlisted in the French Foreign Legion. Germany did everything possible to prevent this. After 1900, in particular, a vigorous campaign was waged in the press warning Alsatian parents of the misery their sons were sure to suffer fighting in tropical countries under the banner of the Foreign Legion. There was formed, even, a Society for Protection against the Foreign Legion. Notwithstanding all this, the desertions continued; and in the one year 1912, 1023 boys from Germany's Reichsland enlisted in the Legion, *a greater number than during any year since 1871*. (Hinzelin, pp. 23 ff.)

No French department, in proportion to population, has lost as many sons as Alsace-Lorraine in the campaigns conducted by France since 1871. (Hinzelin, *Cœurs . . .*, p. 232.)³

Treatment of Alsatian Soldiers

ALSACE, ENEMY COUNTRY

In July, 1914, German officers were well aware of

³ Alsatian leaders endeavoured to prevent the desertion of young men, realizing how disastrous to Alsace the continued emigration of her youth had been. Notwithstanding this, enrolments in the Foreign Legion increased steadily, and general emigration, ac-

the fact that the Alsatians could not be relied upon. Between fifteen and twenty thousand young men who had served in the German army escaped to France during the mobilization and the first weeks of the war, despite the fact that all deserters knew that by their action they forfeited all their property and brought persecution to their relatives left behind.⁴

At Mulhouse, in one proclamation, 773 boys born in the single year 1892 were declared deserters and ordered to appear before the court on March 1, 1915. On December 10, 1915, in one proclamation of the war-council of the 58th Infantry brigade of Freiburg and Mülheim, the names of 300 deserters were made known. (Fribourg, p. 131.) Throughout Alsace the number of deserters would have been much larger if the German staff had not prudently transferred the Alsatians to the Russian front.

A secret order of the Ministry of War, dated January 11, 1916, headed "Concerning the withdrawal of Alsatian and Lorraine soldiers from the West front," runs as follows:

"On account of numerous demonstrations of anti-German tendencies on the part of Alsatians and Lorrainers, it has been proposed to transfer all Alsatian and Lorraine soldiers to the interior of Germany or to the

cording to official figures, mounted after 1907 till in 1912 it almost reached the high percentage of the period 1873-1881.

Percentage of Emigration

1873-1881	70.4%
1907	52.9%
1912	68.6%

(*Statistische Jahrbücher für Elsass-Lothringen*, 1913-14, pp. 43, 45; quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, p. 335.)

⁴ Many of these deserters did not know a word of French, and it was necessary to find godmothers capable of corresponding with them in German. (Puech, in *La Paix par le Droit*, v. 27, 1917, p. 201.)

East front, without any consideration of the reputation or previous record of these soldiers, or of the recommendations of their superiors. •

“After careful study of the question, and with the approval of the general staff, the minister of war considers sufficient the measures taken in regard to the withdrawal from the West front of Alsatians and Lorrainers subject to mobilization. Therefore, he gives up the plan of transferring indiscriminately all Alsatian and Lorraine soldiers either to the interior or to the East front. On the other hand, it seems advisable to remove Alsatians and Lorrainers from all service and posts in the rear, where they might acquire information as to the organization of the army and as to measures of a military nature. Also, it will be well to relieve of their duties Alsatians and Lorrainers employed by superior officers or staffs, such as orderlies, liaison-men or secretaries. . . . Von Wandel.” (Fribourg, p. 136.)⁵

As if this were not sufficient evidence of the iniquity of German rule and the hatred of Alsatians for Germany, fortune has brought us an order dated a month later (February, 1916), which proves that Alsatians were not to be trusted in Germany's service even to the limited extent indicated above. This order is signed by Radecke, Major, for the *ad interim* commander of the 14th army corps, and runs as follows: “It is indispensable to act in conformity with the ministerial decision. All Alsatians and Lorrainers are to be relieved of their functions and sent to the front. In the future all Alsa-

⁵ As early as 1912, at the time when experiments were being made with new guns, Alsatians and Lorrainers were kept away from batteries of artillery. In 1913, by order of General von Mudra, commander of the 16th army corps at Metz, they were excluded from service on the telegraph, telephone and railway systems. (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, April, 1918, p. 41.)

tians and Lorrainers capable of bearing arms are to be sent directly to headquarters, whence they will be transferred to the Eastern armies. A report is requested before April 1, 1916." (Quoted by *Bulletin protestant français*, August, 1917, p. 4.)

The following regimental order signed by Von Bibra, Colonel of the 34th Regiment of Infantry, 80th Reserve Division, was published in the *Freie Zeitung* of November 21, 1917:

"January 25, 1917.

"As in the past few days three Alsatians have gone over to the enemy, all Alsatians and Lorrainers in the regiment are declared to be under suspicion. They will be withdrawn from the front tonight, quartered apart and employed as labourers on the high ground. . . . All conversation with civilians or with soldiers in the regiment is prohibited. All men from Alsace-Lorraine will be deprived of their privileges. Any mention of these measures made in letters or otherwise will be regarded as an offence against the law concerning the preservation of service secrets and most severely punished." (Quoted by *Le Temps*, November 22, 1917.)

In 1915, Dimnet met a soldier who was taken prisoner by a German patrol consisting of more than thirty men; these were Alsatians, and their sergeant trusted them enough to set the Frenchman free that night. If only one of the thirty had been willing, he could have gained a reward by reporting the sergeant. The fact that this officer could trust thirty men is a remarkable indication of the attitude toward France of Alsatians in the German army. (Dimnet, in *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1917, p. 528.)

Professor Martin Spahn of the Catholic faculty of the University of Strasbourg, one of the leaders of the Catholic centre, writing in the *Süddeutsche Monats-*

hefte for August, 1914, says of the Alsatian soldiers: "Our patriotic songs, such as *Die Wacht am Rhein* and *Deutschland über Alles*, are merely good marching songs to them." (Quoted by Blumenthal, *Contemporary Review*, May, 1917, p. 512.)

The *Volksrecht*, a socialist paper of Zürich, published nine circulars, telegrams and confidential reports issued by the Prussian ministry of war and the general staff. They are concerned with German propaganda in camps of prisoners, Mohammedans, Irish and others. On the margin of one of these, General von Loynfeld, military commander of the Berlin region, wrote the following: "The Alsatians are as foreign to us as the Irish to the English. The Lorrainers are French." (*Le Temps*, November 9, 1917.)

It is evident that Alsatians who did not desert to France are not fighting willingly for Germany, and they receive such treatment as might be expected from the officers who directed the exploits recounted in the Bryce report. It was, apparently, not feasible to use them all on the Eastern front. Many were forced into battle against the Western allies, even against the French.

"At the time of my first leave in the spring of 1915," relates an Alsatian, "I found the whole village imbued with sentiments of a violence I should never have suspected. It was genuine hate. It was then only that I felt the truth of what the Bavarian soldiers of my regiment used to repeat: 'The Alsatians and Lorrainers are French to the marrow of their bones.'" On his second leave, in 1916, his father said to him: "One day the French will return here; I can't endure the idea that you should be fighting against them." On the third occasion, in May, 1917, as the son confided to his parents that he would desert if he did not fear

reprisals upon them, his mother replied: "That is no reason at all." It was then that he crossed the frontier. (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, December, 1917, p. 135.)

The following extracts are from a letter published in the *Etoile de l'Est*, November 17, 1915:

"At Cologne I was put in a regiment in which there were already some Alsatians and Lorrainers. Our life was one long martyrdom. There are no evil treatments, irritations, and cruelties the Germans did not inflict upon us. They were well aware that our hearts were beating for France. They made us pay dearly for our attachment to our old fatherland. When officers passed near us, they cried: 'Ah! There are the *Wackes* (vagabonds). You're going to die, all of you, you French dogs.' And they beat us with their whips. For nine days they gave us nothing to eat but dried-up crusts. We hadn't even anything to drink. Finally, on the tenth day they served us a little soup and meat. After this single repast, we were sent to the front. We received our baptism of fire at Huy. All the Alsatians and Lorrainers were put in the first rank. The fire of the Belgians decimated them. Out of 135 of us in the same regiment, only 47 were left, and two of these were shot on the pretext that they had made signals to the enemy. In the evening after the battle an officer told us that we were to be treated thus in all combats till not a single one of us remained. . . . That evening the 45 survivors swore to profit by the first opportunity to escape. . . . Unfortunately we were under unremitting surveillance. Nevertheless, many of our comrades resolved to try. . . . In the midst of a combat they ran toward the French lines with their hands up, but as the Germans often resort to this trick to deceive the French, the latter thought it was a new trap

and shot down our friends. . . . Finally, during the battle around Ypres, we found ourselves suddenly in the presence of a French detachment; we immediately threw down our arms and cried out that we surrendered. When they learned our nationality, the soldiers did everything possible for us. Now we ask only one thing: to enlist in the French army and fight our tormentors." (Fribourg, p. 143.)

An Alsatian sergeant in the French army related the following incident to Fribourg. He was in a trench only a few metres from an enemy listening-post. One night he heard the men in the post talking the Alsatian German dialect. He called out to them: "Hey there, Alsations! Come over here! I'm a *Wacke* too." "We'd come fast enough," replied a voice, "but the non-com's up there." "I'll take care of him!" said the sergeant. He left the trench, found himself face to face with the "non-com," a German Pole, and killed him. The twenty-five men from the listening-post, who belonged to the 99th infantry of Zabern, went over to the French trench and refused to leave it to go to the rear till they had emptied their cartridge belts on their former brothers-in-arms. (Fribourg, pp. 144-145.)

The Abbé Wetterlé tells the story of a certain Jean, one of his Colmar friends. Jean was in Dresden at the outbreak of the war, and was enrolled in a Saxon regiment. He wrote to his father: "We leave tomorrow for the frontier. You know my feelings and you will appreciate my sorrow and my shame. I swear I shall not fire on French troops." Jean kept his word. At the beginning of September, during the battle of the Marne, he was in the front line, south of Châlons.

"Sergeant, your aim is defective," said his lieutenant. "All your balls strike the earth a hundred yards in front of you. Look out!"

Jean continued to fire.

"I understand," cried the officer suddenly. "You are all traitors, you Alsatian dogs! It is time to make an example of you."

With his revolver he shot Jean in the head, saying to his men: "That's the way the friends of France die." (Wetterlé, *Ce qu' était . . .*, pp. 194 ff.)

Early in the war a young Alsatian from the neighbourhood of Mulhouse wrote to a relative a letter from which the following extracts are detached:

"We left . . . for the trenches near Ypres. What we did there, what we endured there, I could not describe to you. Often I wished there were a ball for me; but I was always lucky. . . .

"I stayed there till March. Then came an order to remove all Alsations. They got us together and we were marched to the rear. . . . There were about two hundred of us from our regiment. We were sent to Hamburg. There we learned what was to be done with us. A captain made us a speech in which he said: 'Alsations have French leanings; they are deserters and are to be sent to Russia.' He told us further that we were mangy dogs, miserable reptiles, that we were not worthy of dying the death of heroes in the trenches, and that we ought to be shot then and there. . . . We were incorporated in new regiments and sent to Russia.

"We were sent to the front on foot, to Suwalki; there all was worse even than in Belgium. No rest, night or day. . . . We were devoured by vermin. Often we went days without being able to wash; as for changing our linen, no one thought of such a thing. From March 16th to the end of May, I had on my back the same shirt. . . . But the worst was hunger. . . . Finally my deliverance came . . . I was wounded . . ." (Fribourg, p. 141.)

In March, 1917, in the Main Committee of the Reichstag, the question of German tyranny in Alsace and Lorraine was brought up. The Centre Party Deputy, Herr Fehrenbach,—it is not only the Socialists who are revolted by the treatment of Alsace,—threatened that, unless adequate assurances were given, he would expose in detail in the Reichstag itself “the whole evil business.”

“Meanwhile, even the censored Committee report is eloquent enough. Herr Müller, Radical Deputy for Meiningen, said that the system of police provocation could not be allowed to continue, and that the military authorities prevented soldiers whose homes were in Alsace-Lorraine from going home on leave. The Minister of War, General von Stein, defended the authorities by admitting that a great part of the population was hostile to Germany. He actually declared that ninety *per cent.* of the letters examined by the censorship incited soldiers to desert. The Socialist Deputy Herr Böhle said that when soldiers from Alsace-Lorraine are granted leave, consent has to be obtained from the officials in Alsace-Lorraine and is constantly refused. He could not believe that ninety *per cent.* of the letters from home were incitement to desertion, but said that, if it were so, the fact was sufficiently explained by the state of the administration in Alsace-Lorraine. He had himself made efforts to obtain the redress of injustices, but the military authorities said that their only concern was the ‘protection of the military,’ and that they ‘did not bother themselves about the political consequences.’ At the beginning of the war there were thousands of volunteers from Alsace-Lorraine, but the feeling of the people had now entirely changed.

“Only the Conservatives supported the Government

in the debate." (London *Times*, March 30, 1917, p. 5.)

Treatment of Civilians

During the short-lived French offensive in Alsace early in the war, French soldiers were grieved to discover that not *all* Alsatians were friends. This unfriendliness, however, has been adequately explained; the population had every reason to fear that the French success was only temporary, and they knew what would happen after the return of the Germans to any who had aided the French. The Alsatians, especially the peasants, were already terrorized. But, despite all menaces, the vast majority welcomed the French with heartfelt joy. Here are three quotations bearing on the point,—many others might be offered:

"The French were received at Mulhouse with joyful rapture, and the tricolour hoisted on our Town Hall was saluted with cries of 'Vive la France!' or 'Vive la République!' . . . Even today many people believe in the victory of France, because such is their secret wish. . . ." (*Breisgauer Zeitung*, October 10, 1915.) "It is undeniable that the people of Mulhouse have lent aid to the French army, and that on a large scale." (*Strassburger Post*, July 17, 1915.) "The true spirit of the people was revealed to us, to say nothing of other things, in the welcome which the inhabitants of Guebwiller gave to the French prisoners." (*Kölnische Zeitung*, February, 1915.) "The people [of Lorraine] have not a drop of water for the Germans and in particular for our wounded comrades; whereas for the French soldiers they do all they can." (Letter from a Munich publicist, Jurineck, August, 1915.)⁶

⁶ These quotations are taken by the *Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, April, 1918, p. 40, from an important work (which I

If Von Jagow could say in January, 1914, that a German army in Alsace-Lorraine was in enemy country, the feeling of such an army since July, 1914, when Alsace saw at last the hope of a return to France, may well be imagined.

In general orders addressed to the Baden troops which crossed the Rhine in August, 1914, it is declared: "You are entering enemy country and you are to treat the inhabitants accordingly."

Several months later General Gaede, addressing his troops at Kayzersberg, said: "I like the country, but the population must be destroyed." (Wetterlé, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August 1, 1917, p. 502.)

Sanford Griffith says in the *Outlook* of December 20, 1916: "More than once a German officer has told me: 'We have to take the same precautions in Alsace as on the soil of the enemy.'"

We have seen how Alsations serving in the Kaiser's army are treated. It is, of course, not to be expected that Germans would treat civilians more gently than they do soldiers.⁷ The misery endured by the conquered provinces in the last four years can only be divined; after peace the gruesome story will be told. On March 23, 1917, the Socialist Wendel said in the Reichstag in a protest against the treatment of Alsations: "If some day these people are able to tell the

have not been able to see) on conditions in Alsace since 1914: Florent-Matter, *Les Alsaciens-Lorrains contre l'Allemagne*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1918.

⁷ Von Arx, the German Swiss, in the *Freie Zeitung* of October 3, 1917, denounces the persecution inflicted upon Alsace since 1914, and asks of the Germans: Why this wrath directed against a people whose sons have fallen at the side of yours? He answers his question: "It is because if the people of Alsace-Lorraine gave their blood in your armies, their hearts were never yours, and on the very brow of the dead you could read the contradiction." (Quoted by *Le Temps*, October 17, 1917.)

story of their fate, there will be a cry of indignation from the whole world." (Quoted by Creel, in the *Independent*, February 23, 1918, p. 310.)

The German mayor of Colmar, occupying the seat which is still Blumenthal's by right of election, posted the following proclamation:

"On the occasion of the German victories on the East front, I had invited all right-minded inhabitants to decorate their houses with flags. The invitation was definite and within the limits of my authority. I regret to note that it was not at all observed. Among the so-called upper classes the abstention took on the character of a veritable demonstration. Thus all my efforts to represent the population of Colmar as loyal and profoundly attached to Germany have failed most completely, and it is my duty to call the attention of the inhabitants to the rigorous consequences which such an attitude cannot fail to have for their city and for themselves." (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, September 1, 1915, p. 44.)

An appeal to subscribe to a war loan was posted in French and in German at Lindre-Basse, near Dieuze, in 1917. It runs in part as follows:

"The Reichsland will never again become French.

"Let every one rest assured of that. For the Germans there can be no question of abandoning this country.

"If a withdrawal were possible, the Alsatians and Lorrainers would have to deplore it more than the other Germans.

"It would be a recoil step by step, and every inch of the ground of Alsace-Lorraine would be reduced to the state of a desert by the attack and by the defence; let every inhabitant reflect upon it.

"Let every one reflect upon this: that after the war

the German Empire will inquire very closely as to how the Reichsland has behaved during the war.

"Fidelity and attachment shall have their rewards, as well as treason, and indifference — which must be considered on a level with treason." (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, October 15, 1917, p. 96.)

This reminds us of the Kaiser's declaration: "If I am forced to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, I shall leave it bald as my hand." (Wetterlé, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August, 1917, p. 503.)

The *Strassburger Post* said on April 11, 1917: "Alsatian bonds are now paid for at a considerably higher rate than that of German securities of the same kind. Those who prefer to buy these bonds at such a high price, with the reassuring thought that nothing can happen to them, since Alsatian bonds will, whatever happens, become the securities of the victor, forget that beautiful Alsace, before falling into the hands of the enemy, would be laid waste and levelled to the ground like the lands abandoned on the Somme." (Quoted by *Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, April, 1918, p. 43.)

It was not to be hoped that Alsace might escape the dire effects of the reign of terror systematically instituted in other "enemy country."

A very large number of letters have been smuggled out since the war started. They all have the same tone. Here is one from an Alsatian woman in Strasbourg, written in 1916:

"How we have been suffering, how wretched we have been, especially for the last two weeks!

"A reign of terror has been inaugurated. We leave our houses only when it is necessary. We speak in low voices. We look about us suspiciously. Many acquaintances and friends have been expatriated and sen-

tenced to prison, often twenty-four hours after arrest and without right of appeal. . . .

"We are suspected, spied upon on all sides, by those whom we suppose least capable of doing it. A gesture, a word, a dust-cloth waved out of a window, have caused hundreds of people to be shot. . . .

"It is not out of cowardice that our peasants do not welcome French troops very warmly. They are terrorized." (Fribourg, p. 34.)

An example of German terrorization by means of spies and delation is the case of the lawyer Burger, an officer of reserves, who had given proof of a friendly attitude toward the conquerors. One day, speaking with one of his German colleagues, he said in a low voice, "in Flüstertone," according to the official accusation: "Germany cannot deny, however, that she entered a neutral country, Belgium." The German and Burger were very intimate,—table-friends, "*Stammtischfreunde*." They said "thou" and "thee" to each other. Burger's comrade denounced him to the military authorities, and he was condemned to eight months' imprisonment for having dared to speak of the invasion of Belgium by Germany "despite the articles of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which, as a well-informed man, 'als gebildeter Mensch,' he ought to have known." (Fribourg, p. 38.)

A woman writes at the beginning of 1916 as follows:

"We are overwhelmed here, terrorized, treated in an atrocious manner. The Boches are rendering themselves so odious that the population will never forget it."

Another:

"At Colmar . . . the Germans reign as masters, crushing the Alsatians beneath their boots, shooting

some, imprisoning others, sending all they can to the other side of the Rhine; pillaging, sacking, burning everything. They say themselves, 'We are in enemy country here.'"

The following incident is related in a letter:

"One day two hundred French prisoners were being marched through Strasbourg. Arriving in front of the station, they saw a girl come out dressed in the Alsatian costume, and all, officers and men, gave her the military salute. The poor girl was dreadfully confused, and those who witnessed the scene hid themselves to weep." (Fribourg, pp. 35 ff.)

The joy of Alsatians, in parts of their country definitively rescued from Germany, has been frequently and vividly attested by American newspaper correspondents.

CONDEMNATIONS

The prisons of Alsace, "Hôtels de France," do not suffice to contain all the victims of German terrorization, petty or monstrous.

On February 22, 1916, the sub-prefect of Boulay, considering that "in these times of war the population of Lorraine should have some regard for the feelings of the German population and of the many German soldiers present in the country," sends out the following order to all the mayors under his jurisdiction:

"The use in public of the French language on the part of persons who know enough German to make themselves understood, or enough to enable them to have recourse to persons who do possess a sufficient knowledge of German, will be considered a provocation."

Forthwith, convictions rain. Several hundred have been found in the local newspapers.⁸ Women and chil-

⁸ At first the Germans published full accounts of condemnations and executions in Alsace, with a view to terrorizing the popula-

dren are punished for having spoken French in street-cars or on the street. A merchant is convicted for having left a French label on packages. Girls in boarding-schools are watched for fear they may speak the hated tongue. Uniforms of firemen and schoolboys are forbidden because they have "a French cut." (*Bulletin protestant français*, August, 1917, p. 5.)

The clergy have been treated with the same severity as laymen. The Abbé Horber of Saint-Etienne de Mulhouse was condemned to five months in prison for the expression of anti-German sentiments. In a course of religious instruction he had declared that man is not required to love the temporal authority, but merely to obey it. During the trial the military advocate, Schott, censured violently the general attitude of the region. The case of the Abbé Horber, he said, was all the more grave because he had received in Germany an excellent education. He deplored the fact that the Protestant parish of Saint-Etienne de Mulhouse was no better than the Catholic. "It is shameful," he said, "that the greater part of the clergy of Upper Alsace has not lived up to our expectations," and he added that in applauding the Abbé Horber the children had acted in accordance with instructions received from their families. (Fribourg, p. 78.)

Pastor Gérold, a much respected patriarch of Strasbourg, eighty years old, was brought before the war-council on the charge of having given money to French wounded in the hospitals, and of having shown anti-German sentiments in two of his sermons. On account of his age, he was given only one month in prison. A

tion. But they finally discontinued the practice, since it proved — what they have been at so much pains to disprove — that Alsatians are so hostile to German rule that thousands must be sent to prison. (Fribourg, p. 45.)

very significant note in the *Kölnische Zeitung* in February, 1915, refers to this case:

"It is impossible," says the author, "to close our eyes to the great number of arrests on charges of high treason, not only of professional traitors, but also of many other people. It is impossible to close our eyes to cases like that of Pastor Gérold of Strasbourg, who, after having played an important rôle in the society of German Protestants and having been made Honorary Doctor by the Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg for his collaboration on the new book of canticles for Alsace-Lorraine, has not scrupled to express freely his anti-German feeling from the pulpit and in the hospitals, and so ostentatiously that the war-council has had to condemn him to a month in prison.

"There is reason to deplore still more the case of Dr. Goehrs, judge at Mulhouse, who was deprived of his functions by a disciplinary tribunal as a result of a public demonstration of hostility to Germany.

"The true spirit of the people is revealed, among other incidents, by the welcome offered by the population of Guebwiller to the French prisoners while they were passing through the city. This reception was such that the local commandant and the prefect of Colmar were obliged to go personally before the municipal council, called together expressly for this purpose under the presidency of the Old German [i.e., Immigrant] Freyseng, to present their protest and threaten the population with the most severe reprisals if the action were repeated. . . ." (Fribourg, pp. 80-82.)

Many functionaries are not restrained by their lucrative positions from expressing their feeling in regard to Germany. Three secretaries in the office of the director of internal revenue at Strasbourg, Laucher, Glentzinger and Meyer, were condemned in August,

1916, the first two to six months in prison, and the third to a year, "for demonstration of anti-German sentiments." On August 28, the director himself, Weymann, was condemned to a year in prison for "pro-French statements." (Fribourg, p. 86.)

"In Alsace-Lorraine French sympathies exist, not only in parliamentary circles, but even in some circles of government servants. This is proved by the sentences, comparatively numerous, pronounced against government servants, for anti-German demonstrations," says the *Schwäbischer Merkur*, May 11, 1917. (Quoted by *Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, April, 1918, p. 40.)

A very large number of children have received prison sentences. The following is one example: Johann Ingold, a pupil of a Mulhouse school, carried off and tore up the portrait of the Kaiser which hung in a classroom, painted French flags and added the inscription "Vive la France"; furthermore, according to the official accusation, "he derided the German colours, even though his father occupies a very lucrative position as a German official." Johann was condemned to one month of imprisonment. (Fribourg, p. 66.)

To judge by the condemnations, it would seem that love of France has remained strongest in the hearts of the humble, the proletariat. The erroneous notion prevailed before the war, even in France, that the Alsatian workman was prosperous and satisfied under German rule. Hundreds of published condemnations have proved the falsity of this supposition.

Just as the peasants in Belgium and Northern France have suffered more than any other class, so they have suffered in Alsace. Their property has been wantonly destroyed, and they have been shot on the pretexts invoked so many times elsewhere. An old man was murdered because he had hidden four eggs. Since the

beginning of the war no peasant has known, when he got up in the morning, whether he would sleep the next night in bed or in prison. Espionage and delation have rendered his life a hell. (Fribourg, pp. 120 ff.)

PROTESTS IN THE REICHSTAG

Socialist deputies in the Reichstag have repeatedly denounced the treatment of Alsatians. On March 20, 1915, in an impassioned speech in the Reichstag, the socialist member Ledebour protested against the rigorous measures enforced by German authorities in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. (*La Paix par le Droit*, v. 25, 1915, p. 233.)

At a meeting of the Reichstag in 1916, the socialist deputy Emmel, of Mulhouse, protested against the arbitrary manner in which the police arrest Alsatians, who in most cases are ignorant of the reason of their arrest. He protested also against the regulations which made it impossible for the Alsatians to defend themselves. (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, June 15, 1916, p. 155.)

"The treatment inflicted, at first, upon the Alsatians," wrote the socialist member Hermann Wendel in the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, November 14, 1915, "was such as one would have had no right to inflict upon known criminals. If the padlock of martial law were to be removed from our lips, and if we were allowed to speak on all these subjects, shame would flush the brow of every German for whom German honour is not a vain word."

It was Wendel again who made a new protest in the Reichstag, in May, 1917, jointly with Groeber, a member of the Centre.

"In Alsace-Lorraine," he declared, "hundreds of persons have been arrested who had never displayed the

smallest anti-German activity. . . . Many people have been prosecuted who had relatives in France, or who had formerly travelled in France on matters of business or pleasure; and, lastly, all rich or influential people of Alsace and Lorraine. . . . Today a condition of extremely rigorous penalties still prevails: expulsion from a district, obligation to report to the police daily, refusal of leave, even in urgent cases. . . . This scarcely credible state of things is such today that prosecutions are conducted against the use of the French language even in parts of the country where the great majority of the population speaks only French. . . . Alsace-Lorraine is living under a reign of terror. No one can rest assured that he will not be accused, without the shadow of reason and by any worthless fellow, of anti-German feelings, and condemned to prison on suspicion or to expulsion from the district. . . ." (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, April, 1918, p. 41.)

A deputy said in the Reichstag on October 18, 1916, while speaking of civilians of Alsace-Lorraine who had been thrown into prison at the beginning of the war: "After two and a half years of detention, they are broken morally and physically, and ruined." (Eccard, p. 45.)

In 1917 the socialist Hauss declared in the Reichstag that in Alsace honest men are at the mercy of scoundrels. He cited the case of an individual who had had eighty people arrested. This fellow, he said, was found to be a rascal, was condemned to death and executed,—but the eighty were still in jail. He added that at that moment 2000 Alsatians were detained in prisons in the Reichsland. (*Le Temps*, October 18, 1917.)

Wendel said in the Reichstag in June, 1918: "There is no reason for astonishment if in Alsace-

Lorraine the people are filled with hatred of Germany and the desire of vengeance. . . . If a plebiscite were held to-day, four-fifths of the population would vote in favour of France, solely in order to escape the régime of oppression." (*Le Temps*, June 10, 1918.)

ATROCITIES AND DEPORTATIONS

Irrefutable evidence shows that the same sort of atrocities have taken place in Alsace as in Belgium and Northern France.

We are familiar with the German practice of making Belgian mayors pay for actual or suspected hostility on the part of inhabitants. Many similar incidents are already on record for Alsace-Lorraine. After the battle at Mulhouse in August, 1914, the mayor and priest of a village in the neighbourhood were arrested by the Germans, tied to a gun-carriage, dragged about thus during a whole day in the midst of the battle, and then shot. The imperial official who related this incident to an Alsatian laughed heartily and said: "Die Leute sollen geheult haben vor Angst." ("Those people are said to have howled for terror.") Noting the surprise of the Alsatian at his savage joy, he added: "That was the thing to do. The village church-bell had been rung to warn the French of the approach of the Germans. It was right that the mayor and the priest should pay for the village." (Fribourg, p. 92.)

Deportations such as those which incensed the civilized world in the case of Belgium have been enforced in Alsace.⁹ According to the avowal of the German Under-Secretary of War, Alsatian girls have

⁹ In his speech at the Sorbonne on March 1, 1918, M. Paul Deschanel, President of the French Chamber of Deputies, stated that the deportations of Alsatians and Lorrainers during the war reached 10,000, and that the German judges had inflicted 6,000 years of imprisonment. (*Edinburgh Review*, April, 1918, p. 336.)

been dragged from their homes and forced to work wherever it pleased the military authorities. Energetic protests were made to the Reichstag by a deputy of Alsace-Lorraine and by the Bishop of Strasbourg. The Government replied in a communication published in the official *Strassburger Post*, November 3, 1917. It is stated there that arrangements have been made in order to insure "for the young girls requisitioned in Alsace-Lorraine and at present employed as labourers at the front, the benefits of a moral and religious supervision." That probably was intended to placate the Bishop. It is added that "eight *per cent.* only of these girls are less than seventeen years of age, and that hardly half of them were subjected to work at the front in a coercive manner." It is announced that the girls less than seventeen years of age who had been enlisted by force will be liberated as soon as possible.

The Swiss newspaper *Le Pays* has given some complementary details. "The local command," it says, "did in fact proceed to the country districts, and, recruiting the most robust girls, made them put on a uniform, a cap and hip-boots. These unfortunate women were to pass the night in sheds near the cantonments and be guarded by soldiers." (*Bulletin de l'Alliance française*, December 1, 1917, pp. 135 ff.)

The dismal failure of German rule in Alsace and the absolute necessity of continuing this war until the desire of practically the entire population of Alsace for restoration to France is realized, "in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all," are summed up in these words of the *Basler National Zeitung*, a neutral or pro-German newspaper, in its issue of February 8, 1915:

"The innumerable decisions of war-councils whose duty it is to take cognizance of Germanophobe demon-

strations are conclusive. . . . Hundreds of men of all classes have been thrown into prison or placed on the lists of the proscribed for their French leanings. . . . Despite its love for French traditions, the Alsatian people certainly did not desire to become French again at the cost of a war. But war has come, shattering completely the existing order of things, and it is found that, as a result of a régime of oppression which is persecuting the people even in their most intimate habits of life, the wishes and hopes of other times reappear stronger than ever.

“And so the war with all the events that compose it, events especially painful to the Alsations, has but made more profound the abyss which in the Reichsland separates the two elements. The fatal result is that every one turns more and more towards France, and this even in those circles which, before the war, were more or less disposed to accept what had become historical facts. Even in German circles this transformation of the popular feeling in Alsace-Lorraine is well known. . . . It is sought too often to give us a false idea of the state of mind of the Alsations, in order to have a basis of accusation and to justify certain measures enforced by their present masters. In the presence of these efforts, it is well to have the courage to tell the truth openly and squarely. And the truth is that the Alsatian people, taken as a mass, the exceptions overlooked, would welcome the return to France as a deliverance, putting an end to a situation which had become intolerable.” (Quoted by Fribourg, p. 6.)

CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC QUESTION

THE LORRAINE IRON

The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* said after the beginning of the present war: "Bismarck was actuated solely by strategic reasons when he annexed Alsace-Lorraine. But the country had a considerable economic value. 1) We have at Pechelbronn, in Alsace, the only important oil-well in all Germany. . . . 2) In Upper-Alsace there are rich potash deposits. If this region belonged to France, the German potash monopoly, which renders all foreign lands, especially North America, tributary to our country, would be lost. . . .¹ 3) . . . Terror strikes us when we think what would have happened to us in the present war if we had not had the Lorraine iron fields in our possession. . . ." Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit* . . . , p. 170.)

Of the production of iron ore within the district covered by the *Zollverein* (Germany and Luxembourg) in 1913, which amounted to almost 36,000,000 tons, 21,100,000 came from Lorraine and 7,300,000 from Luxembourg.

The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* may well shudder with terror at the thought of what would have happened to Germany in the present war but for the iron lands she seized fifty years ago in Lorraine, a country as French as Gascony, a country which had been thor-

¹ The slag, a by-product of the Lorraine iron industry, is valuable as fertilizer. In 1914, America imported 74,588 tons of it, valued at \$20 a ton. (S. Brooks, in *North American Review*, November, 1917, p. 698.)

oughly French as far back as history carries us. Germany, however, never would have engaged in this war but for her gains in the war of 1870; it would have been utterly impossible for her to plan and execute the attack of 1914 but for her possession of the Lorraine iron.

THE BRIEY BASIN

Bismarck's geologists in 1871 made a mistake. They did not, as they thought, seize *all* the French iron fields. In 1871 metallurgists regarded phosphoric ores as unworkable, but a few years later a process for dephosphorizing ores was discovered by Thomas and Gilchrist. As a result of this discovery, the part of the ferruginous district Bismarck allowed France to keep is more valuable than the part he took. Fifty-nine *per cent.* of the fields lie within the French boundaries, but nine-tenths of this is in the Briey basin, which has been in German hands since the beginning of the war. Just as Germany could never have started the present war without the French iron she seized in 1870, so she could not have continued it for six months without the French iron she seized in 1914.

In a confidential memorandum on the conditions of future peace addressed to Bethmann-Hollweg by the six great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany, May 20, 1915, it is said: "If the production of pig iron and steel had not been doubled since August, 1914, the continuation of the war would have been impossible. At present, in many cities, even outside the Luxembourg-Lorraine district, the minette [from Briey in France] furnishes from 60 to 80 *per cent.* of the appliances made from iron and steel. If this production be disturbed, the war will be practically lost." (Quoted by Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland*, p. 129.)

ANNEXATION AND THE NEXT WAR

And needless to say, Germany intends to hold the Briey region permanently. "The security of Germany," it is said in the memorandum just quoted, "demands imperiously the possession of the Briey region, including the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, without which it could not be held." Professor Schumacher of Bonn University, one of the leading German economists, said in an address delivered in Berlin on June 20, 1915, printed and circulated as "manuscript, strictly confidential":

"The Peace of Frankfort was to have given us all the ore in Lorraine. This we did not obtain, because the geologists whom Bismarck consulted in drawing the frontier were in error as to the extent of the iron fields. Since the '80's we know that, contrary to Bismarck's view, the broader and more important deposits of ore in the plateau of Briey . . . were left in the hands of France. Today we can make good this serious mistake, since we fortunately conquered these districts at the beginning of the war and hold them firmly in our grasp." (Quoted in *Out of Their Own Mouths*, p. 132.)²

² In January, 1917, Ambassador Gerard asked Bethmann-Hollweg, when they were discussing terms of peace: "How about the eastern frontier (of France)?" The Chancellor answered: "We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier (there)." "Of course," adds Gerard, "rectification is a polite term for 'annexation.'" (Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, p. 366.) The Socialist leader Haase, in February, 1918, before a meeting of the Main Committee of the Reichstag, read excerpts from a secret communication sent to Austria by former Chancellor Michaelis. The following is a paragraph from this communication: "In the Vosges the boundary line must be improved through the annexation of some valleys, so that the German frontier troops can no longer be fired upon from French territory. France will lose Briey and a strip of land west of Luxembourg. The value of Briey, in an economic and military sense, is evident

Many of the quotations here, and indeed throughout this book, are from the lips or pens of mad Pan-Germanists. It may be objected that they do not represent the will of the people of Germany. Dr. David writes in the Socialist *Vorwärts*, September 2, 1917: "The annexationists cry in chorus that the majority of the people is not behind the Reichstag, and impudently affirm that the people are enthusiastic for their aims of conquest. This is laughable, but the German political system prevents the governors from coming into contact with the governed and from learning their real opinion." (Quoted by *Conquest and Kultur*, p. 157.) It was pretty well agreed in the United States during the first year or two of the war that the German people were unwillingly following their leaders. In any case they *have* followed their leaders, who are all Pan-Germanists; it has become evident that they have followed them *willingly*; and, if Germany succeeds, the people will continue to follow these same leaders, more willingly than ever. If Germany meets overwhelming defeat, then, perhaps, the people will disapprove the Pan-German scheme, and, possibly, grow bold enough to denounce it elsewhere and more energetically than through the few bold survivors of the minority Socialists in the national debating society.

It has grown increasingly evident since 1914 that Pan-Germanism is not the dream of a handful of crazy junkers, professors and preachers; it is the doctrine which guides the whole mass of the German people, with marvellously few exceptions.

from the fact that 16,000,000 tons of iron ore are produced there [annually]. For the safeguarding of the German and Luxembourg iron industry and its territory, Longwy must remain in our hands; France must be compensated by a piece of the provinces of Hainault, Brabant [both, parts of Belgium], and Luxembourg." (*Current History*, April, 1918, p. 3.)

It is not only the Pan-Germans of the capitalist class who demand the annexation of the Briey region. The *Volkszeitung* of Cologne published a resolution voted at Freiburg by members of the Moderate parties, the National Liberal, Centre and Conservative, in which it is declared: "The annexation of Briey and Longwy is indispensable to the security of Germany. . . . To keep Alsace-Lorraine, which we hold by force of conquest, we must now further take by force another strip of France." (Quoted by Dewey, in the *New York Nation*, February 1, 1917, p. 126.)

The Socialists have never gone so far, but they (the Majority Socialists, not the Minority Socialists) have never been willing to discuss the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and have repeatedly answered queries as to the right of peoples to choose their rulers in much the same words as those uttered by Emmel at a congress of the party at Würzburg in October, 1917: "The wealth of these provinces [Alsace and Lorraine] in raw materials is a sufficient reason for imposing upon Germany the duty of retaining them." (Quoted by *Le Temps*, October 19, 1917.) It is not only to Pan-Germanists that raw materials appeal.

Bismarck seized the Lorraine mine fields, not in order to make Germany a great industrial nation devoted to peace, but in order to protect her against France, in order to prepare for the next war. The Briey fields will be necessary to Germany after the present conflict, not for industrial reasons, but so that when that nation again sallies forth to conquer the world she will not lack iron. The industrial associations of Berlin and Düsseldorf, in a statement sent to Hertling and Hindenburg in 1917, renewed the Memorial addressed by the six associations to Bethmann-Hollweg two years before. They declare the annexation of the Briey and Longwy

basin indispensable because the possession of this region is of incalculable value to Germany for economic, industrial and agricultural reasons, *in view of a future war.* (*Le Temps*, December 28, 1917.)

Pastor Wilhelm Phillipi, editor of the *Christian Patriotic Weekly*, Berlin, in an editorial under the caption "Through Tirpitz to Jesus," is quoted by our American papers of January 6, 1918, as saying: "Our Divine Redeemer is a lover of peace. So are we, but the peace that the Lord wants must be a lasting peace, and no peace can be lasting except one that brings us Courland, the mining regions of Longwy and Briey, and bases to serve as starting points for our fleet in any eventual war with England.

"Our Tirpitz, a man after Christ's own heart, can assure us the latter. He may be appropriately styled the Warlike Nazarene, whose ardent patriotism is only equalled by his devotion to his Divine Master, who will be his guide in any future enterprise he may engage in for the glorification of Germanism." (Query: Does "Divine Master" mean Christ or the Kaiser?)

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY AT STAKE

The feeling is still alive in the United States that Germany must not be deprived of the Lorraine iron, for her industrial welfare depends upon it. Americans of consequence — still, despite everything, under the spell of that superstition which makes of the Germans a superior race — suggested a year or so ago, and may, perhaps, some day suggest again, that Alsace be restored to France and Lorraine be left in German hands! German industrial prosperity must not be impaired!

It was necessary for German industrial prosperity that she have the Lorraine mines in 1870. Germans now say it is necessary for their prosperity that they

have the Briey mines,— necessary for their industrial prosperity, and also essential in preparation for the next war, which they are already planning.

Necessary for German industrial prosperity! Are we to forget French industrial prosperity? Shall France be utterly forgotten? If all the iron in Lorraine were gold, it would not suffice to repay France a tithe of what she has lost in heroic sons during the last four years as a result of Germany's dastardly assault.

And the iron of Lorraine belongs to France, for Lorrainers are Frenchmen, Lorraine is French territory, Lorraine was always French. The loss of this land would cripple German industries? What has been the loss to French industries in the last fifty years, during which Germany has by the right of the mailed fist held these French riches? Listen to a Frenchman lamenting in 1872 the crippling of French industries: "Their industries [those of Alsace and Lorraine] did us honour; they counted for much in our fortune, and held the first rank in the scale of our production, Lorraine for her foundries and her forges, her glasses and her crystals, Alsace for her cotton mills and her woollen mills and especially her cotton prints, in the production of which for half a century she had been inimitable." (Reybaud, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November, 1872, p. 221.)

Let us not forget that this is not a capitalists' war. The territory at stake, in so far as it represents mere money value, must never be allowed to obscure our vision; this is not a mere sordid scramble for wealth; we are fighting — countless lives have been sacrificed — that justice may again rule in the world, a justice which shall prevent such holocausts as the ghastly one before our eyes at the present time.

Alsatians and Lorrainers demand that they be re-

leased from the yoke under which they have laboured for half a century. Justice to France demands that what is rightfully hers by legitimate possession of the land, and by the choice of the people dwelling in that land, be restored to her.

Germany has been insisting that there must be no economic war after the next treaty of peace. But she has since 1887, and even before, been waging the most determined economic war against France, as far as Alsace-Lorraine is concerned, to the great detriment of Alsace and Lorraine as well as of France. When peace finally comes, certain economic reforms will doubtless take place. An international agreement may be reached whereby Germany and France will freely exchange iron and coal. But the land belongs to the Lorrainers, who are Frenchmen and who insist that they be allowed as Frenchmen to make their land a part of the domain of the French Republic.

GERMAN ECONOMIC PROPAGANDA IN ALSACE BEFORE THE WAR

The German government has tried by its usual skillful propaganda to create the impression that were Alsace and Lorraine detached from the Empire they would face economic ruin. At the moment of the elections of 1911, an official booklet was published, entitled *The Economic Development of Alsace-Lorraine under German Administration*. So successful has the German propaganda been that not only the United States and other foreign nations but even many Alsatians and Lorrainers have been convinced. But their conviction that a return to France was not possible for economic reasons was not unaccompanied by regrets. An Alsatian, Stehelin, in a pamphlet written in 1911 to prove the economic impediment to reincorporation in the Repub-

lic, declared: "Our affection for France has not varied, but a new and considerable factor has had time to make itself felt, the economic factor." In a letter of the same year to Coquet, he writes: "However difficult it is for us to look the situation in the face, however great the sorrow we feel, we are forced to recognize that the door is closed against our return to France. If you knew how grievous this idea is to us, you would understand why it took us so long to open our eyes." (Coquet, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 43, 1917, p. 219.)³

ALSATIAN PROSPERITY — THE REVERSE OF THE MEDAL

Has Alsace-Lorraine really prospered under German rule? The wealth of the country has increased, without doubt, but this is due almost exclusively to the exploitation of the vast iron mines in Lorraine. The profit derived from the consumption of natural resources is rather a loss than a gain, unless the product is used for manufactures within the country. Germany proper, especially Prussia, has been enriched by Lorraine iron; Lorraine has been growing poorer. The test of a country's prosperity is in its creative industries, not in the amount of money received from the exploitation of exhaustible natural wealth. The question of the Lorraine iron, the source of the increase in the *per*

³ Prof. W. Förster, the astronomer of Berlin, says in a personal letter to David Starr Jordan, September, 1913: "Germany has throughout treated the people of Elsass-Lothringen in embittering fashion. By this means, the painful influence of the conquest on the feelings of the French people has been kept alive and constantly renewed. In spite of this, a vote of the people of Elsass-Lothringen would now probably show a majority in favour of remaining a part of Germany. This would mainly be on economic grounds, as the fruit and vine industry of Elsass-Lothringen is in closer relation to the interests of Germany than to those of France." (Jordan, p. 26.)

capita wealth of the two provinces, will be discussed later.

The Lorraine iron aside, Alsace and Lorraine, it may be said with assurance, have not prospered. It must not be forgotten that since 1870 the whole world, and Germany especially, has grown richer with astounding acceleration. Alsace and Lorraine have had a pitifully small share in this general advance, and the fault is Germany's.

It would be natural to suppose that Alsace would prosper in the same proportion as the rest of the Empire. Her failure to do so is exceedingly significant, for were she in her normal economic sphere, her progress would have paralleled more or less closely that of other regions in the same sphere.

TAXATION

The burden of taxation has become more heavy in all countries, but Alsace and Lorraine have suffered from this much more than they would have if they had remained French. Before the war of 1914, taxes in the two provinces were 50% higher than across the Vosges. The State exploited iron mines in Lorraine without paying industrial taxes. It paid no taxes on its railroads. The Alsatian cities were never poorer; they were overwhelmed with debts. The cost of living was much greater than in France. (Hinzelin, pp. 152-159.)

Some figures on taxation in Alsace-Lorraine will make clear the very great increase in public burdens since 1870.

Budget of Alsace-Lorraine

1870: 35,421,648 marks

1914: 74,625,027 marks, an increase of over 100%.⁴

Debt

1870: none at all

1910: 52,650,000 marks, represented by bonds which pay 3% and were in 1911 quoted at 83.

In addition to the budget and debt of the Reichsland as a state, must be considered the separate burdens of departments and communes.

Budget of Departments

1882: 4,347,253 marks

1909: 8,999,981 marks, an increase of 100% in 27 years.

The debt of Upper-Alsace, one of the three departments, was in 1908, 2,675,000 marks, on which 4% or 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ % is paid. In 1909 a loan of 4,000,000 marks was floated.

Budget of Communes

1872: 14,738,128 marks — 9 m. 50 pf. per capita

1908: 49,307,295 marks — 27 m. 90 pf. per capita

Communal Debt

1872: 15,057,576 marks

1908: 160,152,111 marks

1913: 209,572,000 marks

Colmar may be considered as a normal city:

Population in 1870: 23,669

⁴ The alarming increase in the budget is shown by the figures for the last few years before the war:

1911	66,766,662	marks
1912	68,118,286	"
1913	70,577,622	"
1914	74,625,027	"

Population in 1908: 42,000 (including the garri-
son)

Taxes in Colmar in 1870: 567,364 marks

1908: 4,204,500 marks

Debt of Colmar in 1870: 1,120,000 marks

1908: 14,000,000 marks ⁵

The most distressing feature of this intolerable increase is that it has been in large measure due to megalomaniac expenditures — the architectural atrocities committed in Strasbourg, for example — forced upon the people by their German masters. The German administration has unquestionably been efficient, — and for this Alsace is grateful, — but it has been costly, and the benefits derived have not been by any means commensurate with the increased expense. Still worse, Alsations had no choice; they could accept or reject the benefits as they pleased, but the taxes, levied by an administration which took its orders from Berlin, had to be paid.

The cost of administration increased with great rapidity after Alsace-Lorraine became German; 1.31 francs *per capita* under the French régime, it had already become 3.12 francs *per capita* five years later, in 1876. (Antony, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 27, 1912, p. 53; v. 28, p. 39.)

Alsace-Lorraine pays 4,000,000 marks for the collection of customs-duties and of indirect taxes, and is reimbursed to the extent of 2,500,000. All the railroads are owned by the Empire, which not only pays no taxes but requires out of the provincial funds a subsidy of 40,000 marks for every kilometre of railroad built, even

⁵ The figures concerning finance here given are taken from official sources. An article by Muller in the *Economiste français* (v. I, 1912, pp. 159 ff.) has been of great assistance.

in the case of strategic roads of no industrial value, and there are very many of these. In all the other states of the Empire, on the other hand, the Imperial treasury pays for strategic lines which serve no industrial purpose. (Antony, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 27, 1912, p. 253; Delahache, p. 167.)

This avalanche of taxation came without an increase in wealth even remotely compensatory, and with only a slight increase in population. Germany herself has had the utmost difficulty in keeping pace with mounting taxes — due in large part to the insane race in armaments with England, and to preparation for the present war — even though her wealth has advanced far more rapidly than that of any other European nation, and her population as well.

POPULATION

The increase in population in the important states of the Empire as compared with that in Alsace-Lorraine, is as follows:

	Area			Percentage
	Eng. sq. miles	1871	1910	of increase
Prussia	134,616	24,689,252	40,165,219	62.7
Bavaria	29,292	4,863,450	6,887,291	41.6
Württemberg	7,534	1,818,539	2,437,574	34.0
Baden	5,823	1,461,562	2,142,833	46.6
Saxony	5,789	2,556,244	4,806,661	88.0
Alsace-Lorraine ...	5,604	1,549,738	1,874,014	20.9

(*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, v. 33, 1912, pp. 1-3.)

Two-thirds of the increase in population in Alsace-Lorraine is concentrated in the four great cities, whose increase is as follows:

	1871	1910	Increase
Strasbourg	85,654	178,891	93,000
Metz	53,623	68,598	15,000

	1871	1910	<i>Increase</i>
Mulhouse	52,892	95,041	43,000
Colmar	23,311	43,808	20,000
			<hr/> 181,000 *

This increase is almost negligible in comparison with the increase in German cities. The following table of official statistics shows the increase in all German cities whose population is greater than that of Strasbourg:

	1870	1910		1870	1910
Berlin	825,389	2,071,257	Essen	51,526	294,653
Hamburg ..	240,251	931,035	Chemnitz ..	68,229	287,807
Munich	169,478	596,467	Stuttgart ..	91,623	286,218
Leipzig	106,925	589,850	Magdeburg ..	84,452	279,629
Dresden ...	177,089	548,308	Bremen	82,950	247,437
Cologne	129,233	516,527	Königsberg ..	112,123	245,994
Breslau	208,025	512,105	Stettin	76,149	236,113
Frankfort ..	90,922	414,576	Duisburg ...	30,533	229,483
Düsseldorf .	69,351	358,728	Dortmund ..	44,420	214,226
Nürnberg .	82,929	333,142	Kiel	31,747	211,627
Charlotten- burg	19,518	305,978	Mannheim ..	39,606	191,902
Hannover ..	87,641	302,375	Strassburg ..	85,529	178,891

The increase in population in Alsace-Lorraine outside of the four large cities was in the iron region of Lorraine. It was distributed as follows:

	1871	1910
Commune of Algringen	367	9,476
Nilvingen	273	5,795
Sablon	1,039	10,720
Deutschoth	1,050	6,293
Kneuttingen	937	5,612

* Unquestionably the large cities have increased in population, but it must not be forgotten that the soldiers of Germany are counted in the official tables. This necessitates a revision, which is most noticeable in the case of Metz with its large garrison. The civil population of Metz increased by 1000 from 1871 to 1910, from 54,000 to 55,000. (Meuriot, in *Journal de la Société*

Compare this increase with that of the German cities in the Ruhr iron district: Düsseldorf, Essen, Duisburg, Dortmund, Elberfeld (1875: 80,000; 1910: 170,000); Gelsenkirchen (1875: 11,000; 1910: 169,000); Barmen (1875: 86,000; 1910: 169,000); Mülheim (1875: 15,000; 1910: 112,000); Crefeld (1875: 62,905; 1910: 129,406); Hamborn (a village in 1875; 1910: 101,000).

Elsewhere formerly prosperous Alsace has lamentably suffered:

	1871	1910
District of Molsheim.....	74,910	67,069
Schlettstadt	78,162	67,581
Weissenburg	62,333	56,579
Rappoltswiller	67,102	58,151
Chateau-Salins	52,801	45,303

In 1870, Alsace's small, thriving towns were her pride. In Germany many similar towns have become huge industrial centres. Of course Germany, too, suffered from the general exodus to the cities which has taken place throughout the world, but the loss of Alsace from this cause is very much greater than that suffered by Germany. Shifting of population in Germany has resulted in slight loss in localities of less than 2,000, in a considerable gain elsewhere, as follows:

de Statistique de Paris, v. 55, 1914, p. 448.) Even this increase of 1000 is effaced if we reduce the limits of the city to those of 1870: 1869, 48,325; 1871, 39,937; 1874, 35,696; 1910, 48,645, exclusive of the population of Devant-les-Ponts and Pantières-Queuleu, which, incorporated with Metz in 1908, add 6,546 to the figure here given for 1910. (Delahache, *L'Eaode*, p. 131.)

The soldiers included in the official census are not Alsations, are only temporarily in the country, and should not be considered a part of its population. In 1910 there were 82,276 soldiers in the Reichsland, of whom only 6,628 were Alsations. (Vidal de la Blache, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 35, 1916, p. 216.)

	<i>In towns of 100,000 and more</i>	<i>In towns of 20,000 to 100,000</i>	<i>In towns of 5,000 to 20,000</i>	<i>In towns of 2,000 to 5,000</i>	<i>In localities of less than 2,000</i>
1871	1,968,537	3,147,272	4,588,364	5,190,801	26,163,818
1910	13,823,348	8,677,955	9,172,333	7,297,770	25,954,587

(Politicus, in *Fortnightly Review*, February, 1918, p. 222.)

It is not in the rural districts but in her towns that Alsace has suffered most, a loss, it is worth repeating, which was all the more disastrous since her towns were her richest asset. This loss is by no means compensated by the gain in the four large cities and in the iron district. Towns in Alsace which were busy in 1870 are dead today; similar towns in Germany have become industrial centres of international importance.

Following are statistics for Bischwiller, a notable example of the fate of the Alsatian small towns which were flourishing under French administration:

Number of manufacturers: 1869, 96; 1871, 21.

Number of workmen: 1869, 5,000; 1874, less than 2,000.

Number of looms: 1869, 2,000; 1874, 650.

Exportation of manufactured products: 1869, 1,000,000 kilograms; 1874, 400,000.

Value of cloth manufactured: 1869, 18 to 20 million francs; 1874, 5 to 6 million francs.

The decrease in the material prosperity of Bischwiller between 1869 and 1874, and the increase between 1874 and 1910, parallel, approximately, the shift in population: 1869, 11,500; 1874, 7,700; 1910, 8,000, including the inmates of three asylums which did not exist before 1874 and a German garrison of three batteries of artillery. (Delahache, *L'Exode*, pp. 37, 43.)

STRASBOURG AND THE RHINE TRAFFIC

The most considerable gain in population in the provinces is that of Strasbourg. It should not be forgotten that much of this great city's increase is due to

the fact that it is the political and administrative capital of the Reichsland. Governmental officers with their train of employees, mostly foreign, and regiments of soldiers, almost all foreign, add to the population of the city, and, in some degree, also, to its wealth; but these are not the sort of citizens that bring stable and enduring prosperity to a community. Strasbourg was destined by nature to become one of the greatest industrial centres of Europe, and would have attained that proud eminence if it had not been atrociously sacrificed to the German cities on the Rhine. It had been prepared for a marvellous development in the decades preceding 1870, under French administration, by the construction of an admirable series of canals. It is the natural head of navigation on the Rhine.⁷ Its population increased 100% from 1870 to 1910. That of Mannheim increased 500%. Mannheim took the place which would have been Strasbourg's but for the policy, everywhere followed, of subordinating Alsatian to German interests. The German Rhine ports, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Mayence, Mannheim, each increased 500% in population. Strasbourg was entitled to expect an advance at least equal to that of any one of those cities, and it would have realized this advance if it had remained under French administration, if its interests had not been sacrificed by a step-motherly government, as we shall see later.

METZ AND THE IRON-DISTRICT

Just as Strasbourg was deprived of her rightful share of the Rhine traffic by a government which was solicitous only for the prosperity of Germany, so Lorraine with her rich store of iron was sacrificed to the German

⁷ See Vidal de la Blache, *Annales de Géographie*, v. 25, 1916, pp. 161 ff.

interests of the Ruhr district. And just as in the case of Strasbourg, so Lorraine was ready in 1870 to advance with rapid strides. Canals had been built and important work on the Moselle was already started. Since 1871 Lorraine has been unsuccessfully appealing for the canalization of the Moselle and the Sarre. The government has turned a deaf ear, because Prussia is all-powerful in Germany, and the magnates of Silesia and Westphalia are all-powerful in Prussia. German iron interests must not be forced to meet the competition of Lorraine. It has been feared, too, that the railroads, all owned by the State, would be injured by the establishment of satisfactory water routes. This outrageous situation revolted even some German economists, such as Kreuzkam, who in the *Jahrbücher für National Oekonomie* (v. 70, 1910, pp. 660 ff.), protests against the imperial veto on the Moselle and Sarre canal projects, shows that the railroads have nothing to fear, and declares that not only Lorraine but all southwest Germany is retarded by Prussia's selfishness.

Still, of course, the exploitation of the iron fields has continued, and millions of tons of ore are extracted every year. But let us see if Lorraine has benefited by this gift of nature any more than Strasbourg has by her exceptional natural position.

It cannot be urged too strongly that a country is impoverished rather than enriched by the consumption of natural resources, unless the product is used for manufactures within the country. Practically all the iron of Lorraine is exported to Germany. Düsseldorf and the neighbouring cities of the Ruhr district have grown fabulously rich on industries dependent upon Lorraine iron. The great industrial advance of Germany in the past fifty years has been due in very large part to the industries of Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Bochum, Es-

sen, Duisburg, Hamborn, Mülheim, Gelsenkirchen and the other Ruhr cities. Lorraine furnished the raw product. What has she gained?

It is true that the coal is in the Ruhr country and that there is an advantage in bringing iron to coal. But there is coal in the Sarre, and, if Prussia had not prevented the necessary canalization, Metz would have become a Düsseldorf.⁸ As it is, Metz has remained stationary since 1870. Iron need not always go to coal; coal may go to iron. That has been proved in France.

Let us compare Metz with Nancy, the French city across the border. We have seen that, through a fortunate error of Bismarck, large iron fields still remain in the French department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. These fields produced 976,000 tons of ore in 1875; 2,600,000 tons in 1890; and 19,500,000 tons in 1913. The Lorraine iron is shipped out of the country. Meurthe-et-Moselle is not forced to sacrifice its prosperity in this way. Metz cannot get coal because Prussia will not permit the creation of waterways. Nancy, which bears the relation to the Meurthe-et-Moselle iron fields that Metz does to the German-Lorraine iron fields, is farther from coal than Metz; but she gets it. The civil population of Metz has not increased since 1870. The population of Nancy in 1872 was 52,978; in 1911 it was 119,940, an increase of well over 100%. Her prosperity is due, not to the exploitation of natural resources, but to manufactures in which the raw products are used. Nancy is the Düsseldorf of Meurthe-et-Moselle. Metz

⁸ "Few cities," says the great French geographer, Vidal de la Blache, "are better located than Metz to be the capital of a region. The beauty and spaciousness of the site, the confluence of rivers, those hill-slopes widening into the splendid valley where the Moselle flows gently till its course is narrowed again,—everything conspires to give to this old capital an aspect truly sovereign." (*Annales de Géographie*, v. 25, 1916, p. 178.)

would have been the Düsseldorf of German Lorraine if Germany had not treated Lorraine and Alsace as mere colonies existing solely for the benefit of the step-motherland.

Important progress has been made in the whole department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. Many industries independent of the iron mines have made great strides. In 1871 the department produced 192,000 hectolitres of beer; in 1908 it produced 1,146,000 hectolitres. As a result of this advance, the importation of beer into France was in 1905 only a third of what it was in 1881. In 1871 the value of the shoes manufactured in the department was 1,200,000 francs; in 1910 it was 13,500,000 francs. The manufacture of *lingerie*, etc., was introduced in 1880; in 1910 the income of the department from this source was 83,000,000 francs. (Uhry, in *Revue économique internationale*, 1913, I, pp. 279 ff.)

Metz has enjoyed almost no increase in wealth. Among the sixty-one branches of the Banque de France, that of Nancy was twenty-seventh in 1871; in 1911 it was classed as seventh according to volume of business, and first according to profits. Its operations increased by 424% in thirty years. (Lenfort, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 26, 1911, p. 834.)

The natural resources of Lorraine are being exhausted. According to a report which the German professor Krusch read at a meeting of iron and steel operators in 1917, the iron in German Lorraine will be exhausted in forty-five years. (Quoted by Brunhes, professor at the Collège de France, in an article printed in the *Courrier des États-Unis*, January 26, 1918, p. 20.) According to the French expert, de Launay, writing in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (July 15, 1916, p. 340), at the rate of exploitation obtaining before the war

the German fields in Lorraine will be exhausted between 1950 and 1960.

In a few years, therefore, Lorraine will have spent her natural riches, and who will have gained? Where is Lorraine's Düsseldorf? Does Lorraine gain even from the sale of the raw product? Lorrainers do not own the iron of the country. All the mines, with negligible exceptions, were, even before 1914, in the hands of the German iron kings, the Thyssens, the Miehtes and others. (Cf. Kreuzkam, in the article referred to above, p. 665.) And it is almost certain that at the present moment not one share in Lorraine mining companies is owned by any but Germans.

Has Lorraine benefited by being included in the *Zollverein*?

ALSATIAN INDUSTRIES

Alsace has been hampered even more than Lorraine by inclusion in the *Zollverein*. The following statistics for industries which are among the most important in Alsace are enlightening:

WINE

	<i>Production in hectolitres</i>	<i>Value in marks</i>
1874	1,746,232	48,622,815
1876	2,309,975	52,243,079
1885	1,518,564	35,721,091
1889	1,162,965	31,772,370
1898	515,817	18,000,000
1902	706,585	20,039,397
1903	828,503	18,890,669
1904	1,126,204	28,985,872
1905	1,119,259	20,037,396
1906	649,242	23,001,304

(*Bulletin de Statistique et de Législation Comparée*, v. 30, 1891, p. 43; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1900, p. 60; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Elsass-Lothringen*, 1907, p. 57.)

The average since 1906 has been about 600,000 hectolitres, valued at 21,000,000 marks. In the '70's about half the wine produced in the German Empire was credited to Alsace-Lorraine; in the last ten years before the war, this fraction had diminished to less than one-third.

BEER

(In hectolitres)

	<i>Production</i>	<i>Exportation</i>	<i>Importation</i>
1872	812,454	205,900	51,719
1906	1,381,123	31,248	384,968

(*Statistisches Jahrbuch für Elsass-Lothringen*, 1907, p. 95.)

Following is a table showing the number of workmen in all important trades (those engaging more than 30,000):

	1882	1895	Percentage of gain or loss
Agriculture	627,800	599,234	—4.55
Mining	34,677	42,574	+22.77
Stone and earth	41,015	47,632	+16.13
Metal-working	43,338	62,776	+44.85
Machines	36,458	25,396	—30.34
Textiles	127,731	126,562	—0.92
Wood-work	50,012	48,012	—2.81 *
Food-stuffs	40,627	42,794	+5.33
Clothing and cleaning.....	74,509	70,739	—5.06
Building	85,152	102,896	+20.84
Commerce	72,574	75,196	+3.61
Transportation	50,900	51,430	+1.04
Military and civil service....	150,899	104,212	+44.80 *
Without trade	67,260	76,185	+13.27

(*Statistisches Jahrbuch für Elsass-Lothringen*, 1907, pp. 26–28.)

* Obvious error. EDITORS.

The only real gains are in connection with the iron fields of Lorraine. Alsace has remained stationary, or has retrograded.

TEXTILES

The textile industry is, and has been for over a hundred years, by far the most important in Alsace. The

test of Alsace's prosperity is in the fate of this industry.

German manufacturers in 1870 greatly feared Alsatian competition in textiles; uselessly, however, for two reasons: first, and chiefly, because of the governmental encouragement given exclusively to German interests; second, because of the cheapness of labour in Germany.

The following statistics concerning cotton spindles are final and damning proof that Germany has imposed upon the world in her incessant declaration that Alsace has benefited by the annexation of 1871:

	Alsace	Rest of Zollverein
Number of spindles in 1870.....	1,890,000	2,500,000 *
Number of spindles in 1909.....	1,730,000	8,000,000

While the number of spindles in the Empire increased well over three fold, the number in Alsace, which in 1870 had more than two-thirds as many as the whole *Zollverein*, has actually decreased.

Just as Strasbourg was sacrificed to Mannheim, and Metz to Düsseldorf, so Mulhouse, the centre of Alsace's greatest industry, was sacrificed to Prussian and Saxon cities. The population of Mulhouse increased from 58,773 in 1866 to 95,041 in 1910.¹⁰ But, though even

* This figure is not exact. The official figures for 1861 and 1875 are 2,235,950 and 4,200,811. The second, without the Alsatian spindles, which had dropped to 1,650,000, would make 2,550,811. If the figures for 1861 were correct, Germany would have gained only 314,861 between 1861 and 1875, which is manifestly far below the truth. The figure given for 1861 is unquestionably too high, as Grad suspects, in the *Economiste français*, v. 1, 1873, p. 883. On the other hand, the figures given by the Count von Luxburg in the Reichstag on April 17, 1871 (quoted by Delahache, *L'Exode*, p. 89), for Alsace (2,170,000) and for the *Zollverein* (1,760,000), are surely too high for Alsace and too low for the *Zollverein*. Luxburg was prejudiced; he was pleading for the German cotton interests and exaggerated the risk they ran if Alsace were included in the *Zollverein*. 2,500,000 for 1870 is perhaps a little high, but is not far from the truth.

¹⁰ The remarkable provision for the comfort of workmen at Mul-

today she operates more cotton spindles than any other city in the *Zollverein*, her importance as a textile centre is greatly decreased, for in 1870 her large cotton mills controlled smaller but very important establishments in the little towns of Upper-Alsace. We have already seen what happened to these little towns, having taken Bischwiller, a textile centre, as an example.

We tested Lorraine's prosperity by comparing Metz with Nancy. Some idea of what would have been the advance of Mulhouse and the rest of Upper-Alsace can be gained by considering the neighbouring French region.

The old French department of the Haut-Rhin was divided in 1871, the territory of Belfort remaining French. In the part which became German (Mulhouse is in this part), the increase in population between 1871 and 1910 is 12.8% ; the increase in the part which remained French is 80%. (Meuriot, in *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, v. 55, 1914, p. 447.)

Mulhouse increased under German rule from a population of 58,773 to 95,041. Following are the records of the important industrial cities on the French side of the line:

house has for many years attracted the attention of sociologists. It is supposed, quite erroneously, that here is an evidence of Germany's solicitude for the working classes. As a matter of fact, Mulhouse was generations ahead of Germany in this respect, and the credit of the movement belongs entirely to Alsatian manufacturers. Decades before 1870, under French administration, the famous "Workmen's Cities" were established. In an interesting study on "Mulhouse and Its Social Institutions," in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 27, 1912, p. 76, Lange quotes this saying of Bismarck: "If the German social organization were equal to the Alsatian, we should have no need to pass laws appertaining to the condition of workmen." (See also the article by Acker in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 15, 1912, pp. 442 ff., and by Grad in the *Economiste français*, v. 1, 1873, pp. 680 ff.)

	1872	1911
Belfort	8,030	39,371
Epinal	11,847	30,042
Saint-Dié	12,317	23,108

But, as was the case in Alsace before 1870, much of the work in textiles is done in small towns in France. We have seen that the small industrial towns in Alsace remained stationary or lost ground. To take their places small towns sprang up near by in France and even far away in Normandy. Thaon-les-Vosges was in 1870 an insignificant agricultural village of 500 inhabitants; in 1910 it had 7,000 inhabitants and its manufactured products had an annual value of 17,000,000 francs. (Delahache, *L'Exode*, p. 196.)

Has Alsace been benefited by inclusion in the *Zollverein*?

IF ALSACE AND LORRAINE HAD REMAINED FRENCH

Too often it is forgotten that whatever prosperity Alsace and Lorraine have enjoyed since 1870 is not due to the fact that they became German. If they had remained French, their advance would not have been the scandal that it is. Stehelin closed the letter quoted above (p. 126), in which he laments that for economic reasons Alsace must remain German, with these words, significantly inconsistent with the former statement, which was written under the influence of German propaganda: "As to the pretension of certain Germans that the annexation has been a benefit for us, I deny it absolutely, all Alsatians deny it; besides, no one will ever be able to prove what we should have become if annexation had not taken place. The wonderful development of French industry, especially in the East, due to our compatriots [emigrated to France], tends to prove the contrary of the German assertion." (Coquet, *l. c.*, p. 220.)

A comparison of the progress of industrial Alsace with that of the eastern French districts, those bordering on Alsace, is decidedly in favour of the latter. In fact, Alsace's loss has been France's gain. When the Treaty of Frankfort is annulled and Alsace returns to her normal economic sphere, Alsace and France will advance rapidly together, for it is incontestable that economically each country is an asset to the other. Under French administration Strasbourg will become a Mannheim, Metz a Düsseldorf, Mulhouse will regain her old prosperity, small Alsatian towns will thrive again. France and Alsace will go forth together at the pace which has marked German progress of the last fifty years.

Some hint of what might have been is found in the story of Alsace's condition in the last decades of French rule. From 1820 to 1870 the population of the two provinces increased by 50%, and their prosperity increased in the same proportion. (Hinzelin, p. 156.) Since 1870 the population has increased 21%, and the increase in prosperity has by no means corresponded with that low figure. This, as we have seen, amounts to a veritable calamity, in view of the marvellous economic advance of the rest of the world, especially Germany. The following table from official figures shows that, though the large cities of Alsace-Lorraine have increased in population since 1871, they had prospered also in the years preceding:

	<i>Strasbourg</i>	<i>Mulhouse</i>	<i>Metz</i>	<i>Colmar</i>
1800	48,470	6,628	34,401	13,396
1871	85,654	52,892	53,623	23,311
1910	178,891	95,041	68,598	43,808

	<i>Guebwiller</i>	<i>Hagenau</i>	<i>Markirch</i>
1800	2,802	7,009	6,364
1871	11,350	11,388	12,322
1910	13,024	18,868	11,778

And it should not be forgotten that the second half of the century saw throughout the world a much more rapid advance than the first, due to increased facility in transportation and other material progress. This renders all the more remarkable the forward movement of Alsace from 1800 to 1871.

Kiener, a *privat-docent* at the official University of Strasbourg, in an article which appeared in the *Revue Alsacienne* in 1909, shows what he calls "the marvellous increase in material riches which came to Alsace under Napoleon III," that is, in the years immediately preceding the Franco-Prussian war. "Railroads and canals," he says, "gave wings to Alsatian industry, and Alsace won the world market for the second time [the first time was under Napoleon I] when the tariff barriers fell in 1860 and she found herself strong enough to have no reason to fear any foreign competition." So the economic prosperity of Alsace-Lorraine during the last fifty years,—little as it has been,—of which German propagandists have made so much, is, according to a German official professor, not due to German sovereignty but began before the annexation, and, as Stehelin suspected, would unquestionably have increased at least quite as noticeably under French rule. Kiener declares that "the formation of the higher Alsatian bourgeoisie, destined to become the nursery of energetic souls," dates from the period of Napoleon I. (Coquet, *l. c.*, pp. 221-223.) Alsatian prosperity is due to the steady development of the country from the time of the French Revolution. The famous D. M. C. cotton, made at Mulhouse, was known throughout the world long before 1870. Mulhouse was a free republic until 1798, when it voluntarily entered the French nation. In that year this republic had a population of 5,000 and but few industries of importance. At the time of the annexation

of Alsace to Germany, seventy-eight years later, the population had increased from 5,000 to well over 50,000, and the city had become one of the important industrial centres of Europe. (Reybaud, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1872, p. 228.) The development of other Alsatian cities during the first seventy years of the nineteenth century is only less striking than that of Mulhouse. (See Weill, pp. 106 ff.)

After the reannexation of Alsace to France, certain delicate economic readjustments will be necessary to facilitate the return of Alsatian industries to the French markets. However, little difficulty will be encountered. Radical changes in production have not been made in the provinces since 1870. Lorraine iron and Alsatian textiles will find as ready a sale in France and elsewhere as before. Alsace's surplus in agricultural products will be welcome in France, and Germany will still have need of them. It has been said that Alsatian wine-makers will be ruined, but Alsace consumes about as much as she produces, and the excess will still be exported, as in the past, bearing Rhine-wine labels.

For many years before the present war the Chambers of Commerce of Alsace-Lorraine unanimously demanded drastic modification of the tariff by which they were prevented from seeking markets in France. If Alsace were really benefited by inclusion in the *Zollverein*, and if she had economic reasons for avoiding a return to France, she would not thus emphatically have insisted upon the removal of barriers between her and the old fatherland. (Coquet, *l. c.*, p. 222.)

Has the inclusion of Alsace and Lorraine in the *Zollverein* proved of as much benefit to them as it has to Germany? Have they profited therefrom? Would they not have been much more prosperous in 1914 if

they had continued under French rule? Would they not profit enormously, economically as well as morally, by a return to their former economic sphere?

ECONOMIC PERSECUTION

That Alsace has lost greatly in population and immensely in industrial prosperity by the annexation of 1870 is seen to be incontestable, if we compare the figures representing her condition today with the most conservative possible estimate of what her normal life during the last fifty years would have been, had it been passed under French rule.

The reason for this loss is twofold: first, the exodus of her capable men and a large portion of her capital to France; second, and more important, the systematic economic persecution inflicted upon her by Germany. "The truth is," says Coquet, in the important study in the *Revue politique et parlementaire* frequently quoted here, "that Alsace and Lorraine were never so rich as under the French administration, and never so abominably exploited and sacrificed as under the German régime." From the economic as well as from the administrative point of view, Germany has treated Alsace and Lorraine as conquered provinces, as colonies. Their economic prosperity was regularly subordinated to that of Germany.¹¹

In 1904 an Alsatian prospector discovered fabulously rich potash deposits in the region northwest of Mul-

¹¹ The *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, in its issue of March 9, 1916, combating the proposal to annex Alsace to Prussia, argues that the result would be a disaster to Alsace, and advances, among others, the following reason: "The economic advantages held up as a bait are but a delusion and a snare. . . . The railways of Alsace-Lorraine are already in the hands of Prussia, and are managed in accordance with Prussian interests. Prussia would always sacrifice the interests of Alsace to those of her older provinces."

house. It was soon seen that the working of these fields would break the North German potash monopoly, which held the whole world, including the United States, enslaved. Furthermore, the State was financially interested in the German fields. The Reichstag passed the law of May 25, 1910, limiting the exploitation of the Alsatian fields to a mere trifle.¹² The board of directors of the potash company "Amélie" of Wittelheim, in a public statement, May 10, 1910, declared that the Reichstag law aimed to give a death-blow to the nascent Alsatian potash industry with the sole purpose of subserving the interests of North Germany. (Coquet, *l. c.*, p. 218.)

The Germans, while making the Rhine the most important inland waterway in Europe, have been deaf to all appeals for canalization of the Moselle and the Sarre.¹³

In March, 1913, the *Messin*, published at Metz, says: "Under the French régime the canal of the Moselle was constructed as far as Metz; nothing has been done in the forty-two years following the annexation. The same is true of the Sarre. . . . Since the annexation Prussia has done nothing to link our water-courses with the canal

¹² See L. Gouvy, "La Potasse en Haute-Alsace," *Journal des Economistes*, v. 48, 1915, pp. 379 ff.

¹³ The work on the Rhine was done for the benefit of German ports, as we have seen, and the Alsatian port, Strasbourg, was criminally sacrificed. At the end of 1871 the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce asked for the creation of a lateral canal to the Rhine, which should extend from Strasbourg to Ludwigshafen, a port in Bavaria opposite Mannheim in Baden. Mannheim and Ludwigshafen feared the competition of Strasbourg and Bavaria, and Baden had no difficulty in causing the rejection of the Alsatian request by the Imperial government. Alsace thereupon planned to accomplish the enterprise alone. The preliminary studies had not been completed, when, in 1890, a Baden engineer proposed instead a regulation of the flow of the river which would permit navigation during most of the year. This project offered

system of interior Prussia, and in the direction of the industrial regions of Westphalia. There is only one explanation for this neglect; it is that at Berlin the economic interests of the annexed provinces are held of little account, as if in the uncertainty of a lasting possession it seemed undesirable to risk expenditures when the receipts might be lost in the future." (Coquet, *l. c.*, p. 214.)¹⁴

less advantage to Alsace than to Baden, but, since Baden and Bavaria would share the expense and time would be saved, the Alsatian *Landesausschuss* requested the Governor to enter into negotiations with the other two states. Eight years were consumed in exchanges of views and plans. Finally, an agreement between Alsace-Lorraine and Baden was signed, November 28, 1901; Baden was to pay 40% of the expenses. But the Baden Chamber modified its government's agreement, consenting to pay 30% of the expenses on condition that the Alsatian-Lorraine railroads should increase their rates. The Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce declared the conditions unacceptable and returned to the project of a lateral canal. Bavaria was ready to agree to allow the use of one of its ports, Sondernheim, when Baden, feeling again that Mannheim was menaced, began to object and brought its influence to bear against the plan with the usual success. The Emperor one day expressed to the Mayor of Strasbourg his disgust at all the pother about "the stupid canal." The Alsatian administration refused to enter into communication with Bavaria, as the *Landesausschuss* requested, the Under-Secretary of State for Public Works appealed to by the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce refused to have anything to do with the canal, the Governor ignored similar invitations and requests from the *Landesausschuss* and from the Chamber of Commerce. (Delahache, p. 170; Léon, *Flueves, Canaux, Chemins de Fer*, 1903, p. 186. For further details, see Léon, in *Annales de Géographie*, v. 12, 1903, pp. 67-72.)

¹⁴ When the Reichstag was considering the credits asked for the canalization of the Moselle, a Prussian deputy said: "It would be very imprudent to go to that expense. When the work is finished, France will demand Lorraine of us, and we shall have lost thirty millions." These words provoked hilarity, but jests frequently have a way of showing in what direction a mind is tending. (Hinzelin, p. 158.) On the generosity of the State toward Prussian rivers and its hostility to the canalization of the Moselle and the Sarre, see Auerbach, in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 54, 1907, p. 352.

The writer of an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, under date of August 8, 1909, protests that the industrial development of Lorraine is hampered by insufficient railroad communication and reminds the authorities that economic *rapprochement* must precede political *rapprochement*. He says that the German press talks constantly in magnificent language of the firm attachment of Alsace-Lorraine to the Empire, without realizing that there exists in the provinces a *general discontent* in view of Imperial indifference to their economic needs.

The *Journal d'Alsace-Lorraine*, under date of August 27, 1910, protests violently against the German policy of sacrificing the railroads of the annexed provinces to the prosperity of German railroads. "For forty years the Empire has been despoiling us," the writer declares, "with no other right than the right of might. . . ." (Coquet, *l. c.*, pp. 214-216.)

Various projects, purely commercial in character, aiming to bring French and Alsatian markets nearer together by means of a tunnel in the Vosges, were vetoed at Berlin. The Chinese Wall erected between Alsace and France was intended to act not only as a moral barrier to further the interests of Germanization, but also as an economic barrier to force the conquered provinces into the *Zollverein*. Alsatian Chambers of Commerce protested in vain. (Coquet, *l. c.*, p. 216.)

The following somewhat amusing, but significant, incident is illustrative of the high-handed measures in which the German rulers of Alsace-Lorraine are prone to indulge in order to show that Alsace-Lorraine belongs, not to the Alsatians and Lorrainers, but to the Empire. A certain fund provided by taxes levied in the Reichsland is at the disposal of the Governor for use in various works of benefit to the inhabitants (encouragement of the arts, travelling scholarships, etc.).

It was suddenly discovered that 300,000 francs of this had been used to swell the too meagre popular subscription for the monument of William I to be erected on the Kaiserplatz in Strasbourg. An outcry was raised,¹⁵ and the money was finally restored to its original purpose. (Delahache, p. 167; Antony, in *Revue des Sciences politiques*, v. 27, 1912, p. 255.)

Armand Koechlin, member of an eminent family of Alsatian manufacturers, in 1908 explains as follows the lack of progress in the cotton industry, the most important industry in Alsace: "The new administration seemed at certain moments to have assumed the task of impeding the working of industrial and commercial enterprises. Refusals of permits of residence, wholesale expulsions, arrests and imprisonments for the most trifling reasons, at different times deprived the workshops, the offices and the management of factories of a considerable number of experts, often indispensable." (Quoted by Lévy, *L'Industrie Cotonnière en Alsace*, 1912, p. 90.)

"In the matter of public works," says Laugel, deputy in the *Landesausschuss*, "contractors from all Germany come to compete with the native contractors, and it is very rare that they do not carry off the prize, while Alsations and Lorrainers who should go and offer their services in the German countries would be pitilessly scratched off the list of bidders. Every year the *Landesausschuss* protests against such abuses, every year the Government declares it has already remedied the state

¹⁵ "The *Dispositionsfond*, administered by the Governor, is to be used for the general welfare of the country. It would be an improper use of these funds to employ so large a sum for a monument. . . . If it was not possible to amass a sufficiently large amount for the monument of William I by voluntary subscription, it would have been better to give up the project." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 17, 1905, quoted by Delahache, l. c.)

of affairs, every year the same facts are reproduced, resulting with fatiguing monotony in the same complaints." (*Revue politique et parlementaire*, v. 57, 1908, p. 249.)

"After the commerce of Alsace had been ruined by the annexation and the custom-house tariffs of 1879," says Helmer, in the *Nineteenth Century* (February, 1918, p. 237), "the annexed country might perhaps, at a later date, have shared in the great economic development of contemporary Germany. But once more Alsace was regarded as a conquered country, whose interests were of no importance compared with those of the people of Germany. When the Government and the local authorities were not definitely trying to ruin Alsatians, as in the Graffenstaden affair, they neglected the obvious interests of the country in favour of German interests, as was the case when the Rhine improvements were carried out, and nearly always when names were submitted for governmental or departmental posts. The economic crisis, therefore, became a permanent condition. The material condition of Alsace, throughout her connection with Germany, may not have been absolutely stationary, but was none the less inferior to that of the neighbouring countries on both sides of the frontier."

That Alsace was not considered as forming an integral part of the empire, and that Alsatians were looked upon as foreigners whose prosperity must not be allowed to prejudice the prosperity of real Germans, is clearly shown by the Graffenstaden incident. The German minister in charge of railroads demanded that the manager of the Graffenstaden Locomotive Works be dropped, under pain of cancellation of Government contracts. Since all railroads were in the hands of the Government, the choice was simply between dismissal of the

manager and ruin. The manager was accused of propagating pro-French sentiments among the employees, but in April, 1912, sufficient evidence was adduced to convince the legislature of Alsace-Lorraine that the sole purpose of the minister's intervention was to hamper the industrial activity of Graffenstaden in the interests of German factories.¹⁶ After the Graffenstaden affair a general boycott of old Alsatian houses was instituted. Many important Alsatian companies transferred their business to France. The Strasbourg *Neue Zeitung*, on July 3, 1913, deploring this emigration of capital, declared it had been calculated by competent experts that since the annexation capital to the amount of nearly a billion francs had passed over into France, "to the great detriment of our industry, which is declining slowly and without cessation." (Coquet, *l. c.*, pp. 216-217.)

So, a year before the outbreak of the present war, Alsatian industry "is declining slowly and without cessation."

GERMANIZATION OF PROPERTY BEFORE THE WAR

The Graffenstaden affair was only the first move in a project which aimed to secure German ownership of important industrial and commercial enterprises. Already almost all orders for supplies paid for out of public funds were reserved for houses across the Rhine. The plan to drive out French, Swiss and even Alsatian capital involved also the Germanizing of the personnel. In 1912 the Alsatian Chambers of Commerce had been

¹⁶ The Alsatian Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed the following motion: "The Chamber blames most energetically the government [of Alsace-Lorraine; i. e., the Governor and the Minister of the Interior] for its manner of acting in the question of the Graffenstaden factory. It demands that in the future the government defend Alsatian-Lorraine interests and do all within its power to repair the injury caused the Graffenstaden factory." (Hinzelin, p. 142.)

ordered to prepare reports on foreign capital invested in Alsatian factories, and also on foreigners employed therein. The Swiss government had to intervene at this time to protect its citizens who were threatened with expulsion from the Reichsland. (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit* . . . , p. 161.)

Kreuzkam, in his article in the *Jahrbücher für National Oekonomie* (1910, pp. 660 ff.), shows that the Prussian iron kings had already gradually acquired the iron fields of Lorraine.

All the iron industry, except the establishments at Hayange, is in the hands of Germans. The valuable oil well at Pechelbronn passed into the possession of a German stock company in 1906. Three-fourths of the potash concessions are owned by Germans. (Vidal de la Blache, *La France de l'Est*, 1917, p. 224.) At the beginning of this chapter, we found the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* cataloguing the economic resources of Alsace-Lorraine as follows: 1) the Pechelbronn oil well, "the only important oil well in Germany"; 2) the potash deposits; 3) the Lorraine iron. All of these sources of wealth had been captured by German capital before 1914. Alsace had had capital with which to finance these interests, but it had been driven out — across the border into France — to make room for German control.

GERMANIZATION OF PROPERTY SINCE 1914

In the infamous memorandum left at his death in April, 1917, General von Bissing wrote: "Germany is strong enough, and it is to be hoped that, especially after this war, she will have plenty of efficient men to do in Belgium, in the interest of Germany, what unfortunately was not done in Alsace-Lorraine. Surely we shall have learned from the mistakes that were made,

and we shall never again have recourse to the vacillating policy of conciliation which was so disadvantageous not only in Alsace-Lorraine but also in Poland. . . .

"Expropriation is absolutely necessary, in order to prevent such a state of things as has existed in Alsace-Lorraine to the present day. . . . Half measures and a middle course must be condemned most of all." (*Current History*, February, 1918, p. 330.)

The Memorial of the six most important agricultural and industrial associations of Germany, addressed to the Chancellor, May 20, 1915, reads in part as follows:

"Belgium . . . must be subjected to German imperial legislation. . . . After transferring to Germans the economic enterprises and possessions that are important for the domination of the country, its government and administration must be so conducted that the inhabitants shall obtain no influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire. . . . After our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine it is probably self-evident that in these acquisitions also (Belgium, Northern and Eastern France) the people of the annexed districts are not to be put in a position to obtain any political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that the economic resources to be found in these districts, including medium and large land-holdings, are to be put into German hands, with an arrangement that France shall indemnify and take care of the former proprietors." (*Out of their own Mouths*, p. 123.)

A petition to the Chancellor was voted at a meeting of professors, diplomatists and higher officials in active service, held in Berlin, June 20, 1915. It was circulated as "a strictly confidential manuscript," and it was signed by three hundred and fifty-two professors of universities and special schools of the same rank, one hundred and fifty-eight school teachers and clergymen, one

hundred and forty-eight judges and advocates, two hundred and fifty-two artists, writers and publishers, and many others. The petition said: "To avoid such conditions as exist in Alsace-Lorraine, the enterprises and possessions that give economic power are to be transferred from hostile to German hands, the previous owners being taken over and compensated by France. To the part of the population that we take over, no influence whatever in the Empire is to be conceded." (*Out of their own Mouths*, p. 61.)

Germany is already taking steps to remove in the *Reichsland* also the inconvenience of "such conditions as exist in Alsace-Lorraine." In every respect the conquered provinces are being treated as are Belgium and Northern France, in other words, as enemy country.

Thousands of denationalizations have taken place to legitimate the sequestration of fortunes. Alsatians and Lorrainers who had fled to Switzerland, even the old and incapacitated, have been ordered to return home under penalty of the confiscation of their property. (Wetterlé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .*, p. 46.)¹⁷ The German

¹⁷ The following is published by an "Alsatian" in the *Gazette de Lausanne* of August 2, 1917: "The German government has just added another to the numerous injustices inflicted upon Alsatians and Lorrainers. All those who have been forced to desert Alsace-Lorraine to escape prosecution and annoyances are menaced with the sequestration and liquidation of their property.

"It is remembered that on February 1, 1916, an Imperial decree ordered every Alsatian and Lorrainer who had left his home since the beginning of the war, to return immediately. This decree is a part of the program of 'cleaning with an iron broom' which the German administration is employing pitilessly to purge the *Reichsland* of elements hostile to it. Prison, fines, exile to Germany and other measures of the same kind are reserved for inhabitants who have remained in the country; for the others the decree cited above was imagined. If they obey, they suffer the lot of their compatriots who have not left; if they remain abroad, they are declared to have lost their German nationality.

"... This measure . . . is applied to include not only men of

interpretation of the word "sequestration" is fixed by Rehm, Professor of Law in the University of Strasbourg, appointed sequestrator in five affairs. "It is within the right of the German administrator," he says, "to do injury to the interests of the enterprises entrusted to him in order to force the enemy countries to release German properties from sequestration. . . . The dominating principle which administrators should obey is to injure, not to preserve." (Eccard, pp. 71, 184.)¹⁸

military age but also women, old men and children. . . . Alsations who were past military age were first expelled from the country, then ordered to return, then denationalized, and finally provided with a fictitious domicile in Alsace for purely fiscal reasons.

"The *Reichsanzeiger* publishes regularly the lists of denationalized Alsations and Lorrainers; they number several thousands up to the present time."

The above is quoted in an article in the *Journal du Droit international*, v. 44, 1917, p. 1700, the author of which continues as follows:

"A decree of the German Bundesrat, dated July 12, 1917, goes still further. The text is as follows: 'Decrees concerning the enforced administration of French enterprises . . . and those concerning the liquidation of British enterprises are declared applicable to the property of persons who, in virtue of the law on nationality of July 22, 1913 [the celebrated Delbrück Law], have been declared to have lost German nationality.'"

The distinguished Alsatian lawyer Eccard says: "The few women and old men, who, out of fear of reprisals, decided, overwhelmed by terror, to return, did not (with few exceptions) succeed in reaching their homes. Some, adjudged to have committed one of the numerous crimes against the fatherland punishable according to German law, were incarcerated; others, simply suspected, were placed under surveillance; others were deported to the interior of Germany, where, constantly under the eye of the police, they have been assigned a domicile." (Eccard, p. 116.)

¹⁸ A German administrator wrote toward the end of 1916: "I am in no sense a conservatory sequestrator. It is true that I do not administer properties in the interest of the owners, but I was not appointed for that purpose. The Government has instructed me to administer the properties of foreigners in the interest of the economic life of the German Empire." (Eccard, p. 198.)

The decrees of the German Bundesrat determine the rights of administrators, but do not speak of their obligations, beyond pre-

The Société Alsacienne de Constructions mécaniques, involving capital to the amount of 13,500,000 francs, was compelled to submit to the authority of German administrators, who dismissed all the managers and foremen, and are running the business at a loss. The year 1914-1915 brought a loss of 269,000 marks, whereas the returns of the preceding year showed a clear profit of 740,000 marks. (Eccard, p. 184.)

Large German associations have been formed with Government encouragement for the purpose of buying up Alsatian and Lorraine properties held by natives or by French or Swiss capitalists. Such properties may, of course, be had very cheap nowadays, in view of the facts presented above. The "conditions which exist in Alsace-Lorraine," to the scandal of Von Bissing, and of 352 professors, 158 school teachers, 148 judges, etc., will not obtain after the war.

On June 17, 1918, the following appeared in American newspapers, communicated by Henry Wood, of the United Press:

"German papers have just reached the French front by way of Switzerland containing notices of the first

scribing that receipts in excess of expenditures are to be deposited in the *Reichsbank*. (Eccard, pp. 56, 73 ff.)

An official *French* circular of instructions to sequestrators reads in part as follows: "It must not be lost from view that the sequestration of properties belonging to German, Austrian and Hungarian subjects has not, and cannot in any case assume, the character of a measure of spoliation; sequestration does not proceed from the idea of confiscation, and, far from tending directly or indirectly toward expropriation, it must, in conformity with the intentions of the Government, remain always conservatory." (Eccard, p. 56.)

The *Vienna Neue Freie Presse* said on August 15, 1916: "In the application of measures of sequestration in France, the purely conservatory character of these measures has been observed up to the present; according to news just received, the administration of properties under sequestration is carried on loyally and correctly." (Eccard, p. 180.)

official steps toward colonization of Alsace-Lorraine by German emigrants, and especially by German veterans of the present war.

"Under the auspices of a newly created organization known as 'The Rural Society, Limited, of the Western Frontiers,' it is proposed to replace the native population of Alsace-Lorraine, which has been systematically dispersed since the beginning of the war, with a German population, much as Polish inhabitants of Eastern Prussia and Posen who remained faithful to the Polish national aspirations were supplanted by Germans.

"Application for a charter that would permit the colonization of Alsace-Lorraine by Germans was made last August to the German government by 'The Society for Internal Colonization' and 'The Association for Agrarian Reform.' The project has just been realized, as is indicated by the following announcement in a recent copy of the *Strassburger Post*:

"'Today there was inscribed on the register of commerce the "Rural Society, Limited, of the Western Frontiers."

"'The society is destined:

"'First — To purchase and sell farms, especially in the Lorraine country bordering on the frontier.

"'Second — To colonize these farms with men especially chosen from amongst those who have participated in the war.

"'Third — While working purely within economic bounds, the society nevertheless must not lose sight of the public utility of its character.

"'Fourth — The original capital of the society is 7,500,000 marks. The administration will be directed by Hans Meydenbauer, of Berlin, superior secret councillor of finances.'

"Since the beginning of the war, the native popula-

tion of Alsace-Lorraine has been dispersed in an astounding manner. First of all, there were thousands who fled across the frontier in order to take up arms with France when the war broke out. Still other thousands fled to Switzerland and other neutral countries.

"All of those who have refused to return have been denationalized by Germany, and their property has been confiscated. Those who remained fared little better, for practically every one suspected of having French sympathies has been evacuated into the interior of Germany, while others whose sympathies for France were outspoken have been imprisoned. In hundreds of these cases the property has been confiscated by the German government." (Cf. also *Le Temps*, May 6, 1918.)

A special cable to the *Christian Science Monitor* (July 15, 1918), dated Amsterdam, recounts the protests against this colonization scheme made by various deputies at a meeting of the Main Committee of the Reichstag on July 11. "Progressive speakers," says the dispatch, "remarked that the company's foundation was characteristic of the way politics were made in Germany, and declared that the Fatherland Party and big manufacturers had the ear of the army command, which should not, however, be permitted to decide what was to happen in peace time. Herren David and Erzberger referred to the opposition to the colonization policy in Alsace-Lorraine itself, the latter remarking that the idea clearly was to prepare for the annexation of the provinces by Prussia."

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

German arguments have an inconvenient habit of flying back and giving Germany a fillip on the ear. If Alsace and Lorraine would face economic ruin were they detached from the *Zollverein*, why have we found

that Alsatians and Lorrainers almost unanimously demand re-annexation to France? Several solutions may be offered: 1) it is true, as Treitschke said in 1871, that "we Germans know better what is good for the Alsatians than they do themselves"; or, 2) the Alsatians feel sure that their economic prosperity would not be impaired by a return to France; or, 3) so deep is the love of Alsace and Lorraine for France, so intense their hatred of Germany, that they are willing to sacrifice their economic welfare provided they be allowed to secure that happiness which they can find only by the annulment of the Treaty of Frankfort.

It is certain that there is on economic grounds no reason to oppose the choice of the Alsatians. And, after all, it is evident that they are the most vitally concerned, that the essential question is not the wish of Germany, nor of France, but of Alsace and Lorraine.

Moreover, economic questions may easily be given too much weight; they may blind us to the real issues. Germany has no right to Alsace and Lorraine, she has abominably exploited them, they have been and are still wretched under German rule, they demand release. We Americans, who entered this war with what we think are the most unselfish motives that ever in the history of the world prompted a nation to take up arms, we surely will join Alsatians, Lorrainers and Frenchmen in the declaration that economic questions and problems of expediency, material considerations, are of no moment when confronted with the primary issue — justice. It happens, however, that in this case economic interests coincide with higher interests; Alsace and Lorraine prospered before 1870, under French rule; they have not prospered and they have been wretched under German rule; they will prosper more than ever when they are restored to France, and they will be happy and contented.

CHAPTER VIII

THE QUESTION OF A PLEBISCITE

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF A PLEBISCITE

We Americans are inclined to feel that all questions of nationality may be settled by a consultation of the people involved, by a plebiscite. Such an escape is impossible in the case of Alsace-Lorraine.

There can be not the slightest doubt that a plebiscite would result overwhelmingly in favour of France if it could be held with absolute fairness. France is unalterably opposed to a plebiscite because she cannot trust Germany, and particularly because the whole issue is to her a moral one, and the acceptance of the principle of a plebiscite would be tantamount to a recognition of the justice of the Treaty of Frankfort,—not at all because she doubts that Alsatians and Lorrainers almost without exception would vote in her favour.

Since 1871 Germany has refused to consider the Alsace-Lorraine question. "There is none!" she has magnificently continued to say. She says it still.¹

"There is no Alsace-Lorraine question in an international sense, as I have said before," declared Chancellor

¹ At the various peace congresses of the last thirty years, Germany has regularly refused to consider this problem, despite the prayers of the representatives of various nations who saw in the unsettled condition of the captive provinces the seed of a future war. (See *La Paix par le Droit, passim.*) It is most amusing to hear the Germans declare now that the annexation of fifty years ago belongs to history and must not be discussed. In 1870 when the French declared that the annexation of 1552, over 300 years before, belonged to history, Germany refused to listen.

Hertling in the Reichstag on February 25, 1918, while discussing President Wilson's conditions of peace.

All parties in Germany are agreed that the consideration of the question at a general peace conference is unthinkable. The Majority Socialists follow the more conservative parties, except that they ask for the establishment of Alsace-Lorraine as an autonomous state within the Empire; this, however, they insist is an affair which concerns Germans alone. Only the Minority Socialists recognize the iniquity of the Treaty of Frankfort, in this following Bebel and the two Liebknechts,—the whole line of real Socialists, in fact,—and demand a *fair* plebiscite, emphasizing the word *fair*. But the ranks of the Minority Socialists are fast being depleted by imprisonment and flight to Switzerland.

Even if Germany should agree to a plebiscite, the obstacles in the way to a just settlement by this means are insurmountable. A few may be stated here.

Who is to have charge of the voting? Not Germany, nor France, of course. Would any neutral undertake the ungrateful task? Would Switzerland? Would Switzerland risk making of Germany or France a permanent enemy? Would she care to endanger her own unity by setting at loggerheads her own population, ethnically divided already between France and Germany? Is any combination of nations for this purpose possible? What good would a commission do? Thousands of officials scattered throughout the country would be necessary.

This would be no ordinary election. The stake is so great that it is a refinement of cruelty to force it upon a people, for there will be no chance of concealment; every man must show openly whether he is in favour of France or in favour of Germany. Then, if France wins, thousands of citizens — if there are so many in favour of

Germany — who could have accepted French rule without scandal will be convicted of pro-Germanism and be forced to leave the country or to live there despised. If Germany should win, the lot of those who showed their preference for France can be imagined.

Is the country to vote as a whole? Necessarily so, for otherwise we might find a piece of France surrounded by German territory, or a piece of Germany in the heart of France. It is impossible that Alsace and Lorraine should vote separately. Let it not be forgotten that Upper-Alsace, linguistically the most German portion of the two provinces, is the most pro-French portion. In Lorraine we should find the same difficulty; Metz, the great city of the province, in which there were no Germans before 1870, was before the present war predominantly German as a result of emigration and immigration, but the surrounding country is almost as French as ever. The provinces must vote as a whole, and we should clearly risk carrying the whole country in one direction or the other by a large vote in particular localities. It might well be that the Germans could control the city vote to such an extent that the majority in the four large cities would win against French majorities in all the rest of the country.

It is not difficult to see how the Germans might win in the large cities and in all the rest of the country too. A fair plebiscite, whoever may act as umpire, is an utter impossibility when Germany is one of the parties concerned. Whatever improvement dreamers may imagine realizable in the German character as a result of defeat or democratization, nothing can change the present rulers of Germany, or any rulers of Germany in the immediate future, to such an extent as to render them unwilling to make use of their system of espionage, the marvel of the age, and nowhere so efficient as in

Alsace. Free speech would be banned; and a plebiscite would be a fraud if it was not preceded by a thoroughly unhampered discussion of the issues. Every man who intended to vote for France would be known to the German secret agents. Every such man would receive threats of reprisals. Every such man would know that if Germany won he would have to go into exile. Such terrorization would unquestionably be effective. It has already been effective. The German pall is settling fast over Alsace, and it will be years after the war is over before fear of German vengeance leaves the hearts of the people. Terrorization is effective when it continues relentlessly for four years and more. Open intimidation such as could be detected by the umpire would not be necessary, considering the abject state of the population today, and open intimidation is never necessary for Germany, whose skill in working in the dark has been triumphantly exemplified in Russia, to say nothing of other countries. France might try the same game, but France would be a mere novice pitted against the greatest master of underhand methods the world has ever seen.

Alsace is terrorized today. Her leaders are gone. Emigration between 1871 and 1914 had already taken her most energetic sons and daughters; after the outbreak of war tens of thousands more of her most capable citizens fled to France. Thousands more have been deported or imprisoned. There remain at large only those whom Germany has no reason to fear, either on account of their natural supineness or on account of a more or less complete acceptance of the Teutonic ideal. Alsace is without her leaders. German terrorization has been allowed free scope and its effect will be felt for years. Is a plebiscite acceptable under such circumstances?

Who is to vote? Will the twenty thousand and more young Alsatians who have fled to join the French army since the declaration of war be allowed to return to vote? Of course they must be allowed to do so, unless they have already cast their ballots by giving their lives on the field of battle. Will those who emigrated before the war to escape the German yoke be permitted to express their will? If not those who left the country between 1870 and 1890, how will it be with those who emigrated after 1890 and the thousands who left after 1900? They have established their residence in France, but they did so on account of a criminal treaty which the very fact of the institution of a plebiscite declares null and void; and many of them were driven from their home by dastardly persecution. They would return to Alsace, many thousands of them, if Alsace became French again. Could one refuse them a vote?

What of the Immigrants? What of the thousands, well over a hundred thousand, who are in Alsace as functionaries or sons of functionaries, and who have no attachment for the land? In a question of this sort concerning our North and South, would the Carpet-Baggers have voted? Leave the functionaries, the Carpet-Baggers; they certainly must not vote; what of the Squatters? ² Good Alsatians are driven from their country by an iniquitous treaty which our plebiscite annuls, and

² Douglas proposed in 1854 to leave the question of the introduction or exclusion of slavery in each territory to the territories themselves. Lincoln characterizes this "Squatter Sovereignty" as follows (*Works*, v. 1, p. 249): "What was Squatter Sovereignty? I suppose, if it had any significance at all, it was the right of the people to govern themselves, to be sovereign in their own affairs while they were squatted down in a country not their own, while they had squatted on a territory that did not belong to them, in the sense that a State belongs to the people who inhabit it—when it belongs to the Nation—such right to govern themselves was called Squatter Sovereignty." (*Outlook*, January 2, 1918, p. 11.)

the Squatters seize their land and their electoral rights!

If emigrants and immigrants are eliminated, the election will be settled by the least intelligent citizens of the land, the best Frenchmen having departed between 1871 and 1914 and the best Germans being the Squatters.

A plebiscite, as has already been intimated, would set the French and German elements — and consequently France and Germany — against each other in an antagonism even more bitter than that existing today. The harvest of hatred it would engender would rack the unhappy provinces for generations. At the Congress of Socialists at Würzburg in October, 1917, Müller, one of the leaders, declared that a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine was impossible during the war, and that if it was to be put off until after the war it would be the worst calamity that could happen, for, from the day peace was signed until the day on which the plebiscite was held, it would be the pretext for the unbridling of passions both in France and in Germany. (*Le Temps*, October 18, 1917.) In Alsace-Lorraine the riot of passions would be worse still.

The plebiscite is not, as we sometimes hopefully imagine, a panacea for political ills. Its purpose is to obviate friction between powers claiming a given territory. It is effective when public opinion is not inflamed, and when the stake is not too great, but at a time like the present, when theoretically it should prove its greatest utility, it cannot be resorted to, since it would not, however it resulted, assure lasting peace. A plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine would be futile. It would not settle for all time this vexed question, for such a question cannot be settled so easily. If Germany won now, would France cease to hope that in another hundred years or so history might reverse the verdict? If France won, would Germany declare herself satisfied?

A truce, not peace, would follow. A league of nations may guarantee the eternity of the settlement, but leagues of nations are the handiwork of man. The handiwork of man is never eternal. It is most nearly so, however, when it is in conformity with justice, and if the plebiscite resulted in favour of France, a league of nations might insure a certain permanence; but a plebiscite which gave Alsace to Germany would be a denial of justice, for Alsace is French, Lorraine is French, the people of both provinces desire to be French; a plebiscite which would make them German would not represent the will of the people and would have been decided by illicit means and foul play — Germany's chosen weapons.

The sanctity of the idea of a plebiscite should not be accepted without consideration of all that is involved in the establishment of so far-reaching a rule for international conduct. Powers are delegated to the elected representatives of a people for the express purpose of avoiding not only the delay but the uncertainty of popular consultations. If the question of our entering the war had been submitted to the people of the United States in a referendum, we probably should be enjoying the dubious benefits of peace today. We elected our President and our Congress to be guided by their judgment, which is fortified by investigations and enquiries beyond our opportunities. England, too, would doubtless not have entered the war until too late if a preliminary plebiscite had been required.

Lord Bryce writes in regard to the ratification of our Constitution of 1789: "Had the decision been left to what is now called 'the voice of the people,' that is, to the mass of the citizens all over the country, voting at the polls, the voice of the people would probably have pronounced against the Constitution, and this would

have been still more likely if the question had been voted on everywhere upon the same day, seeing that several doubtful States were influenced by the approval which other States had already given. But the modern 'plebiscital' method of taking the popular judgment had not been invented. The question was referred to conventions in the several States." (*The American Commonwealth*, 1910, v. I, p. 26.)

GERMANY'S PREPARATION FOR A PLEBISCITE

When Germany's armies have been sufficiently battered, her leaders will demand a plebiscite as a last chance to retain the French provinces.

Would she accept the result?

In the first place, if she agreed to hold a plebiscite, would she keep faith? Article 5 in the Treaty of Prague, which terminated the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866, reads as follows: "His Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, transfers to His Majesty, the King of Prussia, all the rights over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein granted him by the Treaty of Vienna in 1864, provided that the population of the northern districts of Schleswig shall be restored to Denmark if they express a desire for that union by a popular vote." In violation of this article, the population of Schleswig has never been given an opportunity to express its will by a popular vote. Germany can hardly expect the world to have any confidence in her promises. A centuries-old contempt for treaties as "scraps of paper" has blunted her political sense.

Maximilian Harden, the impetuous editor of the powerful *Zukunft*, indisputably has a habit, as the editors of *Conquest and Kultur* (p. 12) declare, of saying "in a keen and incisive manner what many Germans are thinking." Harden was at one with the rest of

Germany in the declaration that Alsace and Lorraine must always remain German, until suddenly last year (1917) statements began to appear in his paper in which he affirmed the necessity of a radical reconsideration of the status of the provinces; finally he arrived at the insidious proposal that a plebiscite be held three years after the signing of peace — under German supervision, of course! (New York *Nation*, January 31, 1918, p. 106.)

If Harden's plan were followed, and if by a miracle, even in spite of German terrorization, the provinces should vote in favour of France, is it conceivable that Germany would accept the result? Harden's suggestions of a reconsideration of the Treaty of Frankfort began to appear in 1917. One year before, he had written:

"If people think in France that the reëstablishment of peace is possible only through the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity compels us to sign such a peace, the 70,000,000 of Germans will soon tear it up.

"Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for Germany, thanks to the effective force of Central Pan-Germany, than to seize Alsace-Lorraine again, very shortly, having given it up momentarily as a tactical manœuvre." (Quoted by Chéradame, in *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1917.)

Treaties are to the Germans either "scraps of paper" or "tactical manœuvres."

But Germany could not be defeated in a plebiscite conducted according to the plan suggested by Harden, nor according to any plan thus far suggested,—except one, of which I shall speak presently. She hooted at the idea of "self-determination" throughout the nineteenth century; she still rejects it with regard to Posen, where sixty *per cent.* of the population is Polish, and in

North Schleswig (despite her agreement), where the Danes greatly predominate. But a few months ago we found her declaring that the Russian Baltic Provinces must be allowed the right of "self-determination," a right which had suddenly become a sacrosanct principle of international law so far as Russia is concerned, but not yet for Poland, North Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, Trent, Trieste and the Balkans! We found out a few months ago what Germany meant by "self-determination." The Russian army must be withdrawn, said General Hoffmann,—upheld by his superiors,—and the German army must remain while the provinces make their decision. That is "self-determination" according to the German code. All of this Russian territory is now under the German flag, and, unless the western allies rescue it, there it will remain, despite the fact that in Courland, the most German of the provinces, less than nine *per cent.* of the population is German.

Cohn, a Socialist Deputy, declared in the Reichstag on February 22, 1918: "It is not correct to say that the people of Russia's Baltic provinces are longing for German rule." (Quoted in American newspapers.) His statement proves, first, that the German government is trying to convince its people that Courland and the other provinces desire German rule, and, second, what we know perfectly, that this is a lie.

If Germany accepts the idea of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, we may be sure she will prepare for it in such a manner as to insure her success. She is already preparing for such an eventuality in Belgium and in Northern France. According to press dispatches in American newspapers of January 10, 1918, Chancellor Hertling admits that northern France must "have the right of self-determination on the question of restoration to France".!

The significance of this cynical devilry must be fully weighed by every man who proposes a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. French publicists recognize that a plebiscite in Lille today, or at any future time under German rule, would result in a victory for Germany. Lille, before the war as French as Rheims or Marseilles, is to have "the right of self-determination on the question of restoration to France"!

There is no doubt as to how Germany achieves such happy popularity in conquered territories.

The statement of a German official in Alsace-Lorraine to Stoddard Dewey, a few years before the war,—“he was not an evil man and liked to show that he could speak French,” says Dewey,—has already been quoted: “We have been absolute masters here forty years, and we are further from reconciling the natives to our rule than ever. I do not believe it will ever be done until all natives of Alsace and Lorraine are driven out and the country is settled anew with *bona fide* Germans.” (New York *Nation*, February 1, 1917, p. 127.)

German plans to rid Belgium (and presumably Northern France) of unwilling citizens of the empire have been quoted here. “There is to be no Alsace-Lorraine question in Belgium.”

The following is an Associated Press dispatch, dated Geneva, May 4, 1918, and published in American evening papers on that day: “The German military authorities are sending direct to the front lines all youths from the reserve depots in Alsace-Lorraine, according to an Alsatian chemist who has just arrived here from Mülhausen [Mulhouse]. The chemist already has lost four sons, the latest, aged 18, having been killed at Loere, in the Flanders battle.

“‘The Germans are employing their last reserves,’ said the Alsatian, ‘especially the soldiers from Alsace-

Lorraine. It is the German manner of settling the question of the two provinces. If a referendum is taken after the war, only a few Alsatian electors will be left.' "

"If a referendum is taken after the war, only a few Alsatian electors will be left." When Germany accepts the idea of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, she will prepare for it in a ghastly manner: by intimidation, espionage, terrorization, deportation, imprisonment, execution — all beyond the control of any possible umpire or group of umpires after the war, for the simple reason that these measures of preparation will have been brought to fruition during the war, *are now being* brought to fruition.

Americans who still dally with the Utopian notion of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine are encouraging Germany to prepare for it, and the persecution of the provinces will continue with increasing fury until all the world declares that, however few Alsations may be left after the war, those few are to become Frenchmen again without let or hindrance.

DIVISION OR NEUTRALIZATION

Various solutions of the problem aside from ownership by Germany or France have been suggested: autonomy within the German Empire, annexation to Switzerland, division between Germany and France, complete autonomy. The first two of these are clearly impossible.

Division between Germany and France is impossible, since, as all observers have agreed, whether the division is made from north to south or from east to west, the parts will contain equal portions of pro-French and pro-German sympathizers. If a division were made on the basis of language, the result would be no more happy, for, as we have seen, it is those parts of Alsace which

are most German linguistically that are most hostile to Germany, and in Lorraine Germany would not consent to such a partition, for it would leave the valuable iron mines on the French side of the boundary.

Before the war France and Alsace-Lorraine were ready to accept neutralization,— or even mere autonomy within the Empire,— but all that belongs to the past; war, which such a solution was to avoid, came through Germany's criminality, and there is no longer any reason for France or Alsace-Lorraine to put up with the unsatisfactory alternative of neutralization.

Many Alsatians thought, even before the war, that neutralization would mean economic ruin. (See Nysström, p. 56.) There can be no doubt that the financial and industrial situation of a little state lost in the heart of Europe would be precarious indeed.

What benefit could be derived from such a solution? Is it well to test the vitality of a possible future League of Nations from which we all hope so much by enhancing the danger of a Franco-German clash? For, were Alsace and Lorraine neutral, they would — much more than if they were a part of Germany or of France — be a battle-ground, economically, financially, socially; and, eventually, at the first opportunity, the flame of war would again burst forth.

Who would guarantee the neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine? Those powers which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium?

And, as we have seen, Alsace and Lorraine do not desire neutralization. They claim the right to return to France. Even under German rule for fifty years they have remained as French as they were in 1870. Almost every German who has ever discussed the condition of the provinces has admitted that, but for the Draconian regulations of a pitiless government, the prov-

inces would become within a decade, or a generation at most, more French than ever. Neutralization would result in a few years in the complete Gallicization of the country. One prominent Alsatian said: "If we are neutralized, we shall make war on France and she will have to annex us"—another of those jests which adumbrate the truth. A few years after neutralization the whole population would demand the privilege of re-entering the French nation. But the League would be forced to deny the request, for if the treaty did not stipulate that under no circumstances could the neutralization be revised, the possibility of a subsequent plebiscite would, in the uncertainty of future sovereignty, inevitably prove baneful. The door would be closed to great industrial undertakings which could bear fruit only after many years; and the pro-French and pro-German forces would be roused to that atrocious overt and covert internecine war which would make life a hideous dream.

There is one form of plebiscite which would minimize though it would not eliminate the dangers outlined above. Let Alsace and Lorraine be restored to France as they were given over to Germany in 1871; three years later let them elect representatives to the French Parliament, as they sent deputies to the Reichstag in 1874; and let their fate be decided by the first pronouncement of those men to whom they will have delivered their mandate.³

³ This is virtually the proposal of the Interallied Labor-Socialist Conference which sat in London, February 21-23, 1918, as later amplified by leaders. The declaration of war aims there ratified contains the following clauses in regard to Alsace-Lorraine: "The conference declares that the problem of Alsace and Lorraine is not one of territorial adjustment, but one of right, and thus an international problem, the solution of which is indispensable if peace is to be either just or lasting.

"The Treaty of Frankfort at one and the same time mutilated

THE RESTORATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE TO FRANCE
IS THE TEST OF VICTORY

The advocates of a plebiscite in the case of Alsace-Lorraine overlook the fact that this question has its roots in history and cannot be treated solely on the basis of present events. However much it would simplify the world's problems, it is superficial to brush aside the complications accumulated in a century or two of international strife and to heed exclusively the conditions obtaining at this moment.

Alsace and Lorraine never belonged to Germany. They became French piecemeal from 1552 on. They were happy and prosperous under French rule. In 1870 Germany set out on a war of conquest and seized them. The treaty of peace which terminated this war

France and violated the right of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to dispose of their own destinies, a right which they have repeatedly claimed.

"The new treaty of peace, in recognizing that Germany, by her declaration of war of 1914, has herself broken the Treaty of Frankfurt, will make null and void the gains of a brutal conquest and of the violence committed against the people.

"France, having secured this recognition, can properly agree to a fresh consultation of the population of Alsace and Lorraine as to its own desires.

"The treaty of peace will bear the signatures of every nation in the world. It will be guaranteed by the League of Nations. To this League of Nations France is prepared to remit with the freedom and sincerity of a popular vote, of which the details can be subsequently settled, the organization of such a consultation as shall settle forever, as a matter of right, the future destiny of Alsace and Lorraine, and as shall finally remove from the common life of all Europe a quarrel which has imposed so heavy a burden upon it." (*Current History*, April, 1918, p. 109. For Thomas's and Renaudel's significant articles published in the *London Daily Chronicle*, see *Current History*, March, 1918, p. 490; *Le Temps*, January 28, 29, 1918.) The French Socialists in demanding the return of Alsace-Lorraine have consistently rejected the idea of a plebiscite before the act; in 1915, by a vote of 2,736 to 76; in February, 1918, by 2,618 to 218.

is morally invalid: because the war was a war for conquest, a kind of war no longer accepted as legitimate in Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth century; because it was forced upon a prostrate foe who was menaced with utter destruction if he did not sign; because it was a violation of the elementary rights of man in that it disposed of men "like cattle"; because it has never at any moment since the day of signing been recognized as valid either by Alsace-Lorraine or by France; and, finally, because it was annulled by Germany's unprovoked declaration of war against France in 1914.

Alsace-Lorraine is the Belgium of 1871. Were Germany fully successful in the present war, she would annex Belgium. Suppose she were successful and did annex Belgium, and that fifty years from now the powers of light prevailed over the powers of darkness, what would be the feeling of those of us who might happen to be living then, were it declared that the liberation of Belgium must be sanctioned by a plebiscite?

Germany defied every principle of law and right in 1871. She stole Alsace-Lorraine with no pretence of a consultation of the popular will, and against the practically unanimous protest of the inhabitants. Is it just to give her fifty years in which to consolidate her theft, and then decide the fate of the country by a referendum — after the emigration and immigration and persecution of half a century?

Fifty years ago all Alsace and all Lorraine protested against the spoliation which tore them from France. For fifty years in the face of relentless persecution, all Alsace and all Lorraine, with negligible exceptions, have kept alive the protests of 1871 and 1874. Does this not constitute plebiscite enough? All Alsace and all Lorraine have for fifty years been demanding the annulment

of the Treaty of Frankfort. Is this not plebiscite enough? It was the wars against Denmark and Austria, and particularly the one against France in 1870, that created the German faith in force which "unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years," made militarism a cult in Germany and afforded the world the sordid spectacle of a nation of "philosophers" coldly calculating whether the annexation of a slice of territory or the exaction of a huge indemnity was the more profitable achievement! The Treaty of Frankfort debased the political sense of the Germans by obliterating in them every recognition of the rights of peoples to "self-determination."

A plebiscite now would sanction the annexation without plebiscite of fifty years ago, the most monstrous assertion of the right of might in the annals of modern history. When the question of annexation was forcibly raised in 1871, a plebiscite was, in all justice, mandatory; because Gallicization in the provinces had been the work of time, and had been completely effective. A plebiscite today is unthinkable because it would constitute a justification of an act of brigandage, and because Germanization in the provinces has been, not the work of time, but the result of immoral coercion, and has been egregiously unsuccessful and ineffective.

Let it not be forgotten that France and Alsace-Lorraine have not the slightest fear of the result of a plebiscite if it could be conducted without danger of fraud. But they refuse to consider such a solution of the problem, for to them the issue is a moral one, and they have steadily kept it on that high plane.

Alsace-Lorraine is a symbol. This war is being fought to discredit militarism, to prove that war for conquest is no longer to be counted in the normal march of

events, that nations, great and small, must be permitted to go their way unmolested.

The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France is the test of victory. It will right the most grievous wrong of the nineteenth century, and it will be an announcement to all future generations that militarism does not pay, that pacification by coercion, economic or other, has no justification, that governments derive their only just powers from the consent of the governed, that democracy, not autocracy, must be henceforth the order of the world.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

All the liberal countries of Europe unanimously demand that at the next treaty of peace Alsace and Lorraine be restored to France. Opinion in the United States is not so clearly defined, but more and more each day is it becoming evident to us here, too, that one of the most vital issues of the war is the question of the annulment of the Treaty of Frankfort.

President Wilson said to Congress on January 8, 1918: "All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all."

Our President has interpreted these words — if they need interpretation — in a telegram to Clément Rueff, Vice-President of the American Association of Alsatians and Lorrainers, published in the *New York Times*, February 14, 1918:

"May I not thank you very warmly for your generous message of January 9, and express the hope that the New Year may realize for Alsace-Lorraine the hopes deferred?"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Including only those titles which are abbreviated in the text.)

- D. BLUMENTHAL, *Alsace-Lorraine*, New York, 1917.
- G. DELAHACHE, *La Carte au Liséré vert*, 1911 (cited as Delahache).
- L'Exode, 1914 (cited as Delahache, "L'Exode").
- J. DUHEM, *La Question d'Alsace-Lorraine de 1871 à 1914*, 1917.
- F. ECCARD, *Biens et Intérêts français en Allemagne et en Alsace-Lorraine pendant la Guerre*, 1917.
- FLORENT-MATTER, *L'Alsace-Lorraine de nos Jours*, 1908.
- A. FRIBOURG, *Les Martyrs d'Alsace et de Lorraine*, 1916.
- C. D. HAZEN, *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule*, 1917.
- P. A. HELMER, *Alsace under German Rule*, in *The War of Democracy, The Allies' Statement*, 1917.
- E. HINZELIN, *L'Alsace sous le Joug*, 1913 (cited as Hinzelin).
- Cœurs d'Alsace et de Lorraine*, 1913 (cited as Hinzelin, "Cœurs" . . .).
- DAVID STARR JORDAN, *Alsace-Lorraine*, 1917.
- M. LEROY, *L'Alsace-Lorraine, Porte de France, Porte d'Allemagne*, 1914.
- H. MARINGER, *Force au Droit*, 1913.
- P. MATTER, *Bismarck et son Temps*, 1908.
- J. NOVICOW, *L'Alsace-Lorraine, Obstacle à l'Expansion allemande*, 1913.
- A. NYSTRÖM, *L'Alsace-Lorraine*, 1903 (translated from articles in the Stockholm *Aftonbladet*, August-October, 1902).
- R. REUSS, *L'Alsace au dix-septième Siècle, 1897-1898* (cited as Reuss).
- Histoire d'Alsace*, eleventh edition, 1916 (cited as Reuss, "Histoire").
- La France et L'Alsace à travers l'Histoire* (cited as Reuss, "La France et L'Alsace").

G. WEILL, *L'Alsace française de 1789 à 1870*, 1917.

ABBÉ E. WETTERLÉ, *Ce qu'était l'Alsace-Lorraine et ce qu'elle sera*, 1915 (cited as Wetterlé, "Ce qu'était . . .").

L'Alsace-Lorraine doit rester française, 1917 (cited as Wetterlé, "L'Alsace-Lorraine doit . . .").

W. WITTICH, *Deutsche und französische Kultur in Elsass, Strasbourg*, 1901 (cited from the French translation in *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, v. 10, 1902, pp. 777-824, 857-907).

INDEX

Alsace, success of France in assimilation of people of, 25; happiness and prosperity of, under French sway, 25-28; effect of French Revolution on winning of, for France, 28-30; generals from, in Napoleon's armies, 30; feeling in, toward Germany's taking over of country in 1870, 32-33; officers in French army since 1871 who were natives of, 95-96; hampering of industries of, by Germany, 139-147.

Alsace-Lorraine, basis of Germany's claims to, 1 ff.; claim of right of former possession, 1-6; claim based on natural boundary, 6; racial claim, 6-7; claim based on common language, 7-17; composition of population of, 13 n.; Germany's claims to, compared with her claims to Belgium and Switzerland, 17-18; real justifications of Germany's claims to, 18-23; as the pledge of unity of the German Empire, 23; right of might exercised by Germany toward, 24; assimilation of people of, by France, 25; declaration of deputies of, in National Assembly at Bordeaux (1871), 34-36; Protest of Bordeaux (March 1, 1871), 37; Protest in Reichstag (1874), 38-41; persecution of inhabitants by German rulers, 44 ff.; character of

constitutional rights granted to, by Germany, 44-47; acts of repression, 47; the teaching of French, 47-49; further repressive measures, 49-60; the question of autonomy, 61-76; statistics of emigration from, 61 n.; continued love of, for France, 77-78; antipathy of people and German Immigrants, 78-80; part played by women of, in resistance to Germanism, 82-85; threat of annexation to Prussia, 88; recognition of people of, as French, 90-92; conditions of country and people during the war, 93 ff.; treatment of soldiers from, in German army, 96-105; treatment of civilians during war, 105-110; condemnations of citizens, 110-114; German economic propaganda in, before the war, 126-127; comparative lack of prosperity of, under German rule, 127-128; increase in taxation in, 128-131; rate of increase of population in, compared with that of German states, 131-134; possibilities of industrial development under French direction, 143-147; economic persecution of, by German rulers, 147-153; Germanization of property in, before and after outbreak of war, 153-160; question of a plebiscite, 162-173; question of division or neutralization of,

- 173-175; restoration of, to France the test of victory in the war, 176-179; unanimous demand by liberal countries for restoration of, 180.
- Atrocities, German, in Alsace-Lorraine during the war, 116-118.
- Austria, rights of, to heritage of Holy Roman Empire, 3; relations between Germany and, 3 n.; disdain felt by, for rights of people to determine their own destinies, 33.
- Autonomy, question of, for Alsace-Lorraine, 61 ff.; purpose behind Alsatian request for, 63; Germany's refusal of, 63-64; insistence of demand for, in 1900, 69; reasons for Germany's refusal of demand for, 70-75; effect of the war upon Alsatian desire for, 93-95.
- Baudin, Pierre, cited on Gallicization of German Immigrants, 81.
- Bebel, August, protest of, against German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, 4 n.
- Beer, production of, in Alsace in 1872 and 1906, 140.
- Belgium, Germany's claim to, 17-18; General von Bissing's memorandum as to treatment of, 154-155; comparison of fate of Alsace-Lorraine with possible fate of, 177.
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, quoted on constitution of Alsace-Lorraine, 45; on failure of German methods in conquered provinces, 89.
- Bismarck, Prince Otto von, resuscitation of Holy Roman Empire by, 3-4; quoted on Germany's reasons for taking Alsace-Lorraine, 19-20; de-termination of, to crush France, 20; policy of blood and iron followed by, in treatment of Alsace-Lorraine, 50-54; dissuaded from annexing conquered provinces to Prussia by fear of Alsatian democratic instinct, 70.
- Bissing, General von, references by, to Germanization of property in conquered countries, 154-155.
- Blood-and-iron policy used by German rulers of Alsace-Lorraine, 50-54.
- Blumenthal, Daniel, Mayor of Colmar, 16.
- Briey basin, iron production in the, 120; Germany's intention to hold, 121-124.
- Bryce, James, quoted on Holy Roman Empire, 3; on ratification of American Constitution, 168-169.
- Budget of Alsace-Lorraine (1870-1914), 128-131.
- Bulach, Zorn von, chief minister of Alsace-Lorraine, 60; Alsatian love for France admitted by, 78.
- Burger, Alsatian lawyer, story of, 109.
- Canals, sacrifice of projects for, in Alsace-Lorraine, 148-149.
- Caprivi, attitude of, toward Alsace-Lorraine, 52.
- Charles of Austria, Emperor, letter of, to President Poincaré (1917), 3 n.
- Children of Alsace-Lorraine, punishment of, by Germans during the war, 113.
- Clergy of Alsace-Lorraine, severe treatment of, during the war, 111-112.
- Colmar, German element in population of, but pro-French

- feeling in, 15; Daniel Blumenthal Mayor of, 16; rate of increase in population of, 132.
- Colonization of Alsace-Lorraine by Germans, since opening of war, 158-160.
- Condorcet, Constitution drafted by, in 1791, 36 n.
- Constitution of 1911, granting of, to Alsace-Lorraine, 44-45; no relief brought by, 57.
- Cotton industry, lack of progress in, in Alsace, 151.
- Coulanges, Fustel de, quoted, 29.
- Crispi, Bismarck's reply to, concerning neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine, 21.
- De Lisle, Rouget, 29.
- Democratic principles, natural to people of Alsace-Lorraine, 70; received with sympathy from Germany, in form of Social-Democracy, 91-92.
- Deportations enforced in Alsace during the war, 116-118.
- Deschanel, Paul, cited on deportations of Alsatians and Lorrainers, 116 n.
- Division of Alsace-Lorraine between Germany and France, impossibility of, 173-174.
- Economic necessity as a justification of Germany's claims to Alsace-Lorraine, 21-22.
- Economic question in annexation, discussion of, 119-161.
- Emigration of Alsatians, 61-62.
- England, protection of France against Germany by, 20; contrasted with France in ability to assimilate alien peoples, 24-25.
- Erckmann - Chatrian, translations of works of, into Alsatian dialect, 15 n.
- Fassbender, Martin, on assimilation of Alsatians by France, 27-28; denunciation of German methods in Alsace by, 86-87.
- Foerster, Professor, quoted on failure of Germanization of Alsace, 85 n.
- Foreign Legion, French, Alsatians in, 96.
- Former possession as a basis for German claims to Alsace-Lorraine, 1-6.
- Forstner, Lieutenant von, officer responsible for Zabern Affair, 58-59.
- France, basis of claims of, to Alsace-Lorraine, 1-2; Bismarck's determination to dismember and crush, 19-21; success of, in rendering Alsace happy and prosperous, 25-28; acceptance by, of idea of autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine, 64-67; continued love for, of Alsatians and Lorrainers, 77-78; Alsatians as officers in army of, 95-96; industrial interest of, in restoration of her lost provinces, 125-126; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to, the demand of all liberal countries of Europe, 180.
- Franzos, Karl, quoted on use of French language by Alsatians, 9-10.
- Frederick the Great, quotation from, 18.
- French language, the speech of leading classes in Alsace, 9-12; restrictions on teaching of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 47-49; continued proscription of use of, in conquered provinces,

- 56-57; use of, forbidden in Lorraine during the war, 110.
 French Revolution, consolidation of the nation by, 28-30.
- Gallicization of German Immigrants in Alsace-Lorraine, 81-82.
- Generals, distinguished Alsatian, 30.
- Germanization, failure of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 77-92; of property in Alsace-Lorraine, 153-160.
- Germany, basis of claims of, to Alsace-Lorraine, 1; claims of, to Belgium and Switzerland, 17-18; real justifications of claims of, to Alsace-Lorraine, 18-21; Alsace-Lorraine as the pledge of unity of the Empire, 22-23; the right of might exercised by, 24; inability of, to assimilate foreign populations, 24; view held in, of Alsatians as Germans in captivity, 30-31; disdain by, of rights of people to determine their own destinies, 33; policy of persecution practised by, toward Alsace-Lorraine, 44-60; refusal by, of autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine, 63-64; reasons for refusal of, to grant autonomy, 70-75; failure of methods of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 77-92; treatment of Alsatian soldiers by, during the war, 96-105; treatment of civilians by, 105-110; dependence of, on Lorraine iron, 119-120; occupation of and plan to hold the Briey basin, 120-124; willingness of people of, to follow their leaders in Pan-German plans, 122; how industrial prosperity of, is at stake, 124-126; economic propaganda of, in Alsace before the war, 126-127; increase in population in Alsace-Lorraine compared with that of states and cities of, 131-133; refusal by, to consider Alsace-Lorraine question at peace conferences, 162; preparations by, for a plebiscite concerning Alsace-Lorraine question, 169-173.
- Giffen, Sir Robert, on the money profits to Germany of war of 1870, 22.
- Gladstone, W. E., attitude of, toward proposed dismemberment of France by Germany, 20 n.
- Graffenstaden Affair, the, 57, 152-153.
- Granville, Lord, protest of, to Bismarck, against dismemberment of France, 20 n.
- Hansi, Alsatian artist, language used by, 13-14; imprisonment of, following publication of *My Village*, 60.
- Hapsburgs, rule of, over Holy Roman Empire, 3.
- Harden, Maximilian, quoted on German claim to Alsace-Lorraine, 4; on the war of 1870 as a profitable achievement for Germany, 22; proposal of, concerning plebiscite on Alsace-Lorraine question, 169-170.
- Helmer, Strasbourg lawyer, quoted, 65-66.
- Hertzog, chief minister, attitude of, toward people of Alsace-Lorraine, 49.
- Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Prince von, Governor of Alsace-Lorraine, 50.
- Holy Roman Empire, claim of

- King of Prussia to heritage of, 3-4; Bismarck's seizure of crown of, for William I, 4.
- Ichtersheim, von, tribute to French rule in Alsace by, 26.
- Immigrants into Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, 47; conduct of, 54-55; antipathy of Alsatians and, 78-80; Gallicization of, 81-82; as an obstacle to a plebiscite, 166-167.
- Insurance companies, expulsion of French, from Alsace-Lorraine, 65 n.
- Iron, production of, in Lorraine, 22, 119; in the Briey basin, 120; Germanization of the industry, 154.
- Jordan, David Starr, quoted on use of French language in Mülhausen, 11 n.; quoted on instruction in French in Metz, 48-49; letter of Professor Förster to, quoted, 127 n.
- Judges, sentences imposed on Alsatians and Lorrainers by German, 116.
- Kellermann, General, an Alsatian, 30.
- Kléber, General, an Alsatian, 30.
- Kultur, regarded by Alsatians as something alien, 12; reign of pioneers of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 54-55; antagonism to, of young Alsatians educated in German universities, 69 n.
- La Marseillaise, writing of, 29.
- Language, as a basis for German claim to Alsace-Lorraine, 7-17. *See also* French language.
- Liebknecht, protest of, against German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, 4 n.
- Lorraine, German element in population of, 13 n.; acquisition of iron land in, as a profitable investment by Germany, 22; sacrifice of industrial interests of, to German districts, 135-139.
- Manteuffel, Governor of Alsace-Lorraine, 49-50.
- Marx, Karl, attitude of, in war of 1870, 42 n.
- Metz, reasons for Germany's desire for, 19; Romanic origin and development of name, 19 n.; rate of increase in population of, 131; sacrifice of industrial interests of, by Germany, 135-138.
- Military necessity as a justification of Germany's claims to Alsace-Lorraine, 18-21.
- Moselle, German neglect of canalization of, 148-149.
- Mulhouse, admittance of, into French Republic, 2 n.; rate of increase in population of, 132; sacrifice of industrial interests of, to Prussian and Saxon cities, 141-143.
- Natural boundary as a basis of German claim to Alsace-Lorraine, 6.
- Naumann of Heilbronn, quoted, 30.
- Neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine, impossibility of, 174-175.
- Newspapers, suppression of, 47.
- Nippold, Otfried, quoted on Germany's failure in Alsace-Lorraine, 87 n.
- Novicow, Russian observer, quoted on failure of attempts at Germanization, 85 n.

- Oil produced in Alsace, 119;
Germanization of the industry, 154.
- Pan-German schemes, willingness of whole German people to follow, 122.
- Passports, introduction of system of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 50, 52.
- Philippi, Pastor Wilhelm, quoted on Tirpitz and Jesus, 124.
- Plebiscite, difficulties in way of, as regards Alsace-Lorraine, 162-169; Germany's preparation for a, 169-173.
- Plebiscites, disdain of, by Germany and Austria, 33.
- Population, rate of increase of, in Alsace-Lorraine, compared with German states, 131-134.
- Possession, Germany's claims to Alsace-Lorraine based on former, 1-6.
- Potash deposits in Upper Alsace, 119; limitation of exploitation of Alsatian, 147-148; German ownership of concessions, 154.
- Preiss, deputy from Colmar, leader of autonomists in Reichstag, 68, 76; quoted on resistance of conquered provinces to Germanization, 85 n.; death of, in German prison, 94. .
- Protest, of Bordeaux (March 1, 1871), 37-38; in Reichstag (February 18, 1874), 38-41.
- Prussia, threatened annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to, 88.
- Race, German claim to Alsace-Lorraine based on, 6-7.
- Railroads, German sacrifice of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 150.
- Refractory Cousin*, play by Stosskopf, 15 n.
- Reichstag, Protest of deputies from Alsace-Lorraine in (1874), 38-41; protests of Socialists in, against Germany's treatment of Alsatians, 114-116.
- Reuss, Rodolphe, quoted to show that Alsatians are French, 90-91.
- Revenge, passing of French determination to seek, 64.
- Rhine, the natural boundary between Alsace and Germany, 6; the natural zone of defence of German Empire, 21; necessity of re-establishing, as a boundary, 21; Strasbourg deprived of her share of traffic of, 134-135.
- Russia, protection of France against Germany by, 20.
- Sarre, German neglect of canalization of the, 148.
- Schmettau, Baron, on loyalty of Alsatians to France, 27.
- Schumacher, Professor, quoted on iron fields of Briey basin, 121.
- Self-determination of nations, a hobby of Napoleon III, 33 n.
- Sipp, Abbé, stand taken against Germany by, 53.
- Slag, importation of, from Lorraine by America, 119 n.
- Socialists, protest of German, against seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, 4 n., 41 n.; appearance of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 63; encouragement of, by German authorities, 63 n.; success of theories of, among Alsatians, 91; protests by, in Reichstag against Germany's treatment of Alsatians during war, 114-116; German Majority Socialists in favour of retaining Alsace-Lorraine, 123; at-

- titude of Majority and Minority, concerning Alsace-Lorraine question, 163.
 Societies, suppression of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 51, 57.
 Society for Protection against the Foreign Legion, 96.
 Spaha, Martin, quoted on Alsatian soldiers in German army, 99-100.
 Speisser, Pan-Germanist pastor, quoted, 71-72.
 Stehelin, Alsatian propagandist for Germany, quoted, 126-127, 143.
 Stosakopf, play *D'r Herr Meire* by, 14 n.; other plays by, 15 n.
 Strasbourg, date of becoming French, 27; action of citizens, at time of French Revolution, 28-29; "La Marseillaise" written by Rouget de Lisle at, 29; address by students of University of, to German students, and reply, 30-31; siege of, by German army, 31-32; rate of increase in population of, 131; actual increase of population in, compared with what should have been expected, 134-135; statue of William I in, 151.
 Switzerland, Germany's claim to, 17-18.
 Taxation, increase in, in Alsace-Lorraine, 128-131.
 Teutsch, Edouard, speech of, in Reichstag (1874), 38-41.
 Textile industry, decrease in, in Alsace, 141-143.
 Tirpitz, compared with Jesus, 124.
 Treitschke, pamphlet "What do we demand of France?" by, 32-33.
 Unity of German Empire, Alsace-Lorraine as a pledge of, 22-23.
 Vosges Mountains, the natural boundary between Alsace and France, 6; the natural zone of offence of German Empire, 21; veto by Germany of project for tunnel through, 150.
 Water ways, German neglect of, in Alsace-Lorraine, 148-149.
 Wedel, Governor of Alsace-Lorraine, 60.
 Werder, German general at siege of Strasbourg, 32 n.
 Westphalia, Treaties of (1648), 17.
 Wetterlé, Abbé, attitude as a leader of the autonomists, 93; story of Colmar soldier by, 102-103.
 William I of Germany, claim of, to heritage of Holy Roman Empire, 3-4; crowning of, at Versailles, 22; unveiling of statue of, in Strasbourg, 57; improper diversion of fund to building of Strasbourg statue of, 151.
 William II of Germany, no relief brought to Alsace-Lorraine by accession of, 52; angry address of, in Strasbourg (1912), 88.
 Wilson, Woodrow, quoted, 39 n.
 Wine, reduction in production of, in Alsace, 139.
 Wittich, W., quoted on French leanings in Alsace, 12; on culture of Alsace as French and not German, 17; on assimilation of people of Alsace by France, 25; conclusion of, that Alsatians are French, 90; on success of Social-Dem-

- ocratic theories among Alsations, 91.
- Wolf, George, Alsatian renegade, quoted, 73 n.
- Women, part played by Alsatian, in resistance to Germanism, 82-85.
- Zabern, originally named "Saverne," 19 n.
- Zabern Affair, the, 58-60; effect of, on antipathy of Alsations and German Immigrants, 80.
- Ziegler, Theobald, quoted on French rights to Alsace-Lorraine, 7-8; recognition of Alsations and Lorrainers as French by, 90.
- Zislin, Alsatian artist, language spoken by, 13-14; cartoons by, 14 n.
- Zollverein, effects on economic advance of Alsace-Lorraine of inclusion in, 143-147.

JUN 1 1920

THE following pages contain advertisements of a few
of the Macmillan books on kindred subjects

The History of Europe from 1862 to 1914

FROM THE ACCESSION OF BISMARCK TO THE
OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR

BY LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT, PH.D.
(Yale), Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A., Professor of English
and History, U. S. Military Academy,
and

ALEXANDER WHEELER CHILTON
Captain of Infantry, U. S. A., Assistant Professor of
History, U. S. Military Academy

With maps, 8°, \$2.60

"Lieut.-Col. Holt and Captain Chilton have written a very useful volume, one that no one can afford to ignore who wishes to understand clearly the causes and meaning of the great war, and they have done it in a manner so admirable and have invested their survey of events with so much interest that their successive chapters are like the unfolding of a mighty panorama."—*New York Times*.

"The plan of the volume is admirable. The mass of historical data is presented clearly and with fine coördination. Military campaigns are not given undue space, that side of the course being left to other departments, but excellent condensed accounts of the successive European wars are included. The chief stress is laid upon the elucidation of international relations and considerable attention is paid to internal affairs in each of the great powers."—*Argonaut*.

"Indeed, unless it be John Fiske's 'The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War,' no book for the popular presentation of military history is more clear, concise, and easily comprehended. . . . Col. Holt and Capt. Chilton have produced a most useful and timely volume. An especial feature of the work, and one that was least to be expected, is its literary quality. It reads like a volume by John Fiske or James Ford Rhodes, and higher praise than that cannot be given to historical writing."—*Post Intelligencer*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-68 Fifth Avenue New York